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Foreword 
In contrast to its situation during the "lost decade", in the 1990s the 
Latin American and Caribbean region regained its access to international 
capital markets. Its return to these markets, in combination with a 
commitment to achieving basic macroeconomic equilibria, was 
manifested in smaller fiscal deficits and lower inflation, but the region has 
recovered only part of the ground it had lost in terms of its pace of 
economic growth. Thus, the region's economies have not been growing 
fast enough to strengthen their labour markets or to reduce poverty 
significantly. 
This situation is reflected in the volatility exhibited by sources of 
external finance other than foreign direct investment and official credit. 
That volatility, in its turn, is not solely a consequence of the instability 
that is so typical of financial markets; it is also being exacerbated by the 
international financial system's serious problems of governance. This state 
of affairs also attests to the Latin American and Caribbean countries' 
vulnerability to the financial cycles generated by procyclical 
macroeconomic policies and to their inability to raise their savings and 
investment rates enough to achieve higher rates of economic growth. 
Finally, it is also a reflection of shortcomings in the region's financial 
development process and the weakness of the countries' mechanisms for 
regulating and supervising their national financial systems, which has 
opened the way for unusually frequent financial crises in those systems. 
In order to turn this situation around, in this study ECLAC has 
proposed a strategy for attaining growth with stability based on three 
10 ECLAC 
lines of action: strengthening the international financial system's ability to 
prevent and manage crises and the countries' ability to design more 
preventive macroeconomic policies to back it up; picking up the pace of 
export development and improving access to international financial 
markets; and boosting national savings rates while furthering the 
countries' financial development so that national resources can be 
mobilized and channeled into investment. 
The original version of this study was prepared by ECLAC as a 
contribution to the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Consultation 
on Financing for Development, which took place in Bogota, Colombia, in 
November 2000. The final version being presented here constitutes the 
Commission's contribution to the International Conference on the 
Financing of Development to be held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 
2002. Both in its organization of the Regional Consultation and in the 
preparation of this document, ECLAC received generous support from 
the Inter-American Development Bank. 
 
José Antonio Ocampo 
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Summary 
During the 1990s, Latin America and the Caribbean succeeded in 
regaining access to external financing. This paved the way for major 
advances in macroeconomic management, the reduction of inflation and 
the resumption of economic growth. With few exceptions, however, the 
countries of the region failed to achieve the savings and investment rates 
required to fuel rapid growth in production. The 3.3% mean annual 
growth rate recorded for 1990-2000 not only falls short of the average for 
the three decades prior to the debt crisis —5.5%— but it also well below 
the 6% rate that ECLAC has estimated as the minimum rate necessary to 
achieve ambitious goals of economic and social development and, in 
particular, poverty reduction. 
International capital flows have also been displaying two 
disturbing characteristics. The first has been the marked instability of 
such flows, with the sole exception of foreign direct investment. This, in 
conjunction with national policies that tend to accentuate external 
financing cycles rather than attenuating them, has often been reflected in 
a close correlation between capital flows and business cycles in the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. The second is that many of these 
countries, especially the least developed ones, have been sidelined from 
the most dynamic sorts of private capital flows. 
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National efforts 
These developments pose a major challenge. Meeting that challenge 
will call for a concerted effort on the part of the countries of the region, 
but the international environment will also have to be a favourable one if 
those efforts are to bear fruit. In order to grow at an annual rate of around 
6%, the countries of the region will need to reach investment rates of from 
4 to 6 points higher than the averages recorded for the 1990s. And in 
order to avoid driving up the countries' levels of external vulnerability, 
this increase in investment will have to be financed primarily by a 
concomitant expansion of domestic saving and must be coupled with the 
development of national financial markets, since this is the best way to 
ensure that savings will be channeled into productive investment. 
This study underscores how important a role the reinvestment of 
private firms' earnings and public-sector saving can play in helping to 
boost national savings rates. It also points out that households and 
individuals can make a meaningful contribution to this effort, especially 
through special-purpose saving (e.g., for retirement, to buy a house or to 
cover educational expenses). 
The dynamic development of financial systems and capital markets 
calls for reliable ground rules and strong regulatory schemes that will 
insure the systems' stability and provide proper protection for savers. The 
adoption of international regulatory and supervisory standards for their 
financial systems is a challenge that the countries have addressed, but a 
great deal remains to be done in this respect. The promotion of new 
agents and instruments to help create missing financial- and capital-
market segments or to strengthen underdeveloped ones is another vital 
part of this task. These include functional secondary markets; investment, 
risk-capital and guarantee funds; and credit insurance or hedging 
instruments. One key element in developing these new mechanisms is a 
suitable regulatory system for financial governance which provides for 
standards regarding transparency and full, timely and accurate reporting 
that will protect the rights of savers. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, where long-term financing is 
still in short supply and where access to financial resources is segmented, 
the public-sector development banking system can play an important role 
in channeling resources to activities for which the private market offers 
sub-optimum amounts of resources or sub-optimum financing terms. 
Such activities include micro- and small-scale enterprises in both rural 
and urban areas, low-income housing, sustainable development, retooling 
and technological innovation. In order for this effort to be successful, 
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however, the fiscal costs of subsidies provided via development banks 
have to be as transparent as possible and the prompt payment of 
obligations must be guaranteed, with private institutions preferably being 
used as the first-tier agents for channeling these resources. 
Export capacity will have to be strengthened if the region is to 
secure sufficient external resources and reduce its external vulnerability. 
The countries therefore need to work to create a pro-export environment 
by promoting competitive exchange rates and adopting active policies for 
boosting exports and engendering systemic competitiveness based on 
high-quality infrastructure, ambitious technological-development and 
labour-training policies, and the development of dynamic production 
chains. If this undertaking is to be successful, access to external markets 
for goods and services will also have to be secured on more favourable 
terms than at present. 
Higher investment and savings rates, financial development and 
export growth should be combined with national efforts to reduce the 
excessive vulnerability of the region's economies to external financing 
cycles. This indicates that financial booms should be managed on the 
basis of explicitly prudential criteria, since economic crises are incubated 
during periods marked by excessive capital inflows, which gradually 
undermine the recipient countries' macroeconomic fundamentals. 
This and previous ECLAC studies therefore suggest that what is 
needed in order to address this situation is a policy that melds general 
public-revenue stabilization funds; preventive monetary and credit 
policies during economic booms; the prudential regulation of the capital 
account based, wherever possible, on price instruments; strong prudential 
regulation and supervision of financial systems that are actively managed 
during economic booms in order to forestall a build-up of excessive levels 
of risk; and a "liability policy" designed to upgrade the maturity profiles 
of public and private external and domestic debt. In addition, even while 
bearing in mind that there is no such thing as an optimum exchange-rate 
regime for all countries under all circumstances, many quarters have 
drawn attention to the strengths of flexible managed exchange-rate 
systems, which seek to reconcile the conflicting demands for stability and 
flexibility. 
The international and regional context 
The external environment should provide three key elements. The 
first is access for developing countries to export markets. The second is a 
new international financial architecture which, thanks to improved global 
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governance, will make capital flows more stable. The third is the 
necessary machinery to provide the less developed countries with 
sufficient amounts of external resources on appropriate terms and 
conditions.  
The necessary counterpart for the countries' export drive is access 
to external markets. Industrialized countries continue to maintain high 
levels of protection in respect of agricultural products and "sensitive" 
manufactures exported by developing countries. They also frequently 
make protectionist use of contingency measures and employ a range of 
technical standards that act as obstacles to developing countries' exports. 
Furthermore, small island countries that have seen a significant erosion of 
their trade preferences need adequate resources and technical support to 
modernize and diversify their export base.  
The extreme instability of today's international financial system is 
associated with the marked asymmetry existing between the rapid 
development of world financial markets and the absence of suitable forms 
of macroeconomic and financial governance at the world level. If 
governance is to be improved, the major developed countries will have to 
coordinate their macroeconomic policies more closely with a view to 
ensuring greater macroeconomic stability at the global level, and all 
countries will have to accede to the use of macroeconomic and prudential 
surveillance mechanisms. International financial stability also requires a 
suitable institutional framework at the global level. This framework will 
need to include basic minimum standards for prudential regulation and 
supervision of the financial system and for the provision of the 
information that financial markets need in order to function properly. 
Appropriate crisis-management institutions will also be required. 
There are two types of crisis-management institutions. First of all, a 
greater capacity to provide exceptional financing during crises has to be 
created, and suitable mechanisms need to be developed for providing 
liquidity to countries with sounds macroeconomic fundamentals when 
they are threatened by contagion. These two objectives can only be 
achieved if the International Monetary Fund has its own resources at its 
command, which it can secure through temporary issues of special 
drawing rights (SDRs). Of course, it should also be remembered that an 
increased use of SDRs within the international financial system is an end 
in itself which has long been advocated by developing countries. In order 
to forestall any problems of "moral hazard", however, these exceptional 
financing mechanisms should go hand in hand with the development of 
means of ensuring that private agents will be involved in resolving crises 
when they arise. While upholding the principle of voluntary negotiations 
between creditors and borrowers, international rules need to be drawn up 
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that will ensure the participation of all the interested parties in these types 
of negotiations and, through the development of suitable multilateral 
arbitration mechanisms, prevent them from being prolonged unduly. 
It should be emphasized that schemes for ensuring creditors' 
involvement in resolving crises when they occur should be seen as a 
complementary measure rather than a substitute for exceptional 
financing, especially when the causes of the countries' problems are 
strictly temporary in nature (i.e., illiquidity) and are associated with 
problems of contagion. In fact, a sub-optimal combination of these two 
types of mechanisms which makes it necessary to rollover debts 
regardless of the circumstances as a condition for access to emergency 
financing may actually deepen a crisis rather than resolving it and, in the 
long run, will result in an insufficient amount of resources being 
channeled to developing countries.  
In order to ensure access to sufficient resources, mechanisms need 
to be developed that will enable all countries to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and private credit flows. FDI is fairly evenly distributed 
in the region, although its linkages with the national host economies 
should be a subject of priority concern in future. Private credit is much 
more concentrated, and guarantees or cofinancing arrangements should 
therefore be made with multilateral development banks to open up these 
markets for countries that are not yet receiving such flows. This type of 
support is now starting to be provided in new areas of private 
investment, especially infrastructure. 
Multilateral banks have made a highly valuable contribution to 
financing for the region and will no doubt continue to be of key 
importance in the future. First of all, they play a vital role in marshalling 
resources for the less developed countries. Furthermore, the diversified 
profile of these institutions' loan portfolios for all the countries bears 
witness to the importance they place on high-priority social initiatives 
such as social development projects, sustainable development 
programmes and State reforms and on channeling resources to micro- and 
small-scale enterprises. The terms and conditions of the financing they 
provide is also more advantageous in terms of both maturities and cost 
than private financing, even for the region's relatively higher-income 
countries, which suggests that private markets tend to overestimate risk, 
especially (but not only) during crisis periods. Finally, they supply 
financing countercyclically, which helps to softer external shocks, and are 
the only source of long-term financing during crises. Their support has 
been crucial, even for the relatively higher-income countries, and has 
played a key role in restoring confidence in the countries concerned. 
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Official development assistance (ODA) continues to be an essential 
component of financing for the less developed countries. Bringing ODA 
up to the target level (0.7% of the industrialized countries' GDP) set under 
the aegis of the United Nations and making more transparent and 
efficient use of these funds should be priorities for future action. These 
resources should be supplemented with funds that can be used to ensure 
an adequate supply of global public goods or public goods having 
significant externalities, such as peace, sustainable development and the 
effort to combat the world drug problem. Steps should also be taken to 
expedite the implementation of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) debt relief initiative, for which four of the region's countries may 
be eligible, and to ensure sufficient HIPC funding. This last point is 
essential in order to make sure that a disproportionate share of the cost of 
this initiative is not ultimately borne by other developing countries, either 
directly or through higher interest-rate spreads and reduced availability 
of resources for technical cooperation from multilateral development 
banks. 
As work begins on building this global structure, three imperatives 
must be borne in mind. The first is the need for developing countries to be 
fully involved in the corresponding institutions. The second is the 
importance of maintaining countries' autonomy in implementing the 
policies they feel are most appropriate for their development. The third is 
the need —given the countries' varying levels of institutional 
development— for international rules and standards to take their 
differing absorption capacities into account. 
Regional institutions play a decisive role in generating a positive 
interaction between national efforts and suitable international 
environment. These institutions include trade integration agreements, 
which are a key element in the diversification of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries' export bases; the extensive network formed by the 
Inter-American Development Bank and subregional development banks, 
which are the main source of multilateral financing for the region; the 
Latin American Reserve Fund, an almost unique institution in the 
developing world which has done an outstanding job within the Andean 
Community in recent decades and is now taking steps to expand its 
membership; and the new macroeconomic coordination mechanisms that 
are currently being developed as part of various integration processes. 
The region should strive to consolidate all these processes and 
institutions, as well as to deepen regional cooperation in general. Solid 
regional institutions do not run counter to globalization. On the contrary, 
they help us build a stronger, more balanced global structure.
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Resumen 
A lo largo de los años noventa, América Latina y el Caribe 
obtuvieron un renovado acceso al financiamiento externo, lo que facilitó 
avances importantes en materia de gestión macroeconómica, reducción de 
la inflación y recuperación del crecimiento económico. Sin embargo, con 
contadas excepciones, los países de la región no alcanzaron niveles de 
ahorro e inversión que permitieran lograr altas tasas de expansión de la 
producción. El ritmo promedio de crecimiento entre 1990 y 2000, del 3.3% 
por año, no es sólo inferior al registro alcanzado en las tres décadas 
anteriores a la crisis de la deuda –5.5% anual–, sino también al 6% que la 
CEPAL ha señalado como necesario para alcanzar metas ambiciosas en 
materia de desarrollo económico y social, y en especial de reducción de la 
pobreza. 
Los flujos internacionales de capital han mostrado, a su vez, dos 
características preocupantes. La primera ha sido su fuerte inestabilidad, 
de la que sólo se exceptúan los flujos de inversión extranjera directa. Ello, 
unido a políticas nacionales que muchas veces acentúan en vez de atenuar 
los ciclos del financiamiento externo, ha tendido a reflejarse en una alta 
correlación entre los flujos de capitales y el ciclo económico de nuestros 
países. La segunda es la marginación de un grupo importante de países, 
especialmente los de menor desarrollo relativo, de las corrientes más 
dinámicas de recursos de origen privado. 
18 ECLAC 
Los esfuerzos nacionales 
Estos hechos crean grandes desafíos, que para ser superados exigen 
esfuerzos importantes por parte de los países de la región, pero también 
un contexto internacional favorable para que fructifiquen. Para crecer en 
torno al 6% por año, es necesario lograr tasas de inversión que superen 
entre cuatro y seis puntos los niveles promedio de los años noventa. Para 
evitar elevar excesivamente los niveles de vulnerabilidad externa, el 
financiamiento de la inversión adicional debe provenir esencialmente de 
una expansión concomitante del ahorro nacional y debe estar 
acompañado de un adecuado desarrollo financiero nacional, que 
garantice la mejor forma de transferir ese ahorro hacia la inversión 
productiva. 
Este documento destaca el papel decisivo de la reinversión de las 
utilidades de las empresas privadas y del ahorro público en el esfuerzo 
por elevar los niveles de ahorro nacional. Señala igualmente que los 
hogares y las personas pueden contribuir a este objetivo, especialmente a 
través del ahorro con fines específicos, tal como aquel que se realiza para 
fines pensionales, de adquisición de vivienda o de educación. 
El desarrollo dinámico del sistema financiero y el mercado de 
capitales exige, por su parte, reglas de juego estables y marcos 
regulatorios fuertes, que garanticen la estabilidad de los sistemas y la 
adecuada protección de los ahorradores. En particular, la adopción de 
estándares internacionales de regulación y supervisión financiera es un 
desafío que la región ha abordado, pero donde queda mucho por hacer. 
La promoción de nuevos agentes e instrumentos, que ayuden a crear 
segmentos inexistentes o complementar aquellos insuficientemente 
desarrollados en el mercado financiero y de capitales, es también parte 
esencial de esta tarea. Entre ellos se encuentran buenos mercados 
secundarios; fondos de inversión, de capital de riesgo y de garantía; 
seguros de créditos u otros instrumentos de cobertura de riesgos. Uno de 
los elementos esenciales para desarrollar estos nuevos mecanismos es una 
regulación apropiada sobre gobernabilidad financiera, que garantice los 
derechos de los ahorradores mediante normas sobre transparencia y 
entrega oportuna de información completa y confiable. 
En América Latina y el Caribe, donde aún escasea el financiamiento 
de largo plazo y el acceso a los recursos financieros es segmentado, la 
banca pública de desarrollo puede desempeñar un papel importante, 
canalizando recursos hacia actividades a las cuales el mercado privado 
ofrece recursos en cantidades o condiciones subóptimas. Entre estas 
actividades cabe mencionar el financiamiento de la micro y pequeña 
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empresa rural y urbana, de la vivienda social, del desarrollo sostenible, y 
de los procesos de reconversión productiva e innovación tecnológica. Sin 
embargo, para que este esfuerzo fructifique, es necesario maximizar la 
transparencia de los costos fiscales de los subsidios que se asignen a 
través de la banca de desarrollo y garantizar el pago oportuno de las 
obligaciones, utilizando preferiblemente a instituciones privadas como 
agentes de primer piso para la canalización de los recursos 
correspondientes.  
El fortalecimiento de la capacidad exportadora es indispensable 
para lograr un adecuado nivel de recursos externos y reducir la 
vulnerabilidad externa. Es necesario, por lo tanto, avanzar en la creación 
de un ambiente proexportador, basado en tipos de cambio competitivos, 
políticas de apoyo activo a las exportaciones y creación de condiciones de 
competitividad sistémica, mediante una infraestructura de calidad, 
políticas ambiciosas de desarrollo tecnológico y capacitación laboral y el 
desarrollo de cadenas productivas dinámicas. Para que este esfuerzo dé 
resultados satisfactorios, es necesario, como veremos, mejorar las 
condiciones de acceso a los mercados externos de bienes y servicios.  
La elevación de los niveles de inversión y ahorro, el desarrollo 
financiero y la expansión exportadora deben combinarse a nivel nacional 
con esfuerzos orientados a reducir la excesiva vulnerabilidad de las 
economías de la región frente a los ciclos de financiamiento externo. Esto 
implica, en particular, que los auges de financiamiento deben ser 
administrados con claros criterios prudenciales, ya que las crisis 
económicas se gestan durante los períodos de entrada excesiva de 
capitales, que minan gradualmente los fundamentos macroeconómicos de 
los países receptores. 
Éste y documentos anteriores de la CEPAL sugieren para ello una 
política que combine el uso de fondos de estabilización de ingresos 
públicos de carácter general; una política monetaria y crediticia 
preventiva durante los auges; una regulación prudencial de la cuenta de 
capitales, basada preferiblemente en instrumentos de precios; una fuerte 
regulación y supervisión prudencial de los sistemas financieros, manejada 
activamente durante los auges para evitar la acumulación de riesgos 
excesivos, y una “política de pasivos” orientada a mejorar los perfiles 
temporales de la deuda pública y privada, tanto interna como externa. Por 
otra parte, aunque se reconoce que no hay un régimen cambiario óptimo 
para todos los países en todas las circunstancias, se defienden las virtudes 
de los regímenes de flexibilidad administrada del tipo de cambio, que 
buscan conciliar las demandas opuestas sobre estabilidad y flexibilidad 
que enfrentan actualmente los regímenes cambiarios. 
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El contexto internacional y regional 
El contexto externo debe proporcionar, por su parte, tres elementos 
esenciales. En primer lugar, acceso a los mercados para las exportaciones 
de los países en desarrollo. En segundo término, una nueva arquitectura 
financiera internacional, que, gracias a una mejor gobernabilidad global, 
proporcione mayor estabilidad a los flujos de capitales. En tercer lugar, 
mecanismos que permitan que los países de menor desarrollo relativo 
tengan también acceso a recursos externos en cantidades y condiciones 
adecuadas. 
Los esfuerzos nacionales en materia de desarrollo exportador 
tienen como contrapartida necesaria el acceso a los mercados externos. En 
esta materia, subsisten en los países industrializados altos niveles de 
protección a productos agrícolas y manufacturas “sensibles” provenientes 
de los países en desarrollo, así como aplicaciones muchas veces 
proteccionistas de las normas de contingencia comercial y obstáculos 
técnicos a nuestras exportaciones. Por su parte, en el caso de los países 
insulares que han enfrentado una erosión significativa de sus preferencias 
comerciales, es necesario contar con recursos y apoyo técnico adecuados 
para modernizar y diversificar su base exportadora.  
La enorme inestabilidad que acusa el sistema financiero 
internacional está asociada a la acentuada asimetría que existe entre el 
desarrollo dinámico de los mercados financieros mundiales, y la ausencia 
de una adecuada gobernabilidad macroeconómica y financiera a nivel 
mundial. Una mejor gobernabilidad exige una mayor coordinación de las 
políticas macroeconómicas entre los principales países desarrollados, con 
miras a garantizar una mayor estabilidad macroeconómica global; exige 
asimismo, por parte de todos los países, la aceptación de mecanismos de 
supervisión de las políticas macroeconómicas con claros criterios 
prudenciales. La estabilidad financiera internacional requiere también un 
marco institucional apropiado de carácter global, que incluya estándares 
mínimos de regulación y supervisión prudencial de los sistemas 
financieros y de suministro de la información que necesitan los mercados 
financieros para funcionar en forma adecuada. Requiere, por último, de 
instituciones apropiadas para manejar las crisis. 
Estas últimas son de dos tipos. En primer término, es necesario 
aumentar la capacidad de proporcionar financiamiento excepcional 
durante los períodos de crisis y desarrollar mecanismos adecuados para 
suministrar liquidez a países con fuertes fundamentos macroeconómicos 
que enfrenten problemas de contagio. Uno y otro objetivo sólo se lograrán 
si el Fondo Monetario Internacional puede contar con recursos propios, 
provenientes de emisiones transitorias de derechos especiales de giro. 
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Más aún, el uso activo de tales derechos en el sistema financiero 
internacional es un objetivo en sí mismo, largamente defendido por los 
países en desarrollo, que conviene reiterar una vez más. Para evitar los 
llamados problemas de “riesgo moral”, es necesario, sin embargo, que 
estos mecanismos de financiamiento excepcional vayan atados al 
desarrollo de instrumentos que permitan involucrar a los agentes 
privados en la solución de las crisis. Manteniendo el principio de la 
negociación voluntaria entre acreedores y deudores, es necesario diseñar 
reglas internacionales que garanticen la participación de todas las partes 
en este tipo de negociaciones y evitar que ellas se prolonguen 
excesivamente, desarrollando mecanismos apropiados de arbitraje 
multilateral. 
En cualquier caso, es importante resaltar que los esquemas 
orientados a garantizar la participación de los acreedores en la solución 
de las crisis deben ser vistos como un complemento y no como un 
sustituto del financiamiento excepcional, especialmente cuando el origen 
de las dificultades que enfrentan los países es estrictamente temporal (de 
iliquidez) y está asociado a problemas de contagio. De hecho, una 
combinación subóptima entre los dos mecanismos, que exija en todas las 
condiciones refinanciar las deudas como condición de acceso al 
financiamiento de emergencia, puede acentuar las crisis, en lugar de 
resolverlas, y en el largo plazo canalizar un monto insuficiente de fondos 
a los países en desarrollo. 
El acceso a recursos implica el desarrollo de mecanismos que 
permitan a todos los países beneficiarse de la inversión extranjera directa 
y de los flujos privados de crédito. La primera se encuentra en general 
bien distribuida en la región, aunque su articulación con las economías 
nacionales debe ser objeto de atención prioritaria en el futuro. Los 
segundos están mucho más concentrados y deben desarrollarse, por lo 
tanto, esquemas de garantías o cofinanciación de los bancos multilaterales 
de desarrollo, con miras a facilitar el acceso al mercado de los países que 
no se han beneficiado de dichos flujos. Este tipo de apoyos ya ha 
comenzado a existir en nuevas áreas de inversión privada, especialmente 
en infraestructura.  
Los bancos multilaterales han realizado un aporte importante al 
financiamiento de la región, que seguirá siendo decisivo en el futuro. 
Cumplen, en primer lugar, un papel esencial en la movilización de 
recursos hacia los países de menor desarrollo relativo. Su cartera de 
préstamos a todos los países de la región es diversificada, y refleja la 
prioridad otorgada por estas entidades a proyectos de desarrollo social, 
desarrollo sostenible, apoyo a las reformas del Estado y a la canalización 
de recursos hacia la micro y pequeña empresa, entre otras actividades de 
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alta prioridad social. Sus condiciones, tanto en términos de costo como de 
plazo, son, además, más favorables a las del financiamiento privado, aún 
en el caso de países de mayores ingresos relativos de la región, lo que 
indica que los mercados privados tienden a sobreestimar el riesgo, sobre 
todo (pero no únicamente) durante los períodos de crisis. Proporcionan, 
por último, financiamiento en forma contracíclica, mitigando así los 
choques externos. En particular, constituyen la única fuente de 
financiamiento de largo plazo disponible durante las crisis. Este apoyo ha 
sido esencial, aun para los países de mayores ingresos relativos, y ha 
desempeñado un papel crucial en la renovación de la confianza en los 
países afectados. 
La asistencia oficial para el desarrollo sigue teniendo, por su parte, 
un papel esencial en el financiamiento de los países menos desarrollados. 
El cumplimiento de la meta del 0.7% del producto interno bruto de los 
países industrializados, acordada en el seno de las Naciones Unidas, así 
como el uso más transparente y eficiente de estos recursos, deben ser las 
prioridades en el futuro. Estos recursos deben complementarse, además, 
con fondos destinados a garantizar una oferta adecuada de bienes 
públicos globales o con importantes externalidades, tales como la paz, el 
desarrollo sostenible y la lucha contra el problema mundial de la droga. 
Por su parte, la aplicación de la Iniciativa para los países pobres muy 
endeudados, de la cual son beneficiarios potenciales cuatro países de la 
región, debe agilizarse, garantizando, además, recursos adecuados para 
su financiamiento. Esto es necesario para evitar que dicho financiamiento 
recaiga excesivamente sobre otros países en desarrollo, tanto en forma 
directa como a través de mayores márgenes de intermediación y de 
menor disponibilidad de recursos para cooperación técnica por parte de 
los bancos multilaterales. 
La construcción de este edificio global debe tener en cuenta tres 
elementos esenciales. El primero es una participación adecuada de los 
países en desarrollo en las instituciones correspondientes. El segundo es 
el mantenimiento de la autonomía de los países para adoptar las políticas 
que consideren apropiadas para su desarrollo. En tercer lugar, la 
normatividad internacional debe tener en cuenta la capacidad de 
absorción de los distintos países, dado su nivel de desarrollo institucional. 
Es necesario destacar, finalmente, que en la interacción positiva 
entre los esfuerzos nacionales y un contexto internacional adecuado, las 
instituciones regionales desempeñan un papel decisivo. Estas 
instituciones abarcan los acuerdos de integración comercial, claves en la 
diversificación de la base exportadora de nuestros países; la nutrida red 
de bancos de desarrollo, conformada por el Banco Interamericano de 
Desarrollo y los bancos de desarrollo subregionales, que constituyen la 
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principal fuente de financiamiento multilateral en nuestra región; el 
Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas, institución casi única en el mundo 
en desarrollo, que ha cumplido una tarea destacada en la Comunidad 
Andina en las últimas décadas y ha iniciado un proceso de ampliación de 
su composición y, finalmente, los nuevos mecanismos de coordinación de 
las políticas macroeconómicas que se han comenzado a desarrollar en el 
marco de diferentes procesos de integración. La región debe apostar a la 
consolidación de todos estos procesos e instituciones y a la 
profundización en general de la cooperación regional. Las instituciones 
regionales sólidas no son antagónicas a la globalización. Por el contrario, 
son una contribución al desarrollo de un edificio global mucho más sólido 
y equilibrado. 
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Chapter 1 
Financing for development in the 1990s 
In the final quarter of the twentieth century, macroeconomic 
conditions in the Latin American and Caribbean countries were closely 
linked to fluctuations in the region’s capital inflows. During the second 
half of the 1970s and early 1980s, the region had received massive inflows 
of external credit. This process came to an abrupt halt in 1982, however, 
and then gave way to a severe, widespread shortage of external financing. 
From 1991 to 1994, a new wave of capital entered the region, only to be 
followed by another sharp contraction in late 1994 and early 1995, during 
which Mexico and Argentina were particularly hard hit. In the wake of 
this crisis, in 1996 and 1997, capital again became abundant. Then, with 
the onset of the Asian crisis in the second semester of 1997 and the 
Russian crisis in August 1998, capital markets of importance to the region 
continued to exhibit considerable volatility. In view of this instability, 
together with the stabilization of foreign direct investment (FDI) at fairly 
high yet nonetheless below-1999 levels, the steep downturn recently 
exhibited by the world and United States economies, and the low real 
price levels for a number of the region’s export products, there is some 
doubt as to whether the region can recover its ability to attract flows of 
the magnitude needed to ensure robust growth in its principal economies. 
All of these economic expansions and subsequent contractions have 
stemmed primarily from events on international markets. Access to 
external funds and improved macroeconomic management have spurred 
growth and resulted in significantly lower inflation, but investment levels 
have made no more than a partial recovery, and national savings rates 
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have been virtually unchanged. As a result, growth rates have remained 
substantially lower than they were before the debt crisis, while 
investment and economic growth have become highly susceptible to 
swings in external capital flows. 
The countries’ varying degrees of dependency on international 
financing are largely a function of each country’s level of development. 
While many countries have benefited from FDI, the relatively more 
developed countries tend to be the focus of the more volatile debt and 
portfolio flows. On the other hand, although official development 
assistance (ODA) has played no more than a minor role in the region as a 
whole, it has been an important source of financing for the less developed 
countries, which have also been heavily dependent on family remittances 
from emigrants. 
This chapter offers an overview of trends in external finance, key 
features of macroeconomic policy in the region over the past decade, 
major developments in the financial sector, and the impact of these factors 
on growth, saving and investment. These considerations then serve as the 
basis for an outline of the major challenges yet to be faced in connection 
with financing for development, which will be discussed in greater detail 
in the rest of the document. 
1. Capital flows: resumed but volatile 
(a) Main features of external financing in the region 
An analysis of the different countries’ balances of payments and 
international capital flows1 reveals two major features of external finance 
in the region during the 1990s. The first is that, as international labour 
migration increased, family remittances became an important source of 
current income for some small countries (reaching levels close to the 
value of exports in some cases) which helped ease their external 
borrowing requirements. The second has to do with the appearance of 
new, mainly private sources of external financing to which the largest 
countries, in particular, have had access. The marked volatility of some of 
these flows has created new challenges in terms of the management of 
macroeconomic policy and national financial markets. 
 
                                                          
1 Information-source characteristics and differences are analysed in appendix 1. 
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(i) Financing needs 
In the 1990s, the region as a whole exported enough goods and 
services to pay for 91% of its imports. Net borrowing requirements, 
represented by the current account balance, were equivalent to 13% of 
external purchases. These regional averages, however, mask major 
differences among the countries that reflect their varying levels of 
development (see table 1.1).2 Over the past decade, the higher-income 
countries’ earnings from their exports of goods and services generated 
enough foreign exchange, on average, to cover over 100% of their imports. 
By contrast, the ratio for the lower-income countries was only 76%. 
Table 1.1 clearly shows that net current transfers (primarily 
remittances from relatives living abroad) have been playing a significant 
and expanding role in financing the imports of the less developed 
countries as a group. Total remittances from emigrants have reached 
particularly significant levels in countries having high rates of labour 
migration to more developed countries, especially the United States. 
According to conservative calculations, in 1999 migrants from Central 
America, the Dominican Republic and Mexico sent back close to US$ 10.5 
billion in remittances. Mexico accounted for nearly US$ 6 billion of this 
sum, while between US$ 2.5 billion and US$ 3 billion corresponded to 
Central America (specifically El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua) and more than US$ 1.5 billion to the Dominican Republic. In 
the Caribbean, net receiving countries (excluding Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic) took in US$ 1 billion in remittances in 1998, or the 
equivalent of 7.4% of their GDP (ECLAC, 2000a; Torres, 2000; Samuel, 
2000). 
As may be seen in table 1.1, the relative significance of net current 
transfers (including remittances) varies inversely to the size of the 
economy concerned. Although Mexico is one of the world’s largest 
recipients of remittances, this type of transfer represents a very small 
proportion of its GDP (1.5%). The significance of these transfers in El 
Salvador’s social and economic affairs, on the other hand, is quite evident, 
                                                          
2  For purposes of analysis, the countries have been divided into three groups according to 
their per capita GDP. Group A countries reported a per capita GDP of under US$ 2,000 
in 1998, estimated at prevailing market exchange rates: Bolivia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. 
Countries in Group B reported a per capita GDP of between US$ 2,000 and US$ 4,000 in 
1997: Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama and Peru. Group C countries reported a 
per capita GDP of over US$ 4,000 in 1997: Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Group A and Group B account for 15% 
of the region’s population each, while the countries in Group C contain 70% of the total.  
These groups’ shares of the region’s total GDP as of 1998 were 4.8%, 9.5% and 85.6%, 
respectively. 
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since they represented between 15% and 20% of GDP and between 50% 
and 100% of the value of its merchandise exports during the 1990s. The 
Dominican Republic, many of whose citizens have emigrated to the 
United States, Spain and other European countries, is in a similar position. 
In the economies that rely most heavily on remittances, large injections of 
these external resources influence macroeconomic variables, especially 
exchange and interest rates. 
When measured by the current account deficit, external borrowing 
requirements (expressed as a percentage of GDP for each country) tended 
to be greater —even though they were on the decline— in lower-income 
countries (see figure 1.1.A and table 1.2). The borrowing requirements of 
countries with higher per capita incomes, on the other hand, are 
determined less by their trade deficits than by their debt service plus, in 
terms of their gross requirements, debt amortization. 
The differences between certain groups of countries is also reflected 
in the figures on long-term financing actually received (see figure 1.1.B 
and table 1.3). Flows to the less developed countries levelled off at 
between 11% and 13% of GDP from 1993 on, which was below the figures 
for the early 1990s. In countries at an intermediate level of development 
and in the higher-income countries, however, these flows jumped from 
slightly less than 3% of GDP in 1990 to between 6% and 9% of GDP in 
1996-1999. 
(ii) Composition of long-term external financing 
The composition of long-term financing has also differed 
substantially from one group of countries to the next. World Bank figures 
classify grants as a component of long-term financing, and their 
importance as a source of funding decreases as the country’s level of 
development increases. In countries whose GDP is relatively smaller, this 
type of funding amounted to 6.8% of GDP, on average, during the 1990s. 
The relative level of such flows has been on the decline,3 however, owing 
to the worldwide reduction seen in ODA, which totals a mere one third of 
the commitment of 0.7% of the industrialized countries’ GDP agreed upon 




                                                          
3 If inflows of grants are deflated by the United States WPI, the results show a real 







STRUCTURE OF IMPORT FINANCING a 
(Simple averages of percentages of goods and services imports) 
Groups of countries b 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Group A           
Exports of goods and services  84.1 77.3 71.9 73.0 76.3 76.8 78.3 76.4 70.9 76.0 
Net employee earnings -0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4 
Net capital earnings -18.5 -17.8 -17.5 -15.2 -13.6 -12.1 -10.6 -8.5 -7.3 -9.9 
Net current transfers 14.9 16.5 16.8 16.9 17.9 18.8 18.6 17.9 20.8 23.6 
External borrowing requirements 19.8 24.0 28.7 26.0 19.2 16.8 13.8 14.2 15.6 9.7 
Group B           
Exports of goods and services  96.1 98.5 97.4 84.5 86.9 83.7 84.6 86.2 84.4 98.3 
Net employee earnings 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 
Net capital earnings -20.8 -17.3 -15.0 -11.6 -10.0 -10.0 -8.9 -8.9 -9.1 -16.9 
Net current transfers 8.9 10.8 10.6 8.0 8.0 6.8 7.1 5.8 5.7 4.4 
External borrowing requirements 14.7 7.5 6.4 18.7 14.7 19.0 16.9 13.8 15.6 9.4 
Group C           
Exports of goods and services  141.9 112.9 107.0 101.1 106.5 107.3 110.1 97.0 88.5 101.4 
Net employee earnings 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Net capital earnings -25.4 -19.2 -15.3 -14.7 -15.2 -13.5 -13.5 -11.9 -12.5 -14.6 
Net current transfers 3.6 2.9 3.0 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.5 2.1 
External borrowing requirements -20.4 3.1 5.1 11.3 6.2 3.6 1.0 12.8 22.4 11.0 
Latin America c           
Exports of goods and services  107.3 96.0 92.3 86.3 90.1 89.3 91.0 86.6 81.3 92.2 
Net employee earnings 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 
Net capital earnings -21.8 -18.6 -16.3 -14.2 -13.3 -12.1 -11.2 -9.9 -9.8 -13.3 
Net current transfers 9.3 10.2 10.3 9.2 9.6 9.5 9.4 8.7 9.6 10.3 
External borrowing requirements 5.0 12.1 13.5 18.8 13.3 13.3 10.7 13.6 17.7 9.5 
Source: Based on ECLAC figures. 
a The structure of import financing was calculated based on the accounting identity of the balance-of-payments current account. Inverting this equation yields the following 
result: goods and services imports = goods and services exports + net earnings of employees + net capital earnings + net current transfers -  balance on current account. 
The latter figure represents the external borrowing requirement that has to be covered with the net flow of capital resources and variations in reserves. 
b Group A countries reported a per capita GDP of under US$ 2,000 in 1998 (estimated at prevailing market exchange rates): Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. Group B countries reported a per capita GDP of  between US$ 2,000 and US$ 4,000 in 1997: 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama and Peru. Group C countries reported a per capita GDP of over US$ 4,000 in 1997: Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. 









STRUCTURE OF CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT a 
(Simple averages of percentages of GDP for each country) 
Groups of countries b 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Group A           
Trade deficit -5.4 -6.9 -11.5 -10.7 -9.4 -10.0 -7.9 -8.9 -11.0 -11.1 
Net employee earnings -0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.4 
Net capital earnings -5.5 -5.3 -8.2 -7.0 -6.9 -6.3 -4.0 -3.5 -3.0 -3.5 
Net current transfers 3.7 4.1 5.9 6.5 6.1 7.6 5.9 5.9 7.3 8.3 
External borrowing requirements -7.4 -8.1 -13.7 -11.5 -10.1 -8.8 -5.9 -6.4 -6.7 -6.3 
Group B           
Trade deficit -3.3 -3.4 -3.7 -6.8 -4.3 -6.1 -6.8 -3.9 -4.7 -0.7 
Net employee earnings 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Net capital earnings -6.4 -5.9 -5.1 -4.0 -3.7 -4.2 -3.6 -2.8 -3.1 -3.9 
Net current transfers 3.5 3.7 4.2 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.7 2.3 2.2 0.8 
External borrowing requirements -5.8 -5.1 -4.1 -6.7 -3.9 -6.4 -5.9 -4.2 -5.4 -3.8 
Group C           
Trade deficit 5.8 1.9 -0.7 -1.3 0.1 1.2 2.0 0.0 -2.1 0.3 
Net employee earnings 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Net capital earnings -3.3 -2.7 -2.5 -2.4 -2.6 -2.7 -2.5 -2.5 -2.3 -2.4 
Net current transfers 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 
External borrowing requirements 2.9 -0.4 -2.7 -3.3 -2.1 -0.9 0.0 -2.0 -3.9 -1.6 
Latin America c           
Trade deficit -1.2 -2.8 -5.2 -6.3 -4.6 -5.0 -4.2 -4.3 -5.9 -3.9 
Net employee earnings 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Net capital earnings -5.1 -4.7 -5.3 -4.5 -4.4 -4.4 -3.3 -2.9 -2.8 -3.3 
Net current transfers 2.5 2.7 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.9 3.4 2.9 3.3 3.2 
External borrowing requirements -3.4 -4.5 -6.3 -7.2 -5.4 -5.4 -3.9 -4.2 -5.3 -3.9 
Source: Based on ECLAC figures. 
a The structure of financing requirements was calculated based on the accounting identity ratios of the balance-of-payment current account. 
b See the classification given in table 1.1. 
c Simple average. 
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Figure 1.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CURRENT ACCOUNT AND  
LONG-TERM FLOWS 
(Simple averages of percentages for each country) 
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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, Washington, D.C., May 2000; ECLAC, Foreign 
Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999 Report (LC/G.2061-P), Santiago, Chile, 2000. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.00.II.G.4. 
Regarding other sources of long-term financing, table 1.3 illustrates 
the sharp reduction seen in the share of finance provided by net 
borrowings in the lower-income countries, in contrast to the situation in 
the higher-income countries, where its share expanded. A major shift was 
also observed in the composition of these funds, with one of the main 
changes being the increase seen in the share of borrowings from private 
creditors (bond issues, private bank credit and publicly guaranteed 
private debt), most notably in the higher-income countries (see figure 
1.1.C). The poorest group of countries have much less access to these 
types of resources, and in fact have posted negative net flows for some 
years. As of 1998, six countries accounted for a full 93% of the region’s 
total private debt (see table 1.4). By contrast, lower-income countries 
tended to rely more on multilateral sources of credit. 
Over the course of the decade, FDI became the region’s principal 
source of financing. At the international level, flows of FDI expanded 
from an annual average of US$ 243 billion between 1990 and 1996 to 
nearly US$ 830 billion by 1999. Nevertheless, even though developing 
countries received a growing share of these investment flows, by the late 
1990s FDI flows were becoming increasingly concentrated in the 
industrialized countries owing, on the one hand, to the greater risk 
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strength of the United States economy and the introduction of the single 
European currency (Botchwey, 2000; ECLAC, 2000b). Latin America and 
the Caribbean were the exception to the rule, however, with record levels 
of FDI being posted each year.  Indeed, the region’s  inflows swelled from 
US$ 29.6 billion to over US$ 86 billion between 1995 and 1999 and 
accounted for 50% of total FDI for all developing countries (World Bank, 
2000). FDI has been rising in all three groups of countries, especially those 
at the two extremes of the per capita income scale, but even so, since the 
beginning of the decade, its relative weight has been most significant in 
the middle-income countries. Nonetheless, four countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico) accounted for a full 72% of total FDI flows. 
The third component of long-term external financing —equity 
investment— has contributed relatively little to the region’s finances and 
is of some importance only in the higher-income countries.  Its peak level 
of 2.2% of GDP was reached in 1996.4  
(b) The volatility of capital flows 
The degree of volatility exhibited by capital flows into Latin 
America and the Caribbean, as estimated by ECLAC, is shown in figure 
1.2 (see appendix 1). Annual average inflows in 1991-1999 amounted to 
the equivalent of 3% of GDP. This level stands in contrast to the striking 
net outflows of around 2% of GDP recorded in 1983-1990, but is still well 
below the 5% mark reached in 1977-1981. Comparable figures were seen 
only during the boom years of 1991-1994 and 1996-1997, but waning flows 
in the crisis years of 1995 and 1998-1999 brought the average for the 
decade as a whole down to the figure noted above. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Some analysts consider equity investment to be a short-term flow because it is 
potentially more reversible than other components. Nonetheless, because it has no 
predetermined maturity, it is generally considered to be a long-term operation for 









CONTRIBUTION OF EXTERNAL LONG-TERM FINANCING, BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES 
(Percentages of GDP) 
Group of countriesa (simple averages)  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total net long-term flows           
Group A 15.21 22.86 15.63 11.15 12.44 11.33 11.75 14.48 12.62 12.95 
Group B  3.21 4.58 2.33 4.56 5.24 4.16 5.67 8.98 8.42 6.51 
Group C 1.89 2.26 2.55 3.85 4.99 4.04 7.14 7.30 7.43 6.74 
           
I. Net long-term debt flows           
Group A 8.23 3.59 2.67 2.68 2.52 1.72 2.58 4.63 2.00 3.19 
Group B  -0.39 0.26 -1.42 -0.08 -0.34 -0.03 -0.29 2.29 1.94 2.48 
Group C 0.54 0.27 0.63 0.61 1.26 1.17 1.78 1.03 3.01 0.91 
           
II. Foreign direct investment           
Group A 0.78 0.91 6.69 3.28 3.74 3.47 3.28 4.46 5.87 6.32 
Group B 2.01 1.94 2.39 2.18 4.05 2.98 4.50 6.14 5.98 3.69 
Group C 1.08 1.66 1.47 1.98 3.09 2.56 3.15 5.28 4.30 5.71 
           
III. Equity investment           
Group A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Group B  0.00 0.00 0.28 0.79 0.85 0.71 1.09 0.27 0.07 0.12 
Group C 0.17 0.26 0.40 1.04 0.57 0.25 2.15 0.93 0.06 0.09 
           
IV. Grants           
Group A 6.20 18.36 6.26 5.19 6.18 6.14 5.89 5.40 4.71 3.44 
Group B  1.59 2.38 1.07 1.66 0.68 0.50 0.37 0.29 0.44 0.22 
Group C 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.02 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2001, Washington, D.C., 2001. 
a See the classification given in table 1.1. 
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Table 1.4 
STOCK OF DEBT WITH PRIVATE LENDERS, 1999 














Argentina   74,918 27.8   15,894   7.3      71   0.8   90,883 18.4 
Brazil   69,602 25.9 102,885 47.4 1,632 19.1 174,118 35.2 
Colombia    8,251   3.1   13,724   6.3   908 10.6   22,883   4.6 
Chile     5,320   2.0   24,785 11.4     69   0.8   30,174   6.1 
Mexico   69,767 25.9   43,624 20.1 3,250 38.0 116,641 23.6 
Venezuela   21,278   7.9    5,472   2.5 1,325 15.5   28,074   5.7 





























Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2001, Washington, D.C., 2001. 
Figure 1.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET CAPITAL INFLOWS  
AND RESOURCE TRANSFERS 












Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a
 Net autonomous capital inflows (includes errors and omissions). 
b
 Net resource transfers are equal to net autonomous and non-autonomous capital inflows (loans, use of 
IMF credit and exceptional financing) less the balance on the income account (net profits and interest). 
Differing degrees of volatility have been closely associated with the 
different types of resource flows concerned (see table 1.5). Bond issues, 
net commercial bank credit and equity investment have been the most 
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exhibited a positive trend at critical junctures (such as Mexico in 1995 and 
Brazil in 1998, among others). Official flows, including resources from 
multilateral banks and compensatory funds (balance-of-payment 
financing), have displayed a definite countercyclical pattern, while, as 
noted earlier, ODA flows have been diminishing.  
Thanks to its growth and stability, FDI has become the single 
largest component of external financing. On average, it accounted for 
three fourths of net capital flows from 1996 to 1999 and thus, for most of 
the countries in the region, served as a mainstay in financing the balance-
of-payments current account deficit. In 2000, however, these flows fell off 
significantly (ECLAC, 2001). This decrease, together with what appeared 
to be a further reduction in 2001, indicates that, although FDI flows will 
remain high within the context of the region’s historical patterns, the 
period during which such investment grew the most swiftly may have 
run its course. Around 60% of total FDI was used for capital formation, 
while the remaining 40% was used for the acquisition of existing assets. 
The nature of these flows will be examined in greater depth in chapter 3. 
Table 1.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SOURCES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING 
(Net flows in millions of dollars) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000a 
            
A. Debt            
Official b 6,823 3,435 1,220 2,674 -1,301 9,307 -8,212 -4,447 9,125 2,275 -2,701 
Bonds 101 4,133 4,738 20,922 14,306 11,793 29,764 10,562 18,306 19,067 10,965 
Commercial Banks c 2,731 1,275 4,302 201 6,212 15,068 16,200 29,646 -7,994 -16,130 4,339 
            
B. Investment            
Direct  6,758 11,066 12,506 10,363 23,706 24,799 39,387 55,580 61,596 77,047 57,410 
Equity  896 6,938 8,042 27,185 13,160 7,643 13,893 9,947 1,748 3,893 2,305 
            
C. Compensatory funds d 24,539 13,727 8,207 6,309 5,223 30,752 -271 -4,215 8,869 6,629 1,155 
Source: ECLAC, based on official figures from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
a Preliminary estimates. 
b
 Includes bilateral and multilateral funding, with the exception of IMF loans. 
c Includes short-term flows since 1998. 
d Includes loans, use of IMF credit and exceptional financing. In the early 1990s, exceptional financing 
consisted mostly of interest arrears; in recent years it has included resources from multilateral agencies, 
IMF, and the governments of developed countries. 
The advent of the Brady Plan brought the consolidation of the 
secondary bond market. This market then became an increasingly 
important source of financing during the decade, with its operations 
being interrupted only by the fallout from the Mexican financial crisis in 
1995 and the Asian crisis in 1997. While its operations were initially 
concentrated in the relatively larger countries (Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico), it soon became a major source of funds for Chile, Colombia, 
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Uruguay and Venezuela and, later, for several smaller countries, 
including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago. 
These flows have also proved to be erratic, however, with financing 
conditions being highly sensitive to fluctuations on international markets. 
During the first half of the 1990s, new issues by the region had an average 
term of between three and five years. In 1997, during the height of the 
boom in bond sales, the average term was significantly longer, but it 
shortened again in 1998-1999 (see figure 1.3). Finance costs had bottomed 
out in 1997 but then began to rise sharply in August 1998 following 
Russia’s declaration of a moratorium and, although they have settled back 
somewhat since then, they have tended to remain above the figures 
posted prior to the Asian crisis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
according to which today’s financial crises are severe but short-lived, 
years after the outbreak of the Asian crisis, conditions on the bond market 
have yet to recover fully. 
Following a virtual stoppage of bank lending during the debt crisis 
(except for operations in connection with foreign trade), the net flow of 
commercial bank funds into the region remained very moderate until 
1993. From that point on, net flows began to gain momentum, reaching a 
peak in 1997 that was followed by markedly negative flows in 1998 and 
1999. The terms and conditions for this kind of financing, especially with 
regard to maturities, never rebounded to the levels seen before the debt 
crisis, however. Equity investment and the placement of American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on the United States market have proven to 
be the most unstable sources of finance. 
By contrast, official and compensatory financing has behaved 
countercyclically, as illustrated by the fact that during the steep 
downturns in private financing seen in 1995 and 1998, credit from these 
sources increased (see table 1.5). This response demonstrates how the 
International Monetary Fund, other multilateral agencies and the 
governments of some developed countries have helped bolster 
developing economies at critical junctures, with notable cases being 
Mexico in late 1994 and Brazil in 1998 and early 1999. In recent years, the 
net flow of bilateral resources into the region has turned negative as a 
result of Mexico’s payment of the debt it incurred with the United States 
in 1995. Hence, multilateral sources have been the principal suppliers of 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES 

































Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the World Bank and IMF. 
a
  Sum of average spread on bond placements and long-term United States Treasury bond yields. 
Since the most volatile capital flows tend to be concentrated in the 
higher-income developing countries, the need for exceptional financing in 
crisis periods is also greater in these countries (Ocampo, 1999a). Figure 1.4 
clearly demonstrates this trend in IMF credits. In contrast to what 
occurred during the debt crisis, when all three groups of Latin American 
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in the 1990s the need for special IMF support has been concentrated in the 
higher-income countries. 
Figure 1.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: USE OF IMF CREDIT 




















Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance, Washington, D.C., May 2000. 
(c) Challenges posed by new modalities of integration into world 
markets  
A close examination of the ways in which borrowers have gained 
re-entry into voluntary credit markets, especially the bond market, reveals 
a segmented form of integration into international finance that poses new 
challenges for some countries. Government issues represent dollar-
denominated commitments whose only associated risk is that of default. 
The differential between the cost of credit in dollars to governments of 
emerging economies and the cost of the funds that the United States 
Government receives for bond issues provides a measurement of the 
value that these markets assign to the sovereign risk associated with the 
possibility of default. This differential is reflected in the premium that is 
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premium amounts to several percentage points (several hundred basis 
points) over the cost of credit for the United States Treasury. Since this 
premium is higher for Latin American countries and, among them, for 
those that the market regards as being riskier, the countries´ integration 
into these markets is clearly segmented. The risks of concern here are 
associated with debt/GDP (or debt/exports) ratios and/or with factors of 
political uncertainty. It is interesting to note, however, that in addition to 
reflecting factors specific to each country, this type of risk tends to shift in 
a similar way in the different countries in response to international shocks 
of various sorts. This points to the presence of contagion phenomena 
associated with the herd behaviour of some investors. These shocks may 
have their origin in economic decisions taken by industrialized countries, 
in the behaviour of what are regarded as high-risk stocks in 
industrialized-country markets (in recent years, technology stocks) or in 
disturbances in international commodity markets. 
In the experience of the major emerging economies that have access 
to the bond market, in the wake of the Asian crisis risk premiums have 
borne little relationship to fiscal solvency and have instead been more 
strongly influenced by international agents´ perceptions regarding the 
availability of the international liquidity necessary to permit contract 
performance. Consequently, given prevailing levels of liquidity 
uncertainty, these economies have had difficulty in bringing the cost of 
capital down to developed-country levels, and this has hurt investment, 
boosted outward transfers and endangered the sustainability of 
macroeconomic strategies. 
In fact, following a prolonged period of financial integration, public 
and private external debt has ended up playing a central role in 
determining the financial system’s behaviour. When a country’s debt 
service absorbs a large part of its gross capital inflows, its autonomy in 
deciding how and how much it should open up its financial system is 
limited. As a result of this situation, the option of using fixed exchange-
rate regimes to reduce currency risk has been restricted for some 
countries. FDI and debt flows have caused the structure of the balance of 
payments to shift as the relative size of the trade deficit has declined 
while the relative level of payments of profits and interest has risen. 
Vulnerability has been heightened by increases in debt/GDP (or 
debt/exports) ratios and/or in current account deficit/GDP (or current 
account deficit/exports) ratios. The increase in vulnerability is also 
associated with the need for these countries’ to match maturities and 
currencies efficiently when intermediating credit resources using these 
new modalities of external financing. When the market punishes 
borrowers for this heightened vulnerability by raising risk premiums 
and/or reducing or reversing financing flows, credit crunches tend to 
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ensue. Thus, in the presence of certain sorts of international financial 
shocks, countries’ efforts to achieve integration into the world economy 
may lead them into a financing trap which, unless suitable international 
mechanisms for the provision of emergency funds are designed, can leave 
them mired in recessions for years on end. 
An examination of the region’s external debt position corroborates 
this analysis, since although the region’s external debt is significantly 
smaller than it was during the critical years of the 1980s debt crisis, it 
nonetheless remains high. External debt coefficients declined considerably 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and then continued to trend downward 
during the greater part of that decade, but the external debt/GDP ratio 
has never returned to the levels seen in the early 1980s and has been 
worsening in recent years (see figure 1.5). The trend in the external 
debt/exports ratio is more favourable, but, except in the case of Mexico, it 
remains higher than it was in the early 1980s. In fact, as shown in table 
1.6, external debt coefficients are clearly lower than they were in 1980 in 
just five countries of the region, whereas, for all the rest of the countries, 
either the external debt/GDP coefficient or the external debt/exports 
coefficient is above 1980 levels, and in many cases, both of these 
indicators are higher. Hence, the fact that the region is now at less risk of 
a 1980s-style crisis has less to do with the countries´ lower levels of 
indebtedness than it does with the stabilization of inflation in the 
industrialized economies, since this makes an international interest rate 
hike such as the one seen during that period quite unlikely. 
As a consequence of international capital markets´ tendency to 
overestimate the levels of risk associated with the Latin American 
countries and with emerging economies in general, especially during 
crisis periods, the effective interest rates paid by the countries of the 
region on private markets are high, and for many countries they clearly 
exceed the expected growth of exports and, in particular, of GDP. The 
countries of the region are therefore obliged to generate a trade surplus in 
order to service their debt, since otherwise they run the risk of seeing an 
increase in their external debt coefficients. This did not happen during the 
1990s because of the abundant and steady inflow of FDI. If FDI levels off 
or declines, however, as appears to have been the trend in 2000 and 2001, 
and if profit remittances from existing investments continue to rise as 
expected, the pressure on the trade balance or on external debt 
coefficients will tend to build in the coming years. 
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Figure 1.5 




















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Table 1.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXTERNAL  
DEBT COEFFICIENTS, 2000 AND 1980 a 
  Debt/GDP 




Panama                                  (51.4%) 
Trinidad and Tobago              (22.6%) 
Argentina                                 (52.4%) 
Bolivia                                      (52.0%) 
Brazil                                        (40.1%) 
Colombia                                  (43.4%) 
Ecuador                                  (110.1%) 
Guatemala                               (20.2%) 
Guyana                                   (153.6%) 
Haiti                                          (31.5%) 
Honduras                                  (66.7%) 
Nicaragua                               (265.0%) 
Peru                                         (50.5%) 











Costa Rica                            (19.8%) 
El Salvador                           (21.0%) 
Mexico                                  (28.2%) 
Dominican Republic             (18.5%) 
Venezuela                             (27.6%) 
Chile                                        (50.5%) 
Jamaica                                   (43.9%) 
Paraguay                                 (28.6%) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the relevant countries. 
a







































Total debt / exports Debt / exports (excluding Mexico) Total debt / GDP (right axis)
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2. Macroeconomic policies and performance 
(a) Macroeconomic management 
The region made great strides in the 1990s in the area of 
macroeconomic management, but it was also faced with new challenges, 
many of which followed certain basic patterns. One of its achievements 
was to hold on to the ground that it had won during the 1980s in terms of 
fiscal adjustment (see figure 1.6.A). During most of the decade, 
government deficits held steady at an average of around 1%-2% of GDP, 
although the recent crisis brought setbacks and revealed the presence of 
serious fiscal problems in several countries. These moderate fiscal deficits 
were consistent with increases in public spending, thanks to rising income 
levels. Expenditure has climbed by an average of just over three 
percentage points of GDP, and the increase has primarily taken the form 
of an upturn in public social spending, which rose from 10.1% of GDP in 
1990 to 12.4% in 1997 (ECLAC, 2000c). 
Disciplined management of fiscal accounts went hand in hand with 
strict monetary control, and this tended to push up interest rates 
significantly. Because inflation retreated in most of the countries, 
however, these tight controls did not preclude significant growth in the 
money supply or the expansion of domestic credit in real terms. After 
having dipped to negative or negligible levels in the early 1980s, interest 
rates began a resurgence in the mid-1980s and remained very high in the 
1990s (see figure 1.6.B). This upswing in real interest rates lasted the entire 
decade from 1985 to 1995, driving up the return on savings (for term 
deposits) to a median that topped 5% annually. With bank brokerage 
commissions habitually above 10 percentage points, the median real 
annual lending rate rose above 15%. 
The early 1990s also witnessed the beginning of a real appreciation 
of local currencies that lasted until 1998 (see figure 1.6.C). As currencies 
appreciated and trade was liberalized, imports rose and large current 
account deficits were posted, with both of these increases being financed 
by the external capital that was flowing back into the region. In the end, 
as will be discussed at greater length below, the overvaluation of local 
currencies became the Achilles’ heel of the countries´ stabilization 
strategies when capital flows began to wane. Because exchange-rate 
adjustments were too slow in coming, the countries became more 
dependent on external financial resources, replacing the risk of inflation 
with the risk of an external liquidity crunch. Tight control over 
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Source: Based on ECLAC and IMF figures. 
a
 Median for 19 countries. 
b
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Currency disturbances late in the decade spurred the move 
towards greater exchange-rate flexibility that was seen in most of the 
countries of the region during the 1990s. A number of countries made 
explicit decisions to adopt flexible exchange-rate systems during that 
time. For the most part, they chose a currency float involving some degree 
of central bank intervention (a dirty float), which in some cases replaced 
the managed flexibility regimes (currency bands) that had previously 
been in use.5 In fact, as indicated in table 1.7, currency floats became the 
norm throughout the region. 
Table 1.7 
LATIN AMERICA: EXCHANGE-RATE REGIMES, 2000 
Fixed, semi-fixed or dollarized 
regimes 
Crawling pegs or currency 
bands 
Floats a 
Ecuador b Bolivia Argentina 
El Salvador Costa Rica Brazil 
Panama Nicaragua Chile 
Eastern Caribbean States Dominican Republic Colombia 
Belize Uruguay Guatemala 
 Venezuela Guyana 
  Haiti 
  Jamaica 
  Mexico 
  Paraguay 
  Peru 
  Trinidad and Tobago 
  Venezuela 
Source: ECLAC, A Decade of Light and Shadow (LC/G.2113-P), Santiago, Chile, 2002. 
s Most currency floats in the region provide for some degree of intervention by the central bank (a dirty 
float). 
b
 Ecuador announced a dollarization plan at the start of 2000. 
(b) Production 
With the return of capital inflows, production activity rebounded. 
Accordingly, the average economic growth rate for the entire region 
increased from 1% per year during the “lost decade” to 3.2% in the 1990s. 
This rate of progress, while satisfactory, falls short of the region’s pre-
debt-crisis growth rates, which averaged 5.5% per annum from 1945 to 
                                                          
5 Only a minority of countries, Mexico in particular, had adopted flexible exchange-rate 
systems before the Asian crisis. 
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1980. Most of the individual countries posted averages comparable to the 
regional figure, thus exhibiting a slower growth pattern than what had 
become common in the three and a half decades preceding the debt crisis. 
Only four countries displayed a contrasting trend, but all four had 
performed poorly in the period from 1945 to 1980. Within this group, the 
Chilean economy was conspicuous for its dynamism (see figure 1.7). 
In line with these results, in the region as a whole and in the 
majority of the individual countries for which information is available, the 
growth rate of total factor productivity slowed between 1950-1980 and 
1991-1999 due to marked decreases in labour productivity and meagre 
increases in the productivity of capital. The numerous factors contributing 
to this slowdown in total factor productivity growth included the 
obsolescence occasioned by the rapid pace of technological change, the 
destruction of production capacities which occurred in uncompetitive 
sectors that were exposed to outside competition, and the economy’s 
inability to productively absorb the increase in the labour force caused by 
population growth and the entry of growing numbers of women into the 
labour market (ECLAC, 2000, pp. 55-58). 
Figure 1.7 
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These growth rates and increases in productivity have been far too 
low to ensure satisfactory social progress and, in fact, have translated into 
a weak performance on the part of the region’s labour markets (which 
have registered, to differing degrees in the various countries, rising rates 
of open unemployment and informal employment) and into poverty 
levels for the region as a whole as of 1999 that remained above those 
registered in 1980 (ECLAC, 2000d and 2000e). 
Growth patterns have also been unstable and highly dependent on 
external financing. Figure 1.8.A shows that variations in capital flows 
were the main factor underlying changes in the region’s economic growth 
rates throughout the 1990s. External credit booms coincided with 
flourishing production in 1991-1994 and again in 1996-1997, but both 
periods of growth were followed by adjustments in 1995 and 1998-1999. 
This dependency reflects a procyclical pattern of macroeconomic 
management which has often accentuated the impact of sharp swings in 
international financing rather than buffering them. During the 1990s, 
booms in external financing and the resulting expansion in domestic 
credit have given rise to upturns in expenditure, especially in the private 
sector and this, coupled with appreciating exchange rates within a context 
of greater trade liberalization, led to a cyclical deterioration in the 
balance-of-payments current account (see figure 1.8.B). Ready access to 
external and domestic financing during such booms also tended to drive 
up the prices of domestic assets significantly (see figure 1.8.C).6 
This combination of factors set the stage for a dramatic shift in 
expectations, and when international financing trends did an about-face, 
both the current account and asset prices therefore had to undergo a 
significant adjustment. Macroeconomic authorities were then faced with 
the need to deal with the imbalances that had been generated during 
earlier booms. In more than a few cases, these surges in external 
financing, which occurred against a backdrop of financial liberalization 
and weak prudential regulation and supervision, culminated in overt 
national financial crises. The extent of the necessary adjustments has 
depended on the severity of the imbalances that were generated in the 
different countries during those booms. 
 
                                                          
6 Cyclical factors also influenced asset prices. Equity prices —which, along with real estate 
values, were severely depressed at the beginning of the decade— soared by 300%, 
measured in current dollars, between late 1990 and September 1994. After a sharp drop 
triggered by the Mexican crisis, which had contagion effects in all of Latin America’s 
stock markets, average stock prices nearly doubled between March 1995 and June 1997 
as portfolio investment flowed into the region. 
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Figure 1.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: KEY EXTERNAL INDICATORS 
 














































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the 
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These pronounced cycles of economic activity have had major 
social impacts. A growing body of evidence suggests that the different 
phases of the business cycle have asymmetrical effects on social variables, 
including steep increases in unemployment or informal employment or 
steep drop-offs in real wages during crises, followed by slow or 
incomplete recoveries of those variables. The region has also witnessed 
sharp increases in poverty followed by very slow reversals of those trends 
and a deterioration in income distribution during crisis periods that are 
not reversed once the crisis ends (ECLAC, 2000d, chapter 8; Lustig, 1999). 
Incomplete reversal of the decline suffered by many indicators —real 
wages, poverty and income distribution— during the debt crisis despite 
the resumption of economic growth in the 1990s, constitutes the most 
conclusive evidence of this asymmetrical pattern. 
(c) Levels and financing of investment 
Investment levels dropped off steeply during the debt crisis. Later, 
as international capital began to flow back into the region from 1990 on, 
the rate of capital formation began to rebound. This recovery was only 
partial, however, since in most of the countries the increase in investment 
was made possible by an upswing in external financing that was not 
matched by any complementary expansion in national saving or greater 
access for investors (especially small and medium-sized investors) to 
long-term domestic or external financing. Investment levels in Latin 
America have therefore remained below the levels seen prior to the debt 
crisis (see figure 1.9.A). This decrease in investment coefficients has been 
sharper in the larger countries (whose exposure to private capital flows 
has been greater), as is illustrated by the fact that the investment 
coefficient for Latin America as a whole exhibits less of a recovery when 
calculated on the basis of a weighted average (by GDP levels) than when 
a simple average of the countries concerned is used (see figure 1.9.B). 
This pattern indicates that the region’s financial and capital-account 
liberalization drives, even when coupled with the lower levels of inflation 
and public debt seen during the 1990s, have had very limited success in 
speeding up capital accumulation. Moguillansky and Bielchowsky (2000) 
show that the expansion of domestic credit was, in many cases, countered 
by large interest-rate spreads, while big firms able to borrow abroad 
initially benefited from currency appreciations that were not always a 
reflection of increases in productivity. FDI has followed cycles closely 
linked to public privatization programmes, which have been winding 
down as these sectors’ modernization processes near completion. Thus, 
investment decisions have become highly sensitive to the volatility of 
external financing, both because of its direct effects on domestic interest 
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rates and exchange-rate risk and because of the behaviour of FDI. 
Meanwhile, the segmented nature of access to external finance and the 
high cost of domestic credit relative to international levels has confined 
long-term financing to a small number of agents and sectors. The different 
policy options that have been used to deal with these challenges have 
given rise to differing results in terms of the effort to achieve steady 
increases in both national saving and investment. 
Figure 1.9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INVESTMENT FINANCING 

















































































































































Ahorro Nacional Ahorro Externo
INVESTMENT
National saving External savings
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National savings behaviour has been a decisive factor in countries 
where investment rates have undergone sustained increases. Table 1.8 
provides an overview of events in five Latin American countries which, in 
either the first or second half of the 1990s, achieved economic growth 
rates averaging over 5% annually for more than six years in a row 
(Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Peru). The five 
countries´ ability to sustain such high economic growth rates has varied. 
The table differentiates between two phases of economic activity 
following the start of a reactivation triggered by renewed access to 
external financing. The first three-year phase of the reactivation as such is 
underpinned by growth based on a greater use of installed production 
capacity following the removal of external constraints.  During the second 
three-year growth stage, the economy is nearing the production frontier, 
and its rate of growth is therefore more closely linked to the level of 
investment effort. 
The main reason why macroeconomic variables have performed so 
differently in these countries is that their ability to achieve concurrent 
increases in investment and national saving have differed. Argentina and 
Peru, where GDP growth slowed considerably after the changeover from 
the reactivation stage to the following growth stage, also posted smaller 
increases in national saving and investment. By contrast, Chile, the 
Dominican Republic and El Salvador, where growth did not slow down 
after the reactivation phase, also had much stronger performances in 
terms of their investment coefficients and, most importantly, significant 
upswings in national saving. 
There is extensive evidence that points to a substantial substitution 
effect in the 1990s between national and external saving, which means 
that large shares of the increased capital inflows were used to expand 
consumption. According to available estimates, between 45% and 50% of 
international capital flows translated into decreases in national saving 
(Uthoff and Titelman, 1998). Consequently, the improvements seen in 
investment coefficients were not coupled with increases in national 
saving. The result was a greater dependence on external saving as a 
means of financing investment. Hence, each time adjustment programmes 
had to be implemented to restore external balance, they had a strong 
negative impact on investment. The end results was that economic 
reactivation did not give rise to a sustainable growth process except in 
cases where it entailed an increase in investment and national saving that 
reduced the economy’s external vulnerability. 
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Table 1.8 
FAST-GROWTH COUNTRIES IN THE 1990s: GROWTH, SAVING AND INVESTMENT a 
 
 GDP growth 
(percentages) 
 Change between reactivation phase 
and growth phase 













        
Group 1        
Chile 6.2 6.8  -2.9 +5.9 +3.0 +3.3 
El Salvador 5.0 6.2  -1.9 +4.0 +3.5 +3.3 
Dominican 
Republic 
5.2 6.9  -0.7 +3.7 +2.9 +7.2 
        
Group 2        
Argentina  8.7 2.8  0.0 +1.9 +2.0 +2.1 
Peru 9.3 3.7  -0.6 +0.7 +0.1 +2.0 
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official national accounts figures. 
a
 Based on simple averages for the periods concerned. The following years were chosen for each country 
to mark the turning point between the recessionary and reactivation phases: Argentina, 1990; Chile, 1985; 
Dominican Republic, 1993; El Salvador, 1989; and Peru, 1993. The three years immediately following the 
years indicated are defined as the reactivation phase; the subsequent three years are defined as the 
growth phase. 
In more general terms, events in the region show that a recovery of 
investment that is financed by external savings rates in excess of 3% of 
GDP (the average for the 1990s) is not sustainable because of the extreme 
vulnerability of such a pattern of accumulation to shifts in the 
international economic environment. In such a setting, any slackening of 
capital flows will bring investment and economic growth to a halt. 
Accordingly, if high, stable economic growth rates are to be achieved, 
investment and national saving have to be raised at the same time in 
order to reduce the dependence of the country’s investment activity on 
volatile external flows (ECLAC, 1996 and 2000d, chapter 9; Ffrench-Davis 
and Reisen, 1998). 
Investment and savings figures for the Caribbean are very different 
from the statistics for the rest of the region, as the Caribbean countries 
have had much higher rates of both investment (30.4% of GDP in 1990-
1996) and national saving (22.8% of GDP in the same period) (ECLAC, 
2000e, chapter IV). These figures reflect two important facts that 
differentiate the Caribbean from the rest of the region. The first is the 
wide gap, in relative terms, between national saving and investment, 
which gives rise to a high degree of dependence on external funds 
(financial resources, ODA and transfers from migrants). The second is a 
low level of capital efficiency, as attested to by the fact that high rates of 
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investment have not been reflected in high rates of economic growth.  
This indicates that capital productivity continues to be particularly low in 
the subregion (see box 1.1). The causes of this situation have not been 
fully analysed, but one of the reasons may be that these economies are too 
small to take advantage of economies of scale. 
Box 1.1 
SAVING AND INVESTMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN 
All the Caribbean countries suffer from chronic current account 
deficits, which means that a high percentage of investment has to be 
financed with external resources. Remittances from Caribbean emigrants 
residing in the United States, Canada, Europe and other Caribbean 
countries are recorded as external saving and constitute a large proportion 
of this type of financing. Accordingly, remittances strongly influence the 
countries’ balance-of-payments position, as well as their overall 
development. Jamaica and the members of the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) —with the exception of Antigua and Barbuda— 
are the main recipients of these significant flows. In fact, remittances amount 
to 9% of the OECS countries’ GDP and as of the mid-1990s were equivalent 
to 100% of merchandise exports in Montserrat and Anguilla, 20% in Jamaica 
and 9% in Guyana (ECLAC/CDCC, 1999). 
Measured on this basis, the current account deficit shrank 
significantly in the larger countries, declining from an average of 4.9% in the 
1980s to 0.4% in the following decade. Trinidad and Tobago actually 
recorded a current account surplus amounting to an estimated 10.7% of 
GDP in the 1990s, but at the expense of investment. The current account 
deficit has generally been larger in the OECS countries, where it totalled an 
average of 26.6% and 18% of GDP in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. 
In the 1980s, while in the OECS countries investment reached 
33.2% of GDP and economic growth rates averaged 5.1%, the relatively 
larger countries posted an investment/GDP ratio of 22.9% and their 
economies contracted (-0.4%). This apparently high level of investment 
efficiency in the OECS countries changed in the 1990s, however, when GDP 
growth slackened to an average of 2.1% despite the fact that the 
investment/GDP ratio rose to nearly 36.4%. Part of this slowdown in GDP 
growth is attributable to the significant contraction that occurred in 
Montserrat (-6.6%) as a result of the damage done to the country's economic 
infrastructure by volcanic eruptions. Meanwhile, a strong recovery in the 
larger countries’ economies brought their growth rates to 2.1%, while the 
investment rate increased to 29.3%. 
(continued) 
54 ECLAC 
Box 1.1 (conclusion) 
Although these figures demonstrate the importance of investment for 
the economic growth of these countries, it is also interesting to note that, 
although the investment ratio of the OECS countries has reached levels 
comparable to those of South-East Asia, the same cannot be said of their 
growth rates. Along the same lines, even though the larger Caribbean 
countries’ investment rates are higher than Latin America’s, their economic 
growth rate is lower. These patterns indicate that their marginal capital/GDP 
ratios are very high. 
Approximately 22% of gross capital formation corresponds to public 
investment. Public saving plays a fundamental role in ensuring the stability 
of growth. The economies of Antigua and Barbuda (from 1993 to 1995), 
Belize (from 1990 to 1992), Guyana (from 1991 to 1993), Saint Kitts and 
Nevis (from 1993 to 1995) and Saint Lucia (from 1990 to 1992) all 
underwent reactivations that boosted their annual growth rates to over 4%. 
Only some of these countries were able to maintain these rates after the 
reactivation, however. In those that did so (Antigua, Guyana and Saint Kitts), 
initially negative public saving rates improved significantly during the 
recovery process and thus helped to create an appropriate macroeconomic 
climate for continued growth. Just the opposite occurred in Belize and Saint 
Lucia, however.  These economies started out with high public saving rates, 
but these rates declined as their recovery process proceeded and eventually 
converged at less than 3%. 
3. Recent developments in the financial sector 
Financial and capital-account liberalization processes have led to 
major shifts in the region’s financial structures, but they have also clearly 
demonstrated that the development of stable, deep domestic financial 
markets is a task which the region still has before it. Recent bank failures 
in many countries of the region have also shown, however, that such 
markets can develop only within an appropriate framework of prudential 
regulation and supervision capable of ensuring that financial 
intermediaries maintain viable levels of solvency and liquidity. In order to 
deepen the region’s financial markets, explicit measures are needed to 
promote long-term saving and channel it into investment, and access to 
financing has to be provided to sectors that have traditionally been 
excluded from financial markets (Held, 1994; Mishkin, 1996; Wyplosz, 
1998). These twin challenges —increasing long-term financing and 
opening up access to excluded sectors— underscore the major flaws of the 
financial reforms implemented to date (ECLAC, 2000d, chapters 9 and 10; 
Ffrench-Davis, 1999). 
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(a) Principal features of recent financial trends 
In pursuit of the overall objective of improving the financial 
system’s efficiency, the financial liberalization programmes undertaken 
by many countries of the region during the last three decades were 
designed to replace financially repressive regimes, in which the economic 
authorities regulated interest rates and the supply of loanable funds, with 
a free market system. One of the results of this process has been greater 
financial deepening (see figure 1.10). Calculated as a ratio between M3 and 
GDP, this variable has increased from an average of 25% in the 1970s to 
32% in the 1980s and 36% in the 1990s. On a regional basis, this coefficient 
has trended upward throughout the period in question with the sole 
exception of the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, when the 
process was hampered by debt-crisis-related adjustments. 
Figure 1.10 


















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics (several editions). The countries included in the calculation of simple averages are: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
a
 M3/GDP: 1970-1999. Simple average. 
Nevertheless, banking operations are still limited relative to GDP 
(see figure 1.11.A) and are concentrated in short-term financing. This 
reinforces the business community’s tendency to borrow short-term funds 
to finance long-term investments, which heightens the production sector’s 

















































































same time, the banking sector’s spreads are much larger than those of the 
developed countries, which results either in  higher financial costs for the 
domestic business sector or in excessive self-financing. Both options limit 
the national business sector’s international competitiveness and the 
country’s economic expansion. Additionally, the active use of external 
financing has increased the production sector’s vulnerability to exchange-
rate variations. 
The structure of the region’s banking sector has also changed 
considerably. The market share of State commercial banks has declined 
while that of foreign banks has expanded. There are fewer institutions 
than before, and the average size of banks has tended to increase. 
Capitalization levels have improved relative to the 1980s, as have non-
performing portfolio indices. Despite all of these changes, however, 
banking crises occurred in at least 13 countries of the region in the 1990s 
(see section 3.b). 
Development banks had played an important role in economic 
development financing in other periods, but they were hit by severe crises 
during the 1980s and 1990s that reduced their lending capacity (Alide, 
2000). This has exacerbated the situation with respect to long-term 
financing and has thus placed additional constraints on economic growth. 
Steps are beginning to be taken in some countries to design financial 
instruments that will stimulate long-term financing through the use of 
venture capital, investment and guarantee funds, credit insurance and the 
development of derivatives markets. In some countries, pension system 
reforms involving varying schemes for changing over from pay-as-you-go 
regimes to individual capitalization systems have been the most 
important change, but their capacity to finance real investment through 
the provision of a larger supply of long-term resources has been limited, 
as will be discussed later on. 
Although the 1990s saw significant achievements in the area of 
price stabilization, the development of long-term markets was also 
hampered by the fact that their operating environment was marked by 
inflation rates above international levels. Long-term financial instruments 
should include measures that protect their value from inflation. The most 
common such mechanisms have been indexation and the denomination of 
financial paper in foreign currencies. 
In addition, the region’s securities markets are still very small (see 
figure 1.11.B), and its primary markets have been shrinking rather than 
expanding (Dowers, Gomes-Acebo y Masci, 2000). In a majority of the 
countries, especially in the less developed ones, family-based ownership 
regimes predominate and in some cases are even becoming more 
prevalent than before. The development of equity markets has also been 
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hindered by the lack of regulations designed to reduce the level of risk 
associated with a lack of transparency and of mechanisms for defending 
the rights of minority shareholders in open corporations. 
(b) Inadequate prudential regulation and supervision 
Following an almost universal pattern,7 13 countries in the region 
were troubled by severe bank solvency problems during the 1990s (see 
table 1.9). This pattern was also in evidence in the 1980s, when the 
banking systems in eight countries of the region experienced severe 
problems. Two factors have been responsible for this situation. First, 
nearly all the countries´ financial liberalization programmes were 
undertaken in an institutional setting that was predisposed to insolvency.  
Contributing factors included serious shortcomings in the countries´ 
prudential regulatory and supervisory systems, which in turn stemmed 
from faulty risk-control measures, insufficient capital adequacy and 
provisioning rules, supervisory programmes that were either too weak or 
that focused on accounting and financial details, and explicit or implicit 
State guarantees on deposits and other obligations (Held, 1994). Second, 
macroeconomic environments marked by major shifts in relative prices 
and in economic activity, such as those that have characterized many 
countries of the region, tend to generate high levels of systemic risk. 
Since there are either explicit or implicit State guarantees on bank 
deposits in all the countries of the region, the public sector has had to 
absorb most of the losses and subsequent costs of bailing out banks and 
borrowers. Governments have used a range of strategies, such as offering 
emergency central bank loans to affected institutions, buying up non-
performing high-risk bank loan portfolios, rescheduling credit for 
distressed borrowers, and offering preferential exchange rates to debtors. 
These programmes have resulted in losses for public institutions, either 
because they involve some subsidization of interest rates or exchange 
rates, or because the financial institutions in question ultimately fail to 
meet their obligations. The high fiscal or quasi-fiscal costs involved in 
resolving financial crises, which in some cases have amounted to between 
10% and 20% of GDP, attest to the high social rate of return afforded by 
policies designed to prevent financial crises from happening. 
 
                                                          
7 The International Monetary Fund (1998) has reported that 133 of its 181 member 
countries had experienced major banking problems between 1980 and 1996, including 
41 banking crises in 36 countries. This means that financial problems have taken on a 
global scale not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
58 ECLAC 
Figure 1.11 
A. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE SHARE OF BANK CREDIT TO THE 





















B. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE SHARE OF SECURITIES CAPITALIZATION 



















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Levine Ross, “A new database 
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Table 1.9 
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Banking crisis: 45 out of a total of 205 institutions 











Significant banking problems: Closure of two banks 
holding 11% of total assets in 1994. Four out of 15 
banks holding 30% of total assets, experienced severe 
problems with their portfolios in 1995. Problems of 












Significant banking problems: 76 out of a total of 271 
banks were the object of government intervention, were 
placed under a special regime, merged or were 
liquidated. Non-performing portfolios amounted to 10% 










Significant banking problems: Non-performing portfolios 









Significant banking problems: Closure of a major State 
bank in late 1994. State-owned commercial banks’ non-
performing portfolio (after deduction of loan provisions) 










Significant banking problems: Non-performing portfolio 
is estimated at more than 5% of the total. Liquidation of 
three small banks and government intervention in the 










Banking crisis in 1999 following the appearance of 
significant problems in 1995-1996. Government 
intervention in 11 of 40 banks between December 1998 
and June 1999. Deposits frozen in March 1999. 











Significant banking problems: Liquidation and merger of 
a major public bank. Substantial write-downs on 










Significant banking problems: The political situation led 
to a run on deposits in 1994. Perception of financial 








Significant banking problems: Closure of an investment 
banking group in 1994. Steps had to be taken to shore 














Banking crisis: Non-performing portfolios amounted to 
12% of total in December 1995. Government 
intervention in six banks holding 17% of total assets in 
1995. Large-scale sale of portfolios to the FOBAPROA 
banking fund. Banks experienced problems with 















Banking crisis: Government intervention in banks 
holding around 10% of total deposits in 1995. 












Banking crisis: Intervention in 18 out of 47 banks in 
1994-1995. Signs of financial instability in banking 




Source: C. Goodhart and others, Financial Regulation, London and New York, Routledge, appendix to 
chapter 1, 1998; Gerard Caprio and Daniela Klingbiel, “Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy or Bad 
Banking?”, Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Michael 
Bruno and Boris Pleskovic (eds.), Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1996; Pedro Sáinz and Alfredo 
Calcagno, La economía brasileña ante el Plan Real y sus crisis, Temas de coyuntura series, No. 4 
(LC/L.1232-P), Santiago, Chile, 1999.  United Nations publication, Sales No. S.99.II.G.13. 
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This indicates that although liberalization may allow financial 
institutions to mobilize much larger amounts of funds, it will also expose 
them to various new types of risks unless rules are in place that will 
ensure those institutions´ solvency and efficiency. It is therefore essential 
to improve the operational efficiency of financial institutions and capital 
markets and to adopt prudential regulatory systems to safeguard such 
institutions´ solvency. Another critical factor is the existence of a suitable 
supervisory capability to ensure that the objectives of organizational and 
prudential regulations are met. Depending on how credit and capital 
markets have evolved, supervision of the sector may involve one or more 
specialized public-sector authorities, whose performance will depend 
upon the relevant institutions´ degree of autonomy, political support and 
technical capacity. 
(c) Penetration of international banks 
The globalization of financial markets has brought about a fast-
paced restructuring of the local and international banking industries. The 
expanding scope of regional and global competition has obliged financial 
institutions to boost their efficiency and has, in effect, altered the 
optimum scale of operations. Operating on a national scale, perhaps with 
a few branches in other countries, used to be the optimum approach, but 
today, if a bank wants to operate efficiently, it is increasingly obliged to 
maintain a presence in several countries, including the major financial 
centres, and to offer a full range of financial products. This has given rise 
to a wave of mergers and strategic alliances between banks and other 
financial agents around the world and to many foreign banks’ penetration 
into developing-country markets. 
The Latin American and Caribbean region was no stranger to this 
trend during the 1990s. The process was particularly intense between 1996 
and 1998, when foreign banks increased their share of total deposits from 
16% to 30% (Salomon Smith Barney, 1998). Today, foreign institutions 
hold at least some degree of control over nearly 60% of the loans and 50% 
of the equity of the region’s seven largest economies’ banking systems 
(Salomon Smith Barney, 1999). The greater involvement of international 
banks has been prompted by the liberalization strategies implemented in 
these economies, the move to privatize State-owned financial institutions, 
and the existence of potentially high profits and brokerage margins as 
well as new business opportunities (Calderón and Casilda, 2000). Spanish 
banks have been the most aggressive entrants. They now own one third of 
the total assets of the region’s 20 largest foreign banks and have thus 
overtaken even United States banks, which have traditionally been the 
leaders in this industry within the region. There are large privately-held 
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local financial groups that have managed to withstand this tendency 
towards concentration, however, and large, State-owned financial entities 
are also operating which, in some countries, continue to be the dominant 
providers of financial services. 
These strategic changes have proven beneficial for the countries’ 
financial development, but they have also brought new hazards. On the 
positive side, there have been gains in competitiveness, access to financial 
products usually available only in more modern systems, and the 
possibility for local firms to meet calls for large amounts of financing by 
going through international banks operating in their own countries. It is 
also true, however, that as financial conglomerates have increased their 
scale of operation and diversified their business components, prudential 
supervision has become much more difficult. The expansion of local 
financial groups into other countries, as well as their presence in 
international financial centres, is also a factor in this respect. 
As was clearly demonstrated by the failure of a number of large 
international banks and national banks with foreign branches during the 
1990s, the wide range of opportunities available to institutions wishing to 
elude internal and external controls, conceal losses and camouflage illicit 
operations pose a truly daunting challenge for the agencies responsible 
for prudential supervision. The existence of large financial conglomerates 
has made it necessary to have much more information than before in 
order to evaluate a bank’s solvency. Insufficient progress has been made 
in this area, and for the time being, the exchange of information among 
supervisory authorities continues to operate as an informal network 
rather than within an institutional structure. In the absence of more 
specific information, prima facie cases regarding the nature of loans made 
by a given entity and its relationship with other components of the 
financial conglomerate in question appear to be the most viable option, in 
the short run, for safeguarding the solvency of an institution operating in 
one country in the event of the failure of a foreign-owned parent bank, 
another component of the same conglomerate or a subsidiary. 
Unfortunately, this type of presumptive statute is not provided for in the 
financial legislation of most countries of the region, and this void poses a 
serious problem in terms of the preventive function of prudential 
regulation and supervision. 
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(d) Pension funds8 
Another important institutional development in the region has 
been the creation of pension funds. Several of the countries in the region 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay) 
have converted their public pay-as-you-go pension systems into 
individual capitalization schemes, using methods that vary from one case 
to another. One of the explicit financial objectives of these reforms9 has 
been to increase the stock of long-term savings for investment. 
These processes have not all been equally successful in boosting 
saving and channelling it into investment. Such an outcome is subject to 
at least two factors: how governments cover the fiscal costs of the 
transition, and the types of restrictions that prudential regulations place 
on the management of pension funds. The transition costs are the 
payment obligations for the still-functioning State-run pension system, 
plus the obligations created by the new system: current pension 
payments, the transfer of past contributions into the new system and 
guaranteed minimum pensions. These obligations need to be covered by 
funds other than contributor payments, since those monies have to be 
rerouted to private pension funds (ECLAC, 1998a). If the national treasury 
fails to generate enough net savings to cover these costs, then the increase 
in net private saving may be offset by a larger public deficit. If this occurs, 
then the State begins to compete with investors for financial resources, 
including pension funds, and the reforms will therefore be less effective in 
promoting the financial market’s development. 
Even when, as in Chile, these costs are financed through fiscal 
adjustments, the prudential regulations applying to pension fund 
management have placed priority on the corresponding investments’ 
safety and liquidity. This has predisposed fund portfolios towards 
government debt paper and short- or medium-term private securities; as a 
result, the amount of funds being provided to finance long-term 
investment has been smaller than expected (see table 1.10). 
In view of this situation, further institutional changes are needed in 
order to provide pension programmes with the financial instruments they 
need to become an effective source of real long-term investment funds. 
Some of the types of instruments that have been used successfully to 
                                                          
8 The role of pension funds in channelling financial saving towards real investment is also 
examined in chapter 4. 
9 This discussion does not, of course, provide an exhaustive analysis of the objectives of 
pension reforms. ECLAC (2000d, chapter 6) offers a more comprehensive study of the 
effects which these reforms have had on social security systems. 
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channel pension-fund resources into real investment are indexed 
mortgages, corporate bonds and third-party rated equities.  
Table 1.10 
PENSION FUND MANAGERS AND INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS IN  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  
(Late 1999) 














































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from PrimAmerica Consultores. 
(e) Credit for excluded sectors 
Another factor that poses a challenge for national financial systems 
is the heterogeneity of the sector composed of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and microenterprises, which make up the majority of 
the region’s firms and employ 85% of its working population. Some of the 
strategies that have been used to assist and modernize small production 
units have involved providing greater access to information and 
technology, suitable marketing channels and financing (ECLAC, 2000d, 
chap. 10). Traditional mechanisms for supporting small businesses, most 
notably subsidized credit from public-sector development institutions, 
have undergone changes in the course of recent financial reforms. Rather 
than providing credit subsidies, today’s support strategies are geared 
towards helping small production units to obtain bank loans. To this end, 
a number of mechanisms have been created to help small businesses 
compile the accounting and financial information that banks need in 
order to evaluate the level of risk associated with such companies. 
In line with this new approach, more recent financial development 
strategies have sought to strengthen development banks as second-tier 
institutions capable of attracting funds in credit and capital markets on a 
wholesale basis and offering lines of credit or rediscounts to first-tier 
banks and institutions that work directly with business firms. A number 
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of instruments have proven useful, including venture capital funds, credit 
insurance or guarantee funds, leasing arrangements and, in the specific 
case of microenterprises, solidarity circles. 
Despite numerous advances in implementing increasingly complex 
and more fully integrated measures, credit access programmes continue 
to have no more than a limited impact, especially in the case of 
microenterprises and the rural sector. The measures adopted to date have 
focused on furnishing complementary (i.e., non-redundant) resources, on 
improving the targeting of small production units and achieving resource 
additionality, and on ensuring neutrality in the granting of credits. The 
greatest difficulties in implementing credit access programmes have been 
information and risk asymmetries, high operating costs, and the limited 
availability of data on micro-credits. Consequently, the financial sector 
still lacks an appropriate mix of public and private institutions to improve 
access to financing for small businesses. 
Another purpose of the reforms introduced in recent decades has 
been to provide low- and medium-income groups with greater access to 
housing. Since the 1980s, most of the countries in the region have 
reoriented their housing assistance policies towards a three-pillar 
approach based on State subsidies, prior savings and mortgage credit. 
Under this new kind of system, commercial banks or specialized 
institutions have opened up mortgage credit lines, explicit rules have 
been established concerning mortgage collateral, and insurance schemes 
have been developed that include mortgage life insurance policies and 
arrangements for handling mortgage operations in the event of 
bankruptcy. 
The implementation of this type of strategy has run up against 
obstacles of two kinds. First, on the operational level, poorer households 
have had difficulties in meeting the prior savings requirement. This is an 
increasingly serious problem in the case of houses having a higher value 
due to rising land prices. Second, financial difficulties have been 
encountered by these programmes due to a shortage of long-term 
financing and the lack of credit instruments capable of simultaneously 
providing security, liquidity and attractive profits for investors. 
4. Three pillars of financial institution-building 
Conditions in the countries of the region over the past decade have 
been marked by sharp contrasts. On the one hand, there have been 
impressive achievements in the areas of price stability, fiscal consolidation 
and macroeconomic management in general. On the other hand, 
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economic crises have followed one after the other, owing in large measure 
to irregular, unequal access to external financing, an inability to boost 
both investment and national saving simultaneously, and the insufficient 
development of the region’s financial systems. Consequently, although 
the region’s economic growth rate has improved since the “lost decade,” 
it is still unsatisfactory. 
The region faces three key challenges in the sphere of development 
financing: (i) to bring about an improvement in the capacity of developing 
countries and the international financial system to prevent and manage 
financial crises more effectively and thus reduce the region’s vulnerability 
to external shocks; (ii) to begin operating more effectively in the world 
economy by pursuing a dynamic process of export development and 
seeking to ensure access to FDI and international financing based on 
strategies geared to each country’s role in world markets; and (iii) to raise 
public and private savings rates and to further the development of the 
countries’ financial systems in order to ensure suitable financial 
intermediation, stimulate long-term financing and facilitate credit access 
for traditionally excluded sectors. 
The problems affecting the international financial system therefore 
need to be thoroughly analysed so that appropriate courses of action can 
be proposed for promoting world economic stability, averting currency 
and financial crises, responding quickly and effectively when such crises 
do arise (especially during times when international liquidity is tight) and 
helping to eliminate debt overhangs, including those of the higher-income 
countries of the region. It is particularly important to prevent the market’s 
tendency to overestimate risk during such periods from exacerbating the 
crisis, thereby creating self-fulfilling prophecies. The role that regional as 
well as world institutions should play in all these respects must be 
examined. Steps should also be taken to explore the development of 
countercyclical macroeconomic policies from a national economic 
perspective, with careful thought being given to the prudential 
management of such policies during boom periods. In addition, attention 
should be devoted to the role of the exchange-rate regime, the regulation 
of capital flows, and the prudential regulation and supervision of 
financial systems. 
It is equally important to identify the different types of ways in 
which the countries of the region have positioned themselves in 
international financial markets and how these linkages tie in with the 
international financial and trade agendas. In both cases, the experience of 
relatively less developed countries merits special attention. Export 
development policies and developing countries’ access to international 
goods and services markets are also areas that warrant further 
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examination. Policies on FDI and other long-term capital flows need to be 
analysed within their proper context, as do the role of multilateral, 
regional and subregional development banks in expanding the countries’ 
access to international financing; how to restore the flow of ODA and how 
to make better use of those resources; and what types of mechanisms 
should be created to expedite the flow of remittances sent by migrants. 
Further consideration also needs to be given to the implications of the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative for our region. 
Increased national saving and national financial development are 
essential preconditions for stability and economic growth. The countries 
therefore need to explore various institutional development and policy 
options for boosting the saving rate while placing top priority on the 
maintenance of a balanced, sustainable macroeconomic environment and 
on long-term incentives for technological innovation and enhanced 
competitiveness. Particular emphasis should be placed on measures for 
enhancing the savings efforts of the public sector and of private firms 
alike and on appropriate institutional mechanisms for encouraging 
household and personal saving. In order to ensure suitable financial 
intermediation, the countries need to move forward with the 
development of effective systems of prudential regulation and 
supervision, improve the standards and statutes that regulate the activity 
of corporations (corporate governance), develop liquid markets and 
instruments for long-term financing, and encourage the creation of new 
financial instruments and activities such as venture capital funds, 
investment funds and securitization. Finally, the striking inequities 
characteristic of this region, which are reflected in the problems 
experienced by the countries in accessing the financial system, call for the 
development of mechanisms for facilitating the provision of credit to 
micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises and to low-income sectors. 
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Chapter 2 
Promoting stability of capital flows for 
development financing 
The dramatic increase seen in international financial flows in recent 
years has been coupled with a trend towards the diversification of those 
flows. As shown in the previous chapter, in the 1990s the region received 
ever-larger amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI), while the 
international bond market, medium- and short-term bank loans, and 
equity portfolio investment also expanded. With the exception of FDI, all 
these flows were highly volatile. Official, bilateral, and multilateral 
sources helped to cushion the impact of financing cycles to some extent by 
providing funds when private capital markets dried up. Official 
development assistance (ODA), which is an important source of funding 
for the relatively less developed countries in the region, has been steadily 
diminishing, however. 
There is well documented evidence that changes in the composition 
of these flows and their variation over time have in large part been 
generated by developments in source countries, particularly the United 
States (see Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993; Culpeper, 1995; Griffith-
Jones, 1998). Institutional changes paved the way for financial 
internationalization. Early in the decade, the recession in the United 
States, a sluggish demand for funds and very low interest rates prompted 
United States investors to start looking for other markets. The high level 
of international liquidity also contributed to a boom in international 
financing in the years leading up to the Asian crisis, and Latin America 
was a receptive market. At peak periods during the boom, a number of 
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Latin American countries received capital inflows far in excess of what 
they could absorb. 
It will be argued here that international financial crises are 
spawned during periods of excessive capital inflows which gradually 
undermine the recipient countries’ macroeconomic fundamentals. These 
crises are, then, an inevitable consequence of the booms in capital inflows 
that precede them. 
In addition, the liquidity crises that tend to sweep over emerging 
economies during times of massive capital outflows generally leave deep 
marks on their economies, including declines in economic activity and 
investment, higher unemployment and a sharp increase in poverty. As 
was discussed in the preceding chapter, there has been a strong 
correlation between the business cycles experienced by Latin America in 
the 1990s and net capital inflows. 
According to the conventional wisdom that has arisen in recent 
years, because financial crises have been of short duration and the 
countries involved tend to return to capital markets relatively quickly, 
there is no need for any far-reaching reforms in the international financial 
system. The information presented in the previous chapter shows up the 
weaknesses of this argument, however. While it is true that some 
countries which are hit by financial crises may manage to return to capital 
markets, their market access conditions tend to worsen, the interest-rate 
spreads on their paper tend to widen, and new contracts often have 
shorter terms and include put options that allow creditors to demand 
early settlement of financial obligations. In fact, years after the Asian 
crisis, financial markets have not yet fully returned to their pre-crisis 
state. 
Moreover, the economic and social costs of crises are often long-
lasting or even permanent. Crises of this sort bring about an abrupt shift 
in an economy’s growth curve, among other reasons because of the 
sudden interruption of the accumulation process and the loss of both 
tangible and intangible (business experience, firms’ reputations and 
commercial contacts) capital. Recovery is hindered for years afterwards 
by domestic financial crises, and the ensuing bailout operations drain 
fiscal and quasi-fiscal accounts for years on end. In addition, as noted in 
the preceding chapter, the effects on social indicators are asymmetrical, 
since employment, poverty and income distribution all worsen rapidly 
during crises but recover slowly, if at all. 
There are two main policy approaches to financial crisis 
management. The first aims at minimizing the chances of a crisis by 
taking preventive measures. The second approach recognizes that no 
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matter what kind of preventive policies are implemented by individual 
countries or by the international community, crises will always occur, so 
it is important to have international and regional tools for dealing with 
them. Another important aspect of crisis management is the prevention of 
contagion, which can unfairly affect other countries even if they have 
solid macroeconomic fundamentals. 
This distinction is somewhat artificial, of course, since a suitable 
institutional structure for crisis management is the best way to avert a 
crisis in the first place. This is because the creation of such institutions will 
influence financial agents’ expectations and behaviour in ways that will 
tend to make crises become less frequent. In fact, to a great extent, crises 
can be said to be the result of a type of behaviour which is motivated by 
the absence of international institutions capable of regulating the 
globalization of financial activity. 
The first section of this chapter examines how situations of risk or 
vulnerability arise and reviews the principal macroeconomic effects of 
capital inflows, with emphasis on the lessons learned from recent 
experiences. The second section analyses the international aspects of crisis 
prevention. The third discusses the types of measures that recipient 
economies can adopt. The fourth section looks at the two main 
dimensions of crisis management, i.e., emergency financing and 
multilateral rules governing the suspension and renegotiation of foreign 
debt obligations. The final section discusses the need to round out the 
international financial architecture with a regional link. 
1. Capital flows and the new generation of financial 
crises 
It is important to distinguish among different types of capital flows, 
since they have different time horizons, respond to different incentives, 
have different agents behind them, and have very different effects on the 
host economies. FDI, for example, has a long-term horizon and has the 
potential to contribute not only capital, but also technology and export 
marketing channels to its host countries.1 Some medium- and long-term 
loans from international banks and suppliers also have a multi-year time 
horizon and are non-speculative in nature, which means that these flows 
are more closely linked to productive investment. 
Portfolio investments and shorter-term bank loans are at the other 
extreme. Many of the agents who supply funds to these markets are 
                                                          
1 As noted in the preceding chapter, however, in recent years a large portion of FDI has 
been used for the acquisition of existing assets (approximately 40%). 
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attracted to emerging economies by the chance of realizing capital gains 
and currency profits by taking advantage of short-term differentials in 
interest rates and the possible appreciation of host-country currencies. 
The actions taken by some agents prompt others to follow suit, generating 
a bandwagon effect. Capital inflows put pressure on exchange rates, stock 
prices, and interest rates, thus yielding windfall profits that stimulate 
additional inflows. The accumulation of liabilities can therefore be 
regarded as a “rational” form of individual behaviour that stems, in large 
part, from the way in which the actions of numerous agents build upon 
one another. 
Investors operating on the basis of short-term horizons will 
therefore continue to supply funds until expectations of an imminent 
change in the trend begin to build up. As the amount of capital invested 
in a country (or region) increases and debtors become increasingly 
dependent on additional infusions of capital (the current account deficit 
plus rollovers of maturing and liquid debts), investors become more 
sensitive to any hint of bad news. In fact, following significant increases in 
share prices and in the value of the local currency, together with rising 
levels of foreign indebtedness, the likelihood of a change in expectations 
grows exponentially. When this change does occur, everyone wants to be 
the first one to pull out in order to avoid losses. The ensuing stampede 
will, therefore, be a “rational” form of behaviour from the standpoint of 
individual agents. 
It is not yet fully understood why a given country becomes a 
“fashionable” destination for capital flows. Sometimes it is because a 
country has made structural reforms that please international markets or 
has attained what is regarded as a sustainable form of macroeconomic 
stability. In other cases, its terms of trade are improving and the trend is 
expected to last for some time. In some instances, even though agents are 
aware that a country is experiencing unsustainable imbalances (e.g., 
Russia before the 1998 crisis), capital inflows continue because markets 
remain liquid and agents therefore think they will be able to pull out in 
time. 
In financially open economies, such as most of the Latin American 
ones, the behaviour of local agents often accentuates the imbalances 
generated by external financial agents. During periods of plentiful capital 
inflows, higher interest rates on local markets and expectations that local 
currencies will appreciate make it very attractive to borrow abroad, but 
just the opposite is true when downward pressure is brought to bear on 
these currencies. During boom periods, local agents also shift the 
composition of their portfolios towards assets denominated in the local 
currency; then, during crises, they liquidate local-currency assets and take 
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refuge in investments denominated in reserve currencies. Furthermore, as 
pointed out in the preceding chapter, many countries’ macroeconomic 
policies not only fail to mitigate the effects of external financing cycles but 
actually tend to exacerbate them. This approach gives rise to procyclical 
patterns of public and private spending and to the revaluation of the 
exchange rate during bouts of euphoria on capital markets. Adjustments 
in the opposite direction thus become inevitable once these exceptional 
conditions cease to exist. 
The speculative component of these flows therefore translates into 
excessive inflows during booms and an interruption of new flows 
coupled with substantial outflows during times of crisis. These outflows 
are usually substantial in the case of short-term loans and equity portfolio 
investments. Situations in which short-term debt begins to exceed 
available international reserves may trigger capital flight. Everyone wants 
to avoid being trapped in a country whose reserves are insufficient to 
meet its short-term obligations. Creditors do not roll over their loans, and 
investors liquidate their assets, sometimes taking substantial capital 
losses. The dynamic of short-term capital flows thus tends to have a 
serious destabilizing effect (Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). Bond holdings, on 
the other hand (which are medium- or long-term investments), may be 
trapped in recipient countries during crises, but they then lose liquidity, 
and governments and local companies will therefore have difficulty 
placing new issues or will have to accept much less favourable financing 
terms (shorter maturities, larger spreads to be paid, and exit options for 
investors). 
A hallmark of these boom-and-bust cycles in volatile capital flows 
is that they tend to be disproportionate in relation to the size of the host 
economy. It is not unusual for a country that is “fashionable” on 
international capital markets to receive inflows amounting to 10% of GDP 
or more. Net capital flows to emerging economies also tend to be very 
large compared to the size of their financial markets. In contrast to 
developed economies, where net capital flows are rarely equivalent to 
more than 5% of the money supply (measured by M2), in emerging 
economies this proportion may amount to between 10% and 25% during 
booms (see table 2.1). 
Inflows of this magnitude are very difficult to absorb without 
destabilizing the recipient economies. Typically, the real exchange rate 
appreciates, the current account deficit swells, the money supply expands, 
stock market and real estate prices rise disproportionately, and external 




NET CAPITAL FLOWSa AS A PERCENTAGE OF M2 IN SELECTED 
EMERGING AND DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 
Country 1990-1998 1990-1994 1995-1998 
Argentina  22.0 25.5 18.2 
Brazil  7.2 3.3 10.4 
Canada  3.1 4.2 1.7 
Chile  18.6 18.9 19.2 
Colombia 18.5 11.8 26.0 
Ecuador 19.6 16.4 19.3 
Indonesia 3.1 2.1 4.2 
Japan  9.1 8.9 8.4 
Malaysia  1.7 1.8 1.7 
Mexico 11.2 13.2 6.3 
Republic of Korea 18.9 23.8 12.9 
Switzerland 5.7 4.7 7.0 
United States 5.7 5.3 6.0 
Venezuela 14.5 18.5 11.4 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, Washington, D.C., February 
2000. 
a
 Net inflows or outflows (outflows in Switzerland and Japan, inflows in the other countries). 
host country finds itself in a vulnerable position in which any “bad news” 
(economic or political) be it national, regional, or even from distant 
developing countries or any turnaround in conditions in industrialized 
countries can trigger capital flight and a speculative attack on the local 
currency. 
From the standpoint of host countries’ policies, an essential feature 
of these sharp fluctuations in international capital flows is that they have 
a highly exogenous component. Because of the exogeneity of international 
capital flows, there is an important lesson here for host countries: the 
maintenance of macroeconomic balances is not enough in itself to keep 
capital flows stable. In fact, sometimes macroeconomic stability itself, if it 
is perceived as a permanent condition, may attract capital in quantities 
that end up destabilizing the recipient economies. 
Another manifestation of the exogenous nature of capital flows is 
contagion. When a crisis breaks out in one country, international creditors 
and investors will try to pull out before a similar crisis occurs in other 
countries that have received large inflows of foreign capital and that may 
exhibit some of the symptoms shown by the country in crisis. 
Furthermore, some highly leveraged international investors who sustain 
losses in one country will be forced to liquidate investments in other 
countries to restore their own liquidity in the face of margin calls or 
withdrawals. This may cause a financial crisis to spread even to countries 
with sound macroeconomic fundamentals. One piece of evidence 
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regarding the extent to which this type of behaviour pattern causes events 
in one economy to be transmitted to the rest is the close correlation 
existing among external credit conditions for countries having very 
different macroeconomic fundamentals (Bustillo and Velloso, 2000). As 
shown in table 2.2, the correlation coefficients for bond spreads in the 
countries of the region are fairly high. Although to some extent these 
coefficients are consistent with the real and financial interrelationships 
existing among these economies, they are mainly a reflection of the 
behaviour of investors that fail to distinguish between countries having 
different macroeconomic policies and fundamentals. 
Table 2.2 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR BOND SPREADS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(December 1997-September 2000) 
 Argentina Brazil Ecuador Mexico Panama Peru Venezuela EMBI+a  Latin 
American 
EMBI 
Argentina  1.00         
Brazil  0.86 1.00        
Ecuador 0.27 0.21   1.00       
Mexico 0.78 0.91 -0.02 1.00      
Panama 0.90 0.85   0.42 0.73 1.00     
Peru 0.76 0.64   0.15 0.69 0.59 1.00    
Venezuela 0.90 0.85   0.19 0.83 0.83 0.72 1.00   































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+). 
a J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus. 
Contagion has a significant regional component. After the Mexican 
crisis of December 1994, Argentina also registered copious outflows of 
capital. Following the crisis that broke out in Thailand in July 1997, capital 
stampeded out of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong, Singapore, the Chinese province of 
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. In 1998-2000, practically every country 
in South America experienced severe international financial difficulties, 
even though many of them had quite sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals prior to the onset of their difficulties. 
Some of the economies that felt the impact of the latest 
international financial crisis were well prepared to deal with capital flight; 
other countries were exhibiting some signs of fragility when the crisis hit 
(high levels of short-term debt relative to international reserves, large 
current account deficits and an appreciation of the exchange rate that was 
ECLAC 74 
unsustainable over the long run). It should be emphasized, however, that 
crises can affect economies in very different states of health. Even the 
Republic of Korea, one of the hardest-hit countries, had quite solid 
macroeconomic fundamentals, since it had a fairly well-balanced fiscal 
budget and low inflation and had maintained a notably high growth rate 
for quite some time. Neither its current account deficit nor the 
appreciation of its currency in the years immediately preceding the crisis 
were excessive. Its principal weaknesses were a ratio of short-term debt to 
reserves of more than 1.0, and companies with high gearing ratios, which 
made them very vulnerable to rising interest rates, shrinking demand and 
currency depreciation (Agosin, 2000a). One of the lessons to be learned 
from the recent financial crisis is, then, that they can affect both saints and 
sinners alike. 
The hallmarks of this new generation of financial crises are thus the 
magnitude and intensity of external financing cycles, their strong 
exogenous elements and the high risk of contagion. These characteristics 
are largely attributable to decisions taken by short-sighted agents 
specializing in microfinance, whose actions build on one other (Pfaff, 
2000). The outcome, unsurprisingly, is unsustainable macroeconomic 
imbalances, “wrong” or outlier macroprices and an unfavourable 
environment for productive investment (particularly in tradables). It is 
therefore imperative to work towards the creation of an international 
environment that is less likely to generate financial cycles of this sort, 
together with institutions capable of dealing with volatility when it 
occurs. It is equally important for macroeconomic policy makers in 
developing countries to avoid placing the economy in a vulnerable 
position during periods of euphoria on international capital markets, 
since only then will it be possible to attain a sustainable macroeconomic 
equilibrium and create an environment conducive to investment and 
growth. 
2. Crisis prevention: international aspects 
The shortcomings of the existing international institutional 
structure in providing an appropriate framework of governance for 
international capital transactions are becoming increasingly evident. At 
present, the international community does not have the tools it needs to 
provide an increasingly globalized world economic system with the 
global public goods it requires, one of which is international financial 
stability.2 From the standpoint of the issues of concern to us here, the 
                                                          
2 There is a great deal of literature on the issues addressed in the following discussion. 
Regarding the concept of “global public goods” as applied to the international financial 
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three basic elements involved in ensuring an adequate supply of this 
particular global public good are: (a) coherence among the major 
economies’ macroeconomic policies and development of a normative 
framework and surveillance systems to monitor all countries’ 
macroeconomic policies; (b) development of an appropriate international 
financial institutional structure to prevent the build-up of an excessive 
level of financial risk; and (c) a speedy response capacity for coping with 
crises that threaten international financial stability. As will be seen further 
on in this chapter, these elements also have regional dimensions. 
(a) Global macroeconomic management 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed (but 
adjustable) parities, the nominal and real variability of advanced 
countries’ currencies has increased tremendously (Krugman, 1989). The 
resulting privatization of exchange-rate risk fueled the development of 
worldwide financial markets (Eatwell, 1997; Eatwell and Taylor, 2000). 
Although the financial development process has led to the creation of 
special instruments for managing the associated risks, it has also given 
rise to additional elements of financial and macroeconomic instability to 
which developing countries are particularly vulnerable. 
This instability is related to the marked asymmetry existing 
between the dynamic development of world financial markets and the 
lack of adequate macroeconomic and financial governance at the global 
level. The globalization process has made it necessary to coordinate the 
major developed countries’ macroeconomic policies more closely in order 
to achieve the policy coherence necessary for global macroeconomic 
stability. Developing countries’ interests must be suitably represented in 
these coordination schemes in order to ensure that the major economies’ 
macroeconomic policies are designed to internalize their impact on 
developing countries, reduce the volatility of their exchange rates and 
smooth out external financing cycles, all of which have proven to be very 
costly for developing countries. 
This coordination must be coupled with the surveillance of all 
countries’ macroeconomic policies and the development of basic 
standards for the management of fiscal, monetary, and financial policies. 
Surveillance functions, which at the global level are the responsibility of 
the International Monetary Fund and are carried out by means of the 
                                                                                                                                    
system, see Helleiner (2000), Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999), and Wyplosz (1999). 
Regarding international financial reform, see, among others, IMF (1998, 1999 and 2000), 
United Nations (1999), UNCTAD (1998), Akyüz and Cornford (1999), Eatwell and Taylor 
(2000), Eichengreen (1999), Fischer (1999), Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (1999), Ocampo 
(1999a and 1999b), and White (2000). 
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consultation process conducted under article IV of its Articles of 
Agreement, should be clearly preventive in nature. In order to make this 
possible, surveillance must be backed up by mechanisms for monitoring 
events on financial markets and by vulnerability indicators or an early 
warning system. The nature of the preventive macroeconomic policies 
that developing economies should adopt will be discussed in the 
following section. 
The policy approaches outlined in that discussion could be used to 
improve the standards for macroeconomic management being developed 
by IMF. These standards currently include codes of best practice for 
transparency in fiscal matters and in monetary and financial policy, and 
they may be expanded to include codes of best practice for public debt 
and foreign debt management. In any event, these codes should observe 
two basic principles. First, developing countries’ policy-making 
autonomy should be upheld, and this includes their right to choose their 
own exchange regime and the type of capital account regulations they feel 
are best suited to national conditions (United Nations, 1999; Ocampo, 
1999b). Second, these countries have a limited capacity to absorb complex 
regulations, and the standards to be adopted should therefore take into 
account their institutional constraints, especially in the case of the less 
developed countries, along with their macroeconomic policy traditions. 
As will be discussed in greater detail later on, the design of 
subregional and regional macroeconomic policy surveillance and 
coordination schemes should also be an objective for developing 
countries. This issue is becoming increasingly important in Latin America 
and the Caribbean as a result of the integration processes now under way 
and the contagion that has characterized financial markets. 
(b) An appropriate institutional framework for financial stability 
International financial stability also requires an appropriate global 
institutional framework. This framework has two important components: 
minimum standards for the prudential regulation and supervision of 
financial systems, and the provision of the information that financial 
markets need to function properly. The adoption of standards in all of 
these areas fulfils the dual purpose of guaranteeing greater stability for 
national financial systems and allowing them to establish a more stable 
position in international markets. As already noted in connection with 
macroeconomic policy, the corresponding standards should take into 
account the different countries’ absorption capacities and their regulatory 
traditions. 
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Prudential regulation and supervision play a key role in preventing 
financial agents from undertaking excessive risks and in ensuring that 
they have sufficient assets to cover the risks they do assume. The prime 
objective pursued by these means is to prevent the emergence of systemic 
problems. The stringency of these standards should therefore be 
consistent with the risks assumed by economic agents as a group, rather 
than gauging their exposure simply on an individual basis. 
In industrialized countries, the focus should be on the regulation 
and supervision of the more highly leveraged institutions and 
transactions. Despite an awareness of these problems, progress in this 
area has been halting, and the steps that have been taken have mainly 
focused on indirect regulation (of credit intermediaries) rather than taking 
a direct approach. Industrialized countries should also give due weight to 
an adequate risk assessment of the transactions they carry out with net 
borrower countries. This is especially important in the case of short-term 
funds and instances in which the sums involved in these operations are 
disproportionate to the size of those countries’ economies and financial 
sectors. These kinds of risk assessments would discourage high-risk 
financing at its source, and these issues are, in fact, being discussed in the 
G-7 Financial Stability Forum, but developing countries are not well 
represented in that debate. The standards that should apply to such 
countries are outlined later on in this chapter and are discussed in greater 
depth in chapter 4. Furthermore, effective measures should be adopted in 
all countries to prevent and punish money laundering and other financial 
crimes in accordance with the recommendations on this subject issued by 
the United Nations.3 
The role played by information in ensuring the proper operation of 
financial systems has been widely recognized in the recent economic 
literature. Although some information problems may be insurmountable 
(information asymmetries between creditors and borrowers regarding 
projects and the latter’s financial situation), transparent information 
undoubtedly helps markets to function better. 
Some observers have asserted that one of the main causes of recent 
crises has been a lack of information about countries that have been 
receiving large capital inflows. This argument is not completely on target, 
however. In point of fact, in most cases basic information on 
macroeconomic conditions in the principal emerging economies was 
available long before the countries were hit by these financial crises. 
Moreover, as stated in the previous section, even with adequate 
information, it may be rational for individual agents with short-term time 
                                                          
3 See Blum and others (1998) and United Nations (1998). 
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horizons to take positions which, from a collective standpoint, generate a 
high level of systemic risk (Ffrench-Davis, 1999, chapter VIII.C). It should 
also be remembered that the same information can be interpreted very 
differently at different points in time depending on economic agents’ 
expectations. This is true even of the best-informed economic agents 
(investment banks, rating agencies, intergovernmental bodies and 
governments themselves). In other words, the essential problem is the 
volatility of economic agents’ opinions and expectations, not necessarily 
the factual information on which they base their decisions (Ocampo, 
1999a; Eatwell and Taylor, 2000). 
Be this as it may, measures designed to improve the quality, 
quantity and transparency of the information available to economic 
agents certainly can help enhance market efficiency and the stability of 
capital flows (Ahluwalia, 2000). Several important initiatives have been 
undertaken in this area in recent years. One of them is the development 
by IMF of standards for the provision of timely, high-quality economic 
and financial market information. To date, around 50 countries are 
participating in this initiative. Achieving greater uniformity in the data 
provided on business firms’ financial and accounting positions also 
facilitates an accurate interpretation of the information. The International 
Standards on Accounting and Reporting now under discussion within 
UNCTAD offer a good opportunity to achieve greater uniformity in 
countries’ accounting practices. The development of a deep and 
transparent equities market can also help cushion the impact of sharp 
swings in international capital flows. A larger supply of high-quality 
accounting information on different companies can contribute to this 
objective as well. To this end, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) has developed a basic set of accounting standards for 
adoption by the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO). 
Rating agencies are one of the main types of private institutions 
responsible for providing information to investors, but their performance 
during the recent financial crisis was unsatisfactory. This was because, as 
it turned out, they were not immune to the volatility of opinions and 
expectations of the economic agents involved in emerging markets during 
the sharp financial boom-and-bust cycles of the 1990s. This fact, together 
with the inclusion of “subjective” elements in their rating of sovereign 
risk, has generated a procyclical pattern of risk assessment. As a result, in 
instances where the market regards the information they provide as being 
credible, they have tended to exacerbate financial cycles rather than 
attenuating them (which is what a good information system should do). 
In some instances, however, the information furnished by rating agencies 
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has not been heeded by the market, which, for that matter, has access to 
the same information regarding sovereign risk that rating agencies do. 
In effect, the major agencies’ ratings of Latin American countries 
during the 1990s were in line with the trend of the business cycle, as 
ratings were lowered during the Mexican currency crisis, improved in 
1995-1997 and then moved downward again in 1998-1999. What is more, 
as is shown in table 2.3, rating agencies do not appear to have supplied 
the market with any additional information. Between July 1998 and 
December 2000, spreads were already moving in the direction that would 
later be indicated by rating agencies’ announcements in 70% of all cases. 
And more than 70% of the time, spreads moved in just the opposite 
direction as that suggested by these agencies following these 
announcements. 
Table 2.3 
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STANDARD & POOR’S AND MOODY’S RATINGS 
ON MARKET BEHAVIOUR 
(July 1998-September 2000) 
(a) Market moves in direction indicated by rating changes prior to their announcement 
 
 Yes No Inconclusive 
 
3 months before 12 5 - 
1 month before 6 11 - 
 
(b) Market moves in direction indicated by rating changes following their announcement 
 
 Yes No Inconclusive 
 
3 months before 5 12 - 
1 month before 6 10 1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Merrill Lynch, Emerging Markets Debt Quarterly, October 
2000. 
This indicates that the governments of developed countries, 
perhaps with the help of multilateral financial institutions, should take 
steps to encourage private institutions to rate sovereign risk on the basis 
of strict, objective parameters that are publicly known. These principles 
should also serve as a foundation for the development of systems for the 
regulation and supervision of these agencies’ activities and of 
mechanisms for exchanging information between them and regulatory 
bodies. A more radical alternative would be to replace the sovereign risk 
ratings now provided by these agencies with a rating system applied by 
supervisory bodies in the countries of issue in accordance with objective 
parameters agreed upon internationally. 
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(c) An effective crisis response capacity 
The financial crises of the past prompted the development of 
national instruments such as the lender-of-last-resort function of central 
banks, mechanisms for intervening in distressed financial institutions, 
deposit insurance and rules for refinancing or liquidating non-financial 
entities that run into difficulties. Although these mechanisms were 
designed as crisis management tools, they also have a preventive function 
because they help discourage the destabilizing types of expectations that 
generate systemic crises. 
At least for the time being, however, it does not appear to be 
feasible to implement the majority of these mechanisms at the 
international level. The only one that has been applied at this level so far 
is a limited version of the lender of last resort, which takes the form of the 
IMF emergency credits granted to countries in trouble. However, its 
development has lagged far behind the growth of the international 
financial market. Giving the Fund a greater response capacity for coping 
with crises caused by sharp fluctuations in international capital markets 
would help to prevent destabilizing expectations from heightening crises 
in the affected countries. During recent crises, IMF intervention has also 
been important in preventing serious problems of contagion.  
This kind of intervention can, however, lead to problems of moral 
hazard (i.e., the assumption of excessive risk by creditors or borrowers 
based on the expectation that they will be bailed out if they run into 
trouble). This is why it must be coupled with appropriate systems for the 
prudential regulation and supervision of financial activities and with 
procedures for ensuring that creditors will bear a fair share of the costs of 
resolving financial crises. The first of these elements has already been 
discussed; the latter will be analysed in the fourth section of this chapter. 
3. Preventive policies in recipient countries 
It is the responsibility of recipient countries to prevent the 
economic booms associated with heavy capital inflows from triggering 
crises. These measures should be oriented, first and foremost, towards the 
prudential management of those booms. This system of management 
should be paired with a foreign-exchange regime that strikes a balance 
between real exchange-rate stability and a degree of flexibility that will 
allow the economy to adapt to external financial shocks. It should also be 
backed up by “self-insurance” mechanisms that provide protection 
against external disturbances. The relative importance of the various 
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instruments and measures will vary according to the structural 
characteristics and macroeconomic tradition of each country.4 
(a) Prudential management of booms 
Consistent and flexible macroeconomic management during booms 
is the primary component of any crisis prevention policy. This 
management effort should be oriented towards preventing public and 
private agents from building up unsustainably large debts and towards 
avoiding imbalances in key prices, especially the exchange rate and the 
prices of national assets (financial assets and real estate). In the area of 
fiscal policy, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4 of this report, 
the authorities should strive to establish a structural balance or even a 
surplus in public finances in order to help strengthen the economy’s 
savings capacity and give themselves more manoeuvring room for the 
implementation of countercyclical policies. This requires the generation of 
budget surpluses during booms, preferably through public revenue 
stabilization funds (for tax revenues and, where relevant, for government 
proceeds from commodity exports), in order to give policy makers the 
leeway they need to ease fiscal constraints during the subsequent 
downturn and, in particular, to soften the impact of the crisis on the most 
vulnerable sectors of society. It should be noted that in addition to funds 
set up to stabilize earnings from commodity exports, which already exist 
in several countries (coffee and oil funds in Colombia, copper and oil 
funds in Chile, and an oil fund in Venezuela), general tax revenue 
stabilization funds have recently been established under new fiscal 
responsibility legislation.5 The international community should support 
the design of these types of stabilization instruments.6 
Monetary and exchange policies should be geared towards 
preventing cyclical booms from leading to spikes in external and domestic 
borrowing by the private sector and unsustainable surges in the real 
exchange rate. These measures will be more effective if they are 
accompanied by the prudential regulation of capital inflows, the 
prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system, and an 
explicit liability policy aimed at improving the maturity profile of public 
and private debt from both domestic and external sources. In addition, 
                                                          
4 These issues are discussed in greater detail in ECLAC (2000d, chapter 8). 
5 For a discussion of the advisability of these general tax stabilization mechanisms, see 
ECLAC (1998b). 
6 For example, multilateral banks could set up credit systems designed to underpin social 
safety nets.  Under such a system, during periods of fiscal prosperity, national matching 
funds could be deposited in interest-bearing accounts in the banks, where they would be 
held until the next time a crisis hits and the credit is disbursed. 
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the experiences of Asian and Latin American economies during recent 
crises have shown that it is counterproductive to place too much 
emphasis on interest rates as a means of stabilization while curbing 
adjustments in the exchange rate because this will accelerate the 
deterioration of the financial situation and will put additional pressure on 
government coffers (owing to the cost of bailing out the financial sector 
and the increase in the cost of servicing the domestic public debt, 
especially if it is large).7 
The prudential regulation of capital inflows serves the same 
function as a liability policy in the case of external indebtedness, and to 
the extent that they are effective in reducing capital inflows, they also give 
macroeconomic authorities more breathing room for the adoption of tight 
monetary policies during booms and the prevention of an unsustainable 
appreciation in the exchange rate. Permanent prudential regulation 
instruments especially variable reserve requirements or taxes on capital 
inflows which can be tightened or loosened as needed are preferable to 
alternating between allowing the free inflow of capital and imposing 
quantitative controls on outflows during times of crisis. In fact, the latter 
system can be entirely futile if policy makers improvise by applying it 
without prior planning during crises. In such cases, rather than producing 
the expected results, it may lead to the massive evasion or avoidance of 
controls. 
Chile and Colombia have both been successful in managing capital 
flows by applying non-interest-bearing reserve requirements to financial 
flows.8 A number of studies have concluded that this instrument has had 
positive effects on the maturity profile of foreign debt, as it increases the 
cost of short-term borrowing without affecting the flow of longer-term 
capital.9 These studies indicate that reserve requirements have also been 
effective in reducing total inflows of capital or, in what amounts to the 
same thing, in providing greater scope for a sustainable increase in 
domestic interest rates and/or modifying devaluation expectations. The 
question as to whether or not these effects actually do occur has, however, 
been more controversial.10 To the extent that there is an imperfect 
substitution between short- and long-term capital (especially on the 
                                                          
7 For an analysis of these variables in the case of Latin America, see ECLAC (1999a). 
8 Until May 2000, Chile also required that foreign portfolio and direct investments remain 
in the country for one year. Colombia directly regulates such investments. 
9 Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (2000); Agosin (1998); Larraín, Labán y Chumacero (1997); Le 
Fort and Lehmann (2000); Barrera and Cárdenas (1997); Ocampo and Tovar (1999); and 
Villar and Rincón (2000). 
10 See also, in this regard, Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998) and de Gregorio, Edwards and 
Valdés (2000). 
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supply side), the effects of this instrument on the maturity profile of 
liabilities should also reduce total capital inflows. 
It has been argued that improving the prudential regulation and 
supervision of financial systems could serve as a substitute for the 
prudential regulation of capital flows (Mishkin, 1999). There is no doubt 
that proper financial regulation and supervision are crucial in achieving 
domestic macroeconomic stability. They may also help buttress the 
economy’s lines of defense against instabilities associated with capital 
flows. An essential element in small, financially open economies is 
controlling currency mismatches between assets and liabilities in the 
financial system, but when non-financial firms, especially the larger ones, 
have direct access to external credit, prudential regulations will be 
ineffective in preventing such currency mismatches for the economy as a 
whole. The mismatches that are accumulated during boom periods will 
undermine the solidity of the financial system because non-financial 
agents with both external and local-currency liabilities will eventually run 
into difficulties. The fundamental advantage of reserve requirements or 
taxes on capital inflows is precisely that they apply a non-discriminatory 
price instrument to both financial and non-financial agents alike. This 
measure also attacks the problem at its roots, i.e., the excessive increase in 
external borrowing and the differential that tends to exist between the 
cost of external and domestic borrowing during booms owing to 
expectations of an appreciation of the currency. 
The only effective substitute for the direct prudential regulation of 
capital flows is a combination of prudential regulation of financial 
intermediaries and tax mechanisms designed to discourage external 
borrowing by non-financial agents; one example would be the taxation of 
business enterprises’ net foreign-currency debtor positions, as suggested 
by Fischer (1998). This type of measure would not affect borrowing by 
natural persons or equity investments, however. Another consideration is 
that designing a system of flexible taxation of external borrowing by non-
financial companies is considerably more complex than regulating capital 
flows at the border. 
A flexible exchange rate is a disincentive for short-term borrowing 
and for some types of portfolio flows, and in this sense it acts somewhat 
like a liability policy as well, but it does not help attenuate medium-term 
financing cycles. On the contrary, expectations of fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate may actually accentuate these cycles (Ffrench-Davis and 
Ocampo, 2000). 
Prudential regulation and supervision can, in any case, be a useful 
tool for preventing domestic credit from expanding too rapidly during 
boom periods. In order for these instruments to serve this purpose, 
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however, they have to be applied countercyclically (ECLAC, 2000d, 
chapter 8) in order to counter the procyclical effects of the traditional 
approaches used in this sphere (including the Basle Core Principles). This 
is because, during booms, the capital increases made possible by 
intermediaries’ burgeoning profits enhance their credit capacity, whereas 
there is a considerable lag before the debt overhangs of non-financial 
agents become apparent and are then reflected in provisioning levels. On 
the other hand, during times of crisis, smaller profits, the increase in non-
performing loans and higher provisions weaken financial institutions’ 
credit capacity, which can reduce liquidity and hence the ability of 
businesses to meet their loan obligations. These phenomena are 
accentuated by asset price cycles, since during booms, real estate and 
equities used by borrowers as loan collateral are valued at inflated prices 
and can thus be used to over-borrow; the opposite occurs during 
recessions. 
These factors should be taken into consideration in the design of 
instruments for the prudential regulation and supervision of financial 
intermediaries. During cyclical booms, capital requirements and/or rating 
standards should be more rigorous, as should supervision, especially for 
financial institutions whose portfolios are expanding rapidly. Another 
option is to place limitations on the value of equities and real estate that 
can be used as collateral. During downturns, on the other hand, it is 
important to prevent regulatory restrictions from aggravating credit 
constraints and illiquidity problems, which could undermine the quality 
of portfolios in the financial system. 
It should be emphasized that credits are not the only flows that can 
be excessive or destabilizing. Portfolio investments tend to be extremely 
volatile, and they can rise to very high levels in countries that are 
beginning to open up their financial systems. For all of these reasons, it is 
important for countries to be free to adopt the policies best suited to their 
circumstances. Accordingly, obstacles should not be placed in a country’s 
way if it wishes to undertake the prudential regulation of capital flows. 
On the contrary, international institutions should help provide 
information on the experiences that a number of countries have already 
had in this regard so that other countries can expand their range of 
options and learn from what others have done. 
(b) The foreign-exchange regime 
The foreign-exchange regime is subject to a range of contradictory 
demands that are quite difficult to reconcile. First, the long-term 
performance and diversification of a country’s exports are strongly 
influenced by the real exchange rate. In terms of trade activity, it is 
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therefore advisable to have appropriate, stable incentives for international 
specialization. Second, strong external shocks which are transmitted 
primarily through the capital account, but also through the trade 
account generate a demand for flexible economic instruments that can 
help an economy to absorb those shocks. Third, given the existence of 
major currency mismatches between developing countries’ assets and 
liabilities, variations in the exchange rate have considerable wealth effects. 
In recent times, the idea has taken hold that the only stable foreign-
exchange systems are those located at the two extremes of the spectrum: 
either a completely flexible exchange rate or a strong anchor for the 
exchange rate (convertibility or dollarization). This view is based on the 
argument that intermediate systems, such as those based on a managed 
form of flexibility or “soft anchors”, are highly vulnerable to speculation. 
This argument emphasizes the possibility that capital movements may be 
generated endogenously in response to inconsistencies between foreign-
exchange policy and other economic policies. Nevertheless, the major 
challenge for the various systems is how to manage largely exogenous 
fluctuations in the capital account. In this regard, the systems at either 
extreme do not resolve the problems posed in the preceding paragraph 
but instead simply disregard some of the demands made on a foreign-
exchange regime. 
Even with national macroeconomic policies that are designed to 
keep inflation low, a floating exchange regime imparts a high degree of 
volatility to both the nominal and real exchange rates in a world in which 
capital is intrinsically volatile. An overabundance of capital can cause 
symptoms of Dutch disease to appear during booms that may have long-
lasting effects. In more general terms, exchange-rate instability creates 
inconsistent incentives in sectors that produce tradables. This can 
discourage investment in these sectors, thus dampening economic 
growth. Furthermore, in the presence of major currency mismatches, 
fluctuations in the exchange rate will have procyclical wealth effects 
(profits generated by the appreciation of the currency during booms and 
losses due to the depreciation of the currency during crises) that 
accentuate the business cycle. In small, open economies with very shallow 
currency markets, extremely strong pressures that can have severe effects 
on economic activity and price levels can be generated by changes in the 
expectations of just a few dominant agents.  
The major advantage of having a nominal anchor is that, so long as 
it is accompanied by prudent fiscal policies, the real exchange rate 
remains stable. In many instances, however, the stability of this 
macroeconomic price is achieved only when the currency has already 
become overvalued during the transition. On the other hand, the volatility 
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of capital flows tends to destabilize domestic activity in countries using 
this type of regime. This is even more the case when a nominal anchor is 
used in conjunction with a currency board.11 This problem represents a 
formidable challenge for countries that have opted for a nominal anchor. 
During periods of heavy capital inflows, the authorities allow the 
monetization of increases in reserves, and economic activity will be 
buoyant. During times of pessimism, capital flows out of the country, the 
money supply shrinks, GDP falls and unemployment rises. The absence 
of mechanisms to facilitate the adjustment of relative prices to external 
shocks (falling export prices, the devaluation of an important trading 
partner’s currency or the appreciation of the currency to which the 
country’s exchange rate is tied) can entail high adjustment costs. If the 
authorities relinquish the use of monetary policy, however, the central 
bank cannot serve as a lender of last resort, and this may lead to serious 
problems if the national financial system is overtaken by a crisis. 
The main strength of intermediate (i.e., “managed flexibility”) 
regimes, which include dirty floats, exchange-rate bands and crawling 
pegs, is that they seek to combine flexibility with stability. As has already 
been pointed out, this can generate speculative pressures if the 
authorities’ decisions do not enjoy enough credibility. This points up a 
major difference between “soft” anchors and systems of managed 
flexibility, however, since the former lack the usual types of mechanisms 
for maintaining flexibility and are therefore particularly vulnerable to 
speculation. An essential characteristic of managed flexibility systems is 
that, in order to combine flexibility with stability, they need to provide for 
some type of regulation of capital flows so that they can respond to the 
many different demands mentioned earlier. Another of their strengths is 
thus their ability to use other instruments besides the exchange rate to 
cope with pressure generated by the capital account. 
In more general terms, the most important lesson to be drawn from 
the way exchange rates have functioned over the past few decades is that 
no single foreign-exchange regime is the best one for all countries at all 
times. Every country must choose the degree of nominal exchange-rate 
flexibility it needs, in keeping with its objectives and its real possibilities 
for managing other economic policy variables.12 
                                                          
11 With this type of system, policy makers explicitly renounce the use of monetary policy, 
whether by allowing the monetization of increases in international reserves or by 
allowing liquidity to contract when reserves shrink.  When a nominal anchor is used but 
there is no currency board, the central bank still has the ability to sterilize the monetary 
effects of changes in international reserves. 
12 For a more detailed analysis of the issues discussed in this section, see Frankel (1999), 
Hausmann (2000), Velasco (2000), and Williamson (2000). 
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(c) “Self-insurance” mechanisms 
One way of preventing crises is to maintain sufficient (current or 
contingent) reserves to deal with them. The existence of this form of “self-
insurance” serves to discourage speculative attacks on local currencies 
and thus helps ward off crises.  
Building up international reserves can be costly, however, since, as 
recent crises have shown, net capital outflows can amount to several 
percentage points of GDP. If a crisis is severe enough, even national 
agents may shift most of their demand for liquid assets to assets 
denominated in foreign currencies. Stated more generally, the essential 
problem is that international reserves have a high opportunity cost 
because their social productivity is low. Nonetheless, there is no doubt 
that international reserves should be higher in countries that are active on 
international capital markets than in countries with more closed capital 
accounts. 
Some countries (Argentina, Mexico and Indonesia) have attempted 
to take out “self-insurance” by negotiating contingent lines of credit with 
private international banks, for which they pay a commission (equivalent 
to a call option). This is an interesting alternative that may prove to be less 
costly than maintaining high levels of reserves. The market for these lines 
of credit is still at an early stage in its development, however, and, here 
again, the supply of such funds may be insufficient in times of severe 
crisis, particularly if contagion becomes a concern. 
Consequently, self-insurance, while necessary and appropriate, is 
costly and is therefore a second-best solution when compared to collective 
insurance programmes backed up, in this case, by multilateral 
instruments capable of providing the necessary international liquidity. 
4. Crisis management 
No matter how appropriate preventive policies adopted at the 
international and national levels may be, crises will continue to occur, and 
suitable multilateral crisis-management mechanisms are therefore 
needed. In fact, the existence of an adequate crisis response capacity is the 
best way to reduce the chances that a crisis will occur in the first place. It 
is equally important to back up these mechanisms with adequate 
adjustment measures at the national level. 
In theory, there are two ways to deal with international financial 
crises. The first is to create an emergency financing facility which will 
partially replicate lender-of-last-resort functions at the international level. 
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The second option is to allow the countries affected by the crisis to 
temporarily apply a debt standstill and suspend outflows of portfolio 
capital. An alternative to taking these steps on a unilateral basis would be 
to establish orderly multilateral rules for this type of action. As will be 
discussed in greater depth later on, however, the two options are not 
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the second course of action may be 
necessary to ensure a proper distribution of the costs of the adjustment 
between debtors and creditors and to avoid the moral hazard problems 
associated with emergency financing. 
(a) Emergency financing 
Recent crises have made it clear that governments’ ability to take 
action at critical junctures has lagged far behind the development of 
financial markets. Indeed, there has been a dramatic reduction in central 
banks’ international reserves relative to international capital flows. In 
1977, the ratio of banks’ international reserves to annual transactions on 
foreign-exchange markets was 1 to 15, but by 1998 it had fallen to just 1 to 
234.13 This means that, at the same time as the volume of international 
capital transactions has been mushrooming, the ability of even the largest 
countries to combat speculative trends on international capital markets 
has been steadily deteriorating. 
Nor does the IMF have the authority or the resources to undertake 
this task. In its present institutional form, it is not in a position to become 
a lender of last resort (see Eichengreen, 1999; Ocampo, 1999a; Rodrik, 
1999a). So long as it does not have the ability to create money 
unconditionally,14 it will not have the means to serve as the central banks’ 
central banker. Nor does it have the authority to ensure that it will be able 
to recover the funds it lends. Although the principal mechanism for 
mobilizing resources under exceptional conditions loan agreements 
with the main industrialized countries was expanded during the latest 
crisis, its resources are still limited and have therefore had to be 
supplemented at the most critical junctures with bilateral resources 
provided on an ad hoc basis. The uncertainty created by all these 
financing mechanisms reduces their ability to send signals that will 
bolster confidence, particularly in the face of crises that are of a much 
greater magnitude and that spread much more quickly than in the past. 
                                                          
13 Calculations based on Felix (2000, table 6). 
14 The creation of special drawing rights (SDR) is one way of issuing means of payment, 
but it requires an explicit agreement by the Fund’s Board in each case, with an 85% 
majority vote. The last time SDRs were issued was in January 1981. 
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In the wake of the Mexican crisis, IMF set up the Emergency 
Financing Mechanism, which allows it to take action more swiftly during 
severe crises. It also created two additional facilities: the Supplemental 
Reserve Facility (SRF), for exceptionally large-scale financing needs; and 
Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs), designed to help countries to resist 
financial contagion. The SRF is subject to traditional stand-by 
arrangements, and has already been used. In order to be eligible for CCLs, 
countries must have received a positive evaluation during the annual 
consultations carried out under article IV of the IMF Articles of 
Agreement and must have adopted some of the standards mentioned in 
the second section of this chapter. One of the conditions for disbursement 
of the corresponding funds is that they must also enter into a stand-by 
arrangement. Given the uncertainty that still exists about some of the 
conditions for using this line of credit, the possibility that countries may 
send negative signals to the market if they avail themselves of this option, 
and the modest amount of funds available, it is not surprising that no 
country has yet applied for it. 
The conditions imposed under IMF programmes have been the 
subject of heated controversy in recent years. It has been argued, first of 
all, that the Fund’s traditional macroeconomic conditionality (particularly 
with regard to the adoption of tight fiscal and monetary policies designed 
to deal with financial crises originating in the current account of the 
balance of payments) may be inappropriate when the crisis stems from 
the capital account, and even less so when it is a result of contagion. 
Under these circumstances, traditional policies may deepen the crisis in 
the affected countries. In point of fact, the requirement set by the Fund for 
the reduction of the Asian countries’ fiscal deficits following their request 
for IMF assistance had to be eased later on when it became apparent that 
the fiscal targets were exacerbating the recession. It has also been argued 
that the higher interest rates which the Fund demanded in order to stem 
capital outflows aggravated the business sector’s liquidity crisis and thus 
pushed many firms into bankruptcy without necessarily stopping capital 
flight during the early stages (or, hence, the over-adjustment of the 
exchange rate) (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998). 
The increase in the scope of IMF conditionality, which in recent 
decades has expanded from traditional macroeconomic areas to include 
issues relating to economic and social structures, has also been very 
controversial. In fact, a recent report by the United Nations asserted that 
such issues “by their very nature, should be decided by legitimate 
national authorities, based on broad social consensus” (United Nations, 
1999, section 5). The expansion of conditionality to include social policy, 
governance and issues relating to private participation in crisis resolution 
has also been criticized by the Group of 24, the main forum of developing 
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countries on international monetary and financial issues (Group of 24, 
1999b). The idea of confining conditionality to the traditional areas of 
macroeconomic policy and finance has been supported by a broad group 
of analysts holding very different ideological positions and views of the 
Fund’s proper role.15 An external evaluation has expressed a similar view 
of IMF macroeconomic surveillance activities (Crow, Arriazu and 
Thygesen, 1999).  
In light of these considerations, it is clear that the Fund’s capacity to 
provide external liquidity during crises should be expanded. In order to 
prevent the spread of financial crises through contagion, special attention 
should be focused on facilities designed to protect countries with solid 
economic fundamentals from speculative attacks. The mere existence of a 
properly funded facility of this nature would alter the international 
regime and economic agents’ behaviour. Thus, in order to do its job, the 
Fund must have a larger volume of resources at its disposal on a more 
flexible basis. The eligibility requirements for its various lines of credit 
should also be redefined. 
Despite the technical and political difficulties involved, the 
potential benefits of having multilateral financing facilities for countries 
faced with potentially destabilizing capital flight are great enough to 
warrant a continuing effort on the part of the international community to 
find ways of improving or developing them (see, in this regard, the 
proposals of Williamson, 1996; Ezekiel, 1998; and Ahluwalia, 1999, among 
others). These facilities should have sufficient resources to enable them to 
go to the aid of affected countries and to be readily accessible. Following 
the practice established for recent lines of credit, these loans should be for 
short terms and their interest rates should be higher than traditional IMF 
credits in order to encourage borrowers to pay back the loans as soon as 
possible. They should be renewable, however, since the available data 
indicate that these markets do not bounce back very quickly. 
When there is conclusive evidence of the existence of 
macroeconomic imbalances that have been brought about by national 
policies, access to multilateral resources should be subject to 
conditionality. In light of the recent controversy, however, the expansion 
of conditionality to areas beyond the traditional spheres of 
macroeconomic and financial policy is of debatable value and should 
therefore be subject to explicit multilateral negotiations. 
Recent programmes have embraced the principle that 
macroeconomic programmes adopted within the IMF framework should 
                                                          
15 Council on Foreign Relations (1999), Meltzer and others (2000), Collier and Gunning 
(1999), Feldstein (1998), Helleiner (2000b), Ocampo (1999b) and Rodrik (1999b). 
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take into account their effects on the most vulnerable sectors of the 
population. Given the asymmetric behaviour of social variables 
throughout the cycle (see chapter 1), this principle should be upheld. 
Moreover, its scope should not be confined to the design of appropriate 
social safety nets, but should also encompass the design of 
macroeconomic adjustment packages themselves based on further 
analyses of the social impact that various adjustment measures are likely 
to have. A consensus has not yet been reached regarding this issue, nor is 
enough known about it. In this, as in all areas in which conditionality is 
applied, the principle that adjustment policies should have the genuine 
support of the relevant national authorities (that is, the principle of 
“ownership”) should also be respected. This principle is, moreover, 
essential in ensuring appropriate institution-building and the 
sustainability of the adjustment measures themselves.  
Facilities designed to block contagion should have a low level of 
conditionality, not only because it is inappropriate in cases where 
imbalances are attributable to speculative attacks motivated by factors 
unrelated to national policies, but also because it can interfere with efforts 
to respond swiftly to critical situations when they arise. To make sure its 
funds are not being used to defend unsustainable policies, IMF should 
apply a few basic, uncontroversial eligibility requirements relating to 
macroeconomic stability and the current account balance. Nonetheless, 
there are some technical difficulties involved in the ex ante definition of 
eligibility requirements that remain to be overcome. Some experts have 
argued that this would turn IMF into a certifying agency, and that a 
ruling on its part that a country is not eligible for lines of credit could 
actually trigger a crisis. Instead of undertaking any ex ante determination 
of eligibility requirements, one alternative would be to set up a system 
based on simple guidelines that could be used to review applications 
quickly whenever the market is experiencing turbulence. 
If IMF is to respond in a flexible manner to financing needs during 
times of crisis, its resources will have to be expanded considerably. 
Among the available options, the best one is the temporary allocation of 
special drawing rights (SDR) to all member countries when a crisis hits. 
These temporary allocations could later be destroyed in order to avoid 
creating liquidity on a permanent basis. Another option would be to 
allocate SDRs only to the member countries that are in crisis; those 
countries would later reimburse IMF after the crisis subsides, at which 
time the SDRs would be destroyed. The third possibility is for IMF to 
issue itself SDRs for use during crises. The last two options would require 
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the amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement.16 Of course, greater use 
of SDRs in the international financial system is an end in and of itself 
which has long been advocated by developing countries and which 
should not be contingent upon the adoption of specific lines of credit. 
(b) Multilateral rules for external debt standstills and workouts 
The alternative to emergency financing is the suspension of debt 
payments. In its most extreme form, this would involve renegotiations 
between the debtor country and its creditors with a view to rescheduling 
and possibly reducing the debt. For obvious reasons, this is a path that 
few countries would want to take, since it entails breaking off normal 
relations with creditors. The subsequent restoration of credibility could be 
a long and costly process, and only countries in critical situations will 
therefore resort to this kind of solution. 
A broad consensus has arisen out of recent debates that the private 
sector should be involved in solving problems of indebtedness and capital 
flight associated with financial crises. Without private-sector involvement, 
debtors have to shoulder a disproportionate share of the cost of the crisis, 
the moral hazard problems of creditors are exacerbated, and the amount 
of resources needed to deal with crises becomes excessive. It should be 
emphasized that such schemes should be seen as a supplement rather 
than as a substitute for emergency financing, especially when the relevant 
countries’ difficulties (illiquidity) are strictly temporary in nature and are 
largely the result of contagion. In fact, a suboptimal combination of the 
two mechanisms, which would in any case require debt refinancing as a 
prerequisite for access to emergency finance, could deepen the crisis 
rather than helping to solve it and, in the long run, channel an insufficient 
amount of resources to developing countries. 
Although debt standstills are extreme solutions, they can help solve 
problems of both illiquidity and insolvency in recipient countries. In the 
first case, the deferral of debt payments by countries with obvious 
liquidity problems but with solid macroeconomic fundamentals could 
help prevent temporary difficulties from turning into more long-lasting 
problems for debtors and creditors alike. In the second case, the 
renegotiation of payment obligations is unavoidable, and any delay 
would be harmful to both debtors and creditors and could lead to an 
inequitable distribution of the costs of the crisis among creditors (between 
those who withdraw their capital and those who keep it in the affected 
                                                          
16 For different variations on the first of these proposals, see United Nations (1999), 
Council on Foreign Relations (1999), Meltzer and others (2000), and Camdessus (2000). 
Regarding the latter two, see Ezekiel (1998) and Ahluwalia (1999). 
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country or countries). In both cases, a debt standstill will make it possible 
to distribute the costs more fairly between creditors and debtors. 
It has taken a great deal of time to develop national institutions 
capable of dealing with these problems, and there are no such 
mechanisms in existence at the international level. Any institution 
established on this front should obviously maintain voluntary 
negotiations among the parties as an essential element, but multilateral 
rules also need to be devised in order to contend with the two basic 
problems of coordination that negotiations of this type entail: the 
possibility that some creditors (and, perhaps, debtors) will be reluctant to 
be involved in the solution (the “free rider” problem); and the slow pace 
or repetitive nature of the negotiation process, which is very costly for 
both debtors and creditors (“zero-sum game”). 
To solve the first of these problems, collective action clauses must 
be included in debt contracts (be they for sovereign bonds, bonds issued 
by private institutions, or private bank loans) that authorize the countries 
where the debtors are located to defer payment (on which interest will 
accrue) for a limited period of time in cases of capital flight for reasons 
beyond their control, or to unilaterally declare a standstill for a longer 
period of time if their payment capacity is clearly insufficient. These 
clauses should be universal and should thus apply equally to debt 
contracts entered into by industrialized countries so that the market will 
not penalize countries that introduce such clauses by charging higher 
interest rates or restricting their access to funds.17 Temporary standstills 
could also be expanded to include outflows of portfolio capital. 
Although it is difficult to think of an alternative to a debtor country 
declaring itself to be in financial distress, the Fund could recommend that 
countries make use of this mechanism and could perhaps go on to 
authorize standstills (especially the longer-lasting moratoriums), thereby 
legitimizing them. The latter option can also help to avert problems of 
moral hazard on the part of debtors, i.e., the declaration of a standstill 
without just cause, although, as noted at the beginning of this section, this 
may not be a significant problem. Some analysts believe that the Fund is 
already empowered under article VI to take actions of this sort. In 
addition, the Fund should continue its practice of lending into arrears to 
countries that are making an effort to move in the right direction because 
this encourages creditors to cooperate in resolving the crisis. 
                                                          
17 There are already widely known precedents for the mandatory inclusion of this type of 
clause in debt contracts, especially for bonds issued on the British market (Griffith-Jones, 
1998). 
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The existence of standstill clauses could help keep capital inflows 
from reaching excessive levels during booms, as creditors and investors 
would then be internalizing the risks of illiquidity or insolvency in 
recipient countries more fully. This approach has its own costs, of course, 
which would most likely take the form of higher interest rates. 
A possible means of solving the second problem would be to set up 
multilateral arbitration mechanisms to settle disputes regarding debt 
renegotiation or refinancing processes. It may also be appropriate to 
promote flexible arrangements that take foreseeable contingencies into 
account so that renegotiations can be avoided and incentives can be 
provided for creditors to continue providing resources to countries facing 
difficulties during critical periods. 
Whatever systems are devised should be applicable to all countries, 
regardless of their level of development. This means that the special 
multilateral schemes developed for the poorest countries, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter, are complementary rather than being 
replacements for the more general programmes mentioned in this 
chapter. As the corresponding plans are developed, accumulated 
experience should be taken into consideration as well. In this regard, it 
should be noted that the renegotiation of Ecuador’s debt is undoubtedly a 
substantial improvement over the debt renegotiations that took place 
during the debt crisis, which were belatedly but effectively remedied by 
the Brady Plan. 
5. The regional link 
Mechanisms of a strictly multilateral nature, as referred to in 
sections 2 and 4 of this chapter, should also have a regional dimension. 
Although recent crises have highlighted the fact that certain types of 
“global public goods” and services of international financial institutions 
have been supplied on a suboptimal scale, it would be a mistake to 
conclude that any additional supply of such goods and services should 
come exclusively from worldwide organizations (Ocampo, 1999a and 
1999b). On the contrary, the requisite structure should have a regional 
link. Countries in a given region face common international financial 
problems, and since regional contagion is a feature of the new generation 
of financial crises, regional institutions capable of preventing and 
managing crises in one country could have major externalities for the 
other countries in the same region. A model of this sort makes it clear that 
today’s globalization process is also a process of open regionalism, in 
which subregional and regional organizations must therefore play an 
increasingly important role. 
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Such institutions can contribute, first of all, to crisis prevention. 
Improved macroeconomic coordination among Latin American and 
Caribbean economies could help avert crises and prevent them from 
spreading when they do arise. This coordination may include a wide 
variety of aspects, such as the adoption of common fiscal and monetary 
policy standards, common practices in the prudential regulation and 
supervision of financial intermediaries, possible agreements on exchange-
rate management, and in the long run, perhaps even shared currencies. 
The countries in the region have begun to make headway in the first of 
these directions within the context of subregional integration processes. 
Regional mechanisms can also help to resolve crises. In fact, the 
region has had one of the most interesting experiences in this area in the 
form of the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR). This fund has a 20-year 
record of service to the Andean Community during which it has been an 
important source of financing for the five member countries (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). For the smaller countries (Bolivia 
and Ecuador), FLAR has been as important a creditor as IMF. With the 
recent accession of Costa Rica, FLAR has begun to reach out to Latin 
American countries outside the Andean Community as a step towards 
strengthening its institutional sphere of activity further (FLAR, 2000). 
At the international level, the most ambitious proposal on this front 
is the creation of an Asian monetary fund, which was discussed at Japan’s 
behest at the IMF meeting held in the Special Administrative Region of 
Hong Kong in November 1997 (Hamada, 2000). This idea recently took on 
a more concrete form when 13 Asian countries members of the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, the 
Republic of Korea and Japan reached an agreement in May 2000 to 
establish currency swap arrangements among their central banks (Park 
and Wang, 2000). 
Since financial contagion has a significant regional component, the 
existence of regional funds would have important advantages over an 
architecture consisting solely of a global fund (Agosin, 2000b; Mistry, 
1999; Ocampo, 1999b; ECLAC, 1999b). The first advantage lies in the 
possibility of modifying financial agents’ expectations and behaviour 
towards the region as a whole as a means of preventing contagion. With 
expanded international reserves provided by other members of the fund, 
and perhaps also lines of credit (including contingent lines) obtained by 
the fund on international markets on better terms and in larger quantities 
than the countries could obtain if they dealt as individuals, the 
participating nations would have a much stronger line of defence against 
crises. The fund could also play an important role in furthering the 
coordination of macroeconomic policies and prudential regulations. 
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Is a Latin American fund feasible? A recent study estimates that a 
fund made up of 15% of the reserves of 11 countries in the region 
(including all the largest ones except Mexico) could provide enough 
financing to deal with capital flight amounting to the total short-term debt 
of the countries, taken individually (Agosin, 2000b). Moreover, a fund of 
this size could cope with capital flight from each country, taken one at a 
time, equivalent to its entire money supply (measured by M2), with the 
exceptions of Argentina and Brazil. In the case of Argentina, a fund this 
size would be enough to finance capital flight equivalent to all of M1 (bills 
and coins in circulation plus demand deposits) and more than half of M2 
(M1 plus time and savings deposits). This suggests that a common fund 
made up of even a modest percentage of the region’s reserves could 
protect the countries from sequential financial crises. These calculations 
do not, moreover, consider the possibility that the fund could arrange for 
contingent credit lines on international capital markets or that 
contributions might be made by developed countries or IMF. 
It should also be noted that, although there is some degree of 
covariation in capital movements among the different countries, it is not 
so high as to make it necessary for such a regional fund to cope with 
simultaneous capital flight from all the countries, which would indeed 
make it unviable. In fact, the Latin American Reserve Fund’s experience 
shows that, even in a subregion such as the Andean Community, 
exceptional financing requirements are sufficiently spread out over time 
to allow a reserve fund to play an important role. In addition, the 
underlying premise is that by stopping an incipient crisis in one country, 
a regional fund can help to see to it that the crisis does not spread to other 
countries. 
Regional funds could be recognized by IMF as an integral part of 
the international financial system. Viewed from this standpoint, they 
could serve as intermediaries between the Fund and individual countries 
in some respects. In times of crisis, the regional funds could be given 
near-automatic access to IMF resources. If a new contingency facility of 
the Fund were financed with SDR allocations, the regional funds could be 
authorized to use their members’ local currencies to acquire SDRs for 
onlending to countries in crisis. 
It should be noted that the proposed network of institutions 
already exists in the case of development banks, as the World Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank and four subregional banks the 
Andean Development Corporation, the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration, the Caribbean Development Bank and the Financial 
Fund for the Development of the River Plate Basin (FONPLATA) are 
currently operating in concert on this front. 
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Chapter 3 
Trade linkages and access to the 
international capital market 
The foreign exchange needed by the region to make external 
payments has mainly come from export earnings and, in the case of the 
less developed economies, to an increasing extent from the remittances 
sent home by migrant workers. As discussed in the preceding chapter, 
ready access to international financial markets enables national 
authorities to design better macroeconomic policies for coping with 
swings in domestic economic activity and fluctuations generated by 
changes on world markets. It also represents an important source of 
investment finance to supplement domestic savings efforts. 
Based on the analysis of external financing flows to Latin America 
and the Caribbean presented in chapter 1 and the characteristics of the 
region’s export base, guidelines are set out for the development of its 
export sector, as a first line of action for strengthening external financing. 
The discussion will then turn to the question of access to long-term 
external funds both official and private, and within the latter, both 
financial resources and FDI— and ways of enhancing their contribution to 
regional economic development. The analysis of official resource flows 
will address issues related to financing for sustainable development and 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. 
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1. Strengthening export capacity as a means of 
boosting growth and reducing external vulnerability 
Strengthening export capacity is the first line of action for securing 
adequate levels of external funding (ECLAC, 1998b and 2000d). A greater 
export capacity will contribute to financing for development both by 
helping to finance imports (thereby easing the constraints that import 
requirements may place on economic growth) and by reducing external 
vulnerability. 
Despite a resolute effort to diversify the region’s products and 
markets in recent decades, its exports are still heavily concentrated in 
commodities. While it is true that the share of total exports represented by 
commodities and natural-resource-intensive manufactures (industrial 
commodities) has been cut to less than half, the countries of the region 
with the exception of Mexico and some Caribbean economies, where 
services are the main source of income remain heavily dependent on 
commodities (see table 3.1).  
This degree of concentration makes the region’s economies highly 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the international prices of their export 
products, as illustrated in table 3.2. As may be seen from the table, 
average fluctuations around the trend were greater in the 1980s than in 
the 1990s, and export unit values have systematically varied more than 
those of imports. It also shows that the degree of variability is greater 
among the region’s less developed countries; this translates into greater 
instability in their export earnings, which then has knock-on effects on 
investment and growth. 
The creation of a pro-export environment is a key component of 
any effort to expand and diversify the region’s export base, for without 
such an environment other export-promotion measures are unlikely to 
succeed. Policies for managing the risk associated with the variability of 
external markets are another important element. And in order for 
initiatives in these areas to bear fruit, adequate access to those markets is 
essential. The following discussion of these topics will be supplemented 
by a brief examination of possible means of making better use of 
remittances from emigrants. 
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Table 3.1 
SHARE OF COMMODITIES AND NATURAL-RESOURCE- 
INTENSIVE MANUFACTURES 
(As a percentage of total exports) 
Country 1965 1999 
Argentina 60.8 56.5 
Barbados   8.9 22.5 
Belize 21.9 36.2 
Bolivia 97.9 44.1 
Brazil 78.7 43.0 
Chile 96.1 73.0 
Colombia 92.8 77.0 
Costa Rica 78.2 29.7 
Ecuador 89.5 81.7 
El Salvador 80.3 47.0 
Guatemala 77.3 60.9 
Honduras 87.3 60.0 
Jamaica 63.8 … 
Mexico 76.4 17.3 
Nicaragua 83.3 66.0 
Panama 92.9 74.9 
Paraguay 51.5 62.9 
Peru 65.4 62.9 
Trinidad and Tobago 90.0 82.6 
Uruguay 12.3 24.9 
Venezuela 99.4 95.2 
Source: ECLAC, Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 1999-2000 (LC/G.2085-P), 
Santiago, Chile, March 2000. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.00.II.G.17. 
Table 3.2 























Group A 7.3 3.4 5.5 3.7 2.2 3.0 9.0 3.9 6.5 
Group B 4.0 3.3 3.5 2.3 2.1 2.2 5.1 3.2 4.0 
Group C 4.7 3.1 3.9 2.6 1.7 2.0 6.2 2.9 4.5 
Source: ECLAC, Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 1998 (LC/G.2038-P), Santiago, 
Chile, March 1999. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.99.II.G.3; Preliminary Overview of the 
Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000 (LC/G.2123-P), Santiago, Chile, December 2000. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.00.II.G.138. 
a
 Estimated as the mean absolute deviation (expressed as a percentage) from trend values; calculated as 
a three-year moving average. 
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(a) Creation of a pro-export environment 
Three crucial elements in the creation of a pro-export environment 
are the maintenance of competitive and stable real exchange rates, the 
elimination of anti-export biases and the development of systemic 
efficiency. 
The cornerstone of any export development strategy is a stable, 
competitive exchange rate, since it is highly unlikely that other measures 
can succeed in offsetting the negative effects of unstable or unduly low 
real exchange rates on the profitability of exports. There are two different 
dimensions to be taken into account here. At the national level, the 
macroeconomic policy mix should aim to keep real exchange rates at 
levels compatible with growth and with medium- and long-term external 
equilibrium. At the same time, care has to be taken to avoid major lags not 
compensated for by productivity increases and currency appreciations 
resulting from transitory inflows of foreign funds. At another level, the 
increasing integration of regional markets is posing new challenges since, 
as recent evidence shows, volatility in bilateral exchange rates has 
negative effects on both intra- and extra-regional trade.1 It is therefore 
worth considering the potential contribution to the region’s export 
development of regional macroeconomic coordination mechanisms, as 
well as other proposals for improving its external stability, as analysed in 
chapter 2 of this report (Agosin, 2000b and Mora, 2000). 
One of the main anti-export biases is generated by high import 
tariffs, which raise the prices of tradable inputs (either imported or 
produced locally) used in the production of exportable goods. This bias is 
compounded by inadequate drawback or tariff suspension mechanisms. 
Although the trend in the region has been towards lower and more 
uniform import duties, in some cases tariffs remain a disincentive to 
export activity, and in such cases appropriate systems need to be set up to 
reduce or mitigate this effect. Tariff suspension mechanisms are more 
effective in achieving this end for regular exporters than drawback 
systems are, and such mechanisms have played a vital role in promoting 
the growth of export activity in South-East Asia and Mexico. Customs-
free zones are, of course, another very important mechanism for a number 
of small countries in the Caribbean Basin. 
Another essential element of a pro-export climate is the existence of 
conditions conducive to systemic efficiency. Stable export growth clearly 
depends on continuing improvements in productivity, and policies to 
                                                          
1 Recent studies suggest that a 10% variation in the real bilateral exchange rate above or 
below its mean value (calculating the mean at each point in time) is associated with an 
8.6% reduction in exports (Mora, 2000). 
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promote the diffusion and adaptation of technology play a part in this. 
Other important aspects of external competitiveness include the efficiency 
of export infrastructure (transport systems, ports, storage systems, etc.), 
the development of complementarities between export firms and the 
production chains of which they are a part, and the removal of barriers 
through, in particular, the simplification of export procedures. 
(b) Active pro-export policies 
Measures aimed at identifying sources of external demand and 
promoting the countries’ exportables in external markets have been of 
fundamental importance in backstopping export activity. This task has 
traditionally been performed by government promotion agencies, but 
recently the private sector has also begun providing export services. 
Public-sector agencies or private associations can also play an important 
role in promoting various sorts of product- or market-specific associations 
to help exporters to take advantage of economies of scale and the 
externalities generated by a collective presence in external markets. These 
activities are particularly important for small and medium-sized firms 
seeking market access. 
Another key component is the development of adequate financing 
mechanisms and pre- and post-shipment insurance schemes. Progress in 
this area has been quite slow in most of the region despite the importance 
of such elements, particularly for small and medium-sized firms that lack 
access to foreign credit. The few exceptions include Banco de Comercio 
Exterior (BANCOLDEX) in Colombia, Banco Nacional de Comercio 
Exterior (BANCOMEXT) in Mexico and the greater priority being 
assigned to this area of endeavour by the Government of Brazil. It should 
be mentioned that the practice of extending credit to export firms is 
compatible with the Uruguay Round agreements, provided that it is not 
offered at subsidized interest rates. 
One type of activity that has not received sufficient support is the 
creation of investment banks or other private-sector institutions to 
channel venture capital to new firms or greenfield activities that will help 
to diversify the export base. The work of the Fundación Chile and some 
activities being carried out by national development banks continue to be 
isolated examples of initiatives in this area. Efforts in this field also need 
to be coordinated with activities aimed at promoting technology-based 
enterprises. 
Although the new rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
limit most export subsidies, it is still possible to design programmes with 
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subsidy content.2 In setting up such programmes, it is important to ensure 
that any subsidies which are included are moderate, temporary, subject to 
regular evaluations and designed primarily to help diversify the export 
base or destination markets. 
(c) Policies for managing the risk associated with external-
 market variability 
The demands involved in the management of risk arising from the 
variability of external trade point up the ongoing importance of efforts to 
diversify export products and destination markets. They also underscore 
the need to develop “self-insurance” mechanisms to cushion the domestic 
effects of changes in external prices, together with international 
mechanisms based on risk-management tools to counteract the effects of 
fluctuations in the prices brought by the region’s export products on 
external markets. 
Some countries have made use of export-price stabilization funds in 
order to protect themselves against external variability.3 These national 
efforts help to attenuate the domestic impact of external volatility, and 
their effects on the stability of producer and/or public-sector incomes 
have generally been assessed positively. Stabilization funds have 
sometimes been criticized for failing to fully isolate the country from price 
fluctuations, but this objective is not only misguided as it is unwise to 
insulate national producers from international price trends but would 
also make such funds financially unsustainable. 
There have been a number of attempts to use insurance-like 
mechanisms such as producer and consumer agreements, buffer stocks, 
variable tariff schemes and marketing boards to mitigate export price 
fluctuations. At the multilateral level, during the fourth United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1976, an Integrated 
Programme for Commodities was approved. In addition, the participating 
governments recognized the need to negotiate a Common Fund for 
Commodities in order to develop viable financial instruments to fund 
individual price stabilization agreements. Negotiations for the approval 
and ratification of this fund were complicated by disagreements among 
                                                          
2 WTO allows the use of horizontal subsidies (not specific to export activities alone). It 
also authorizes subsidies on technology development projects covering up to 75% of the 
corresponding costs, and there is still some room for certain types of direct subsidies 
under the de minimis clause. 
3 Although these schemes are mainly applied to export products, in Chile they have also 
been used to moderate the domestic effects of fluctuations in international oil prices. 
Price-band schemes for agricultural products are also being used in several countries to 
smooth out the domestic effects of fluctuations in the prices for such products. An 
analysis of this latter type of mechanism is beyond the scope of this document, however. 
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the major industrialized countries, however, and although the agreement 
was formally signed in the late 1980s, by that time product agreements 
had already ceased to exist, had fallen into disuse or had been modified in 
ways that significantly curtailed their price stabilization functions. 
More recently, there has been renewed interest in the use of 
market-based instruments for risk management, and it has been 
suggested that multilateral lending agencies should act as bridges 
between the suppliers of such instruments and institutions in developing 
countries that do not have access to them. Whether these instruments can 
be applied to the region’s exports on a suitable scale, and especially at an 
affordable cost, remains to be seen, however. These alternatives could 
prove particularly burdensome for countries with highly concentrated 
exports and/or those that are highly exposed to regionwide systemic 
fluctuations. 
It should be stressed that although both self-protection mechanisms 
and international insurance schemes can help mitigate risks, they do not 
reduce exposure to risk and can be costly. The diversification of exports 
and destination markets therefore continues to serve as the region’s 
principal proactive risk-reduction strategy. 
(d) Access to external markets 
A key element of any export diversification and development 
strategy is improved access to destination markets. Notwithstanding the 
achievements of the Uruguay Round, there are cases where very high 
tariff levels still apply (see table 3.3) to products of importance for the 
region, as well as highly variable tariff rates resulting from the 
tariffication of quantitative restrictions. These problems are particularly 
serious in the case of agricultural products, where the high production 
subsidies provided by industrialized countries (which underwent no 
more than moderate cuts in the Uruguay Round) continue to distort 
international markets. In addition, tariff escalation based on a product´s 
degree of processing continue to hinder developing countries´ efforts to 
export manufactures. As regards quantitative restrictions, the use of 
textile quotas continues to be permitted under an agreement for their 
gradual dismantlement, and some of the region’s exports are subject to 
practices equivalent to voluntary export restraints, even though such 






PRESENCE OF HIGH TARIFFS ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN MAJOR 
DESTINATION MARKETS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 
 
Market 
Percentage of tariff 
lines with rates > 12% 
Number of tariff lines 
with rates > 100% 
Products with high 
tariff rates 
European Union 45 33 >  200%: 
meats, grape juice 
Japan 40 146 >  300%: 
butter, wheat, 
groundnuts, rice 




Canada 11 68 >  200%: 
powdered milk, 
butter, cheese 
Source: Prepared on the basis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development/World Trade 
Organization (UNCTAD/WTO), The Post-Uruguay Round Tariff Environment for Developing Country 
Exports: Tariff Peaks and Tariff Escalation (TD/B/COM.1/14/Rev.1), Geneva, 28 January 2000. 
Despite stricter oversight since the creation of WTO, the use of 
contingent trade measures (antidumping and countervailing duties and 
safeguard clauses), which are sometimes applied for protectionist 
purposes, is still widespread. Nearly half the disputes heard by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body relate to measures of this kind, some of which 
have recently been imposed on a number of the region’s successful export 
products. These measures have been applied to no more than a small 
portion of the products traded by the region, but they nevertheless 
discourage new export projects because they create a great deal of 
uncertainty as to the prospect for regular market access under reliable 
rules. What is more, additional antidumping duties are generally much 
higher than average tariff rates. 
Other measures that amount to discriminatory barriers to the 
region´s exports include technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards. 
Although these types of measures have also come under stricter 
multilateral control, their application by developed countries often entails 
requirements that are hard for developing countries to comply with. The 
international community therefore has to develop means of 
distinguishing between regulations that are justified on these grounds 
and ones that are tantamount to camouflaged non-tariff barriers. 
These considerations underscore the importance of pursuing 
multilateral efforts to eliminate trade practices that hurt developing 
countries, especially in the cases of agricultural products, labour-intensive 
manufactures and other manufactures deemed to be “sensitive” by 
industrialized countries. In addition, many small countries, especially in 
Growth with stability 105 
the Caribbean, have suffered from an erosion of the trade preferences that 
they have traditionally enjoyed in industrialized markets. It is essential to 
make sure that these countries have access not only to such markets, but 
also to the resources and technical support they need to modernize and 
diversify their export base. 
An especially promising line of action for the diversification of the 
export base entails taking advantage of the substantial increase in 
intraregional trade that has been spurred, among other things, by bilateral 
and multilateral integration agreements and treaties. The evidence shows 
that intraregional trade contains a higher proportion of manufactures 
than extraregional trade does, thus helping to reduce export 
concentration. This is also a key component of a strategy for gaining entry 
into the more dynamic, high-technology segments of world trade. During 
the recent crisis, however, this trade segment displayed a marked degree 
of cyclical vulnerability, particularly in South America, owing both to 
downturns in these economies and to fluctuations in bilateral exchange 
rates. Here again, this underscores the need for more sophisticated 
mechanisms for coordinating macroeconomic policy at the subregional 
and regional levels. 
(e) Emigrant remittances 
As discussed in chapter 1, emigrant remittances have become a 
major source of external funds, especially for the less developed countries. 
Three main policy approaches have been identified that would permit this 
source of financing to be used more effectively. These policy packages 
focus on forwarding costs, the potential productive use of these resources, 
and migrants´ organizational and entrepreneurial capabilities. 
(i) Cost of sending remittances 
The lack of competitive formal mechanisms for sending remittances 
has allowed specialized agencies to offer below-market exchange rates 
and charge large commissions for this service. As a result, the cost of 
sending remittances is very high, and the receiving households’ savings 
and buying power is diminished accordingly. Proposals have been made, 
with some variations from country to country, to regulate this market by 
promoting competition, either by encouraging formal financial agencies 
to enter this line of business and give it greater transparency by posting 
their fees and charges (commissions and exchange rates), or by helping 
emigrants to organize themselves so that they can increase their 
bargaining power. Non-governmental organizations could assist with the 
creation of alliances or, conditions permitting, advantage could be taken 
of the internationalization of banking systems and the development of 
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suitable instruments, such as dollar accounts or credit cards on which 
payments can be made in the United States. 
(ii) Productive use of remittances 
Unlike the situation with respect to exports and FDI, and despite 
the importance of this source of funds, there is a conspicuous lack of 
public policies on remittances. There is, in fact, no regional policy that 
considers population expulsion areas as zones in which migrants and 
their families can act as agents of development by allocating part of their 
savings capacity to projects that will stimulate activity in those areas. 
There is convincing evidence that such a policy could be successful, since 
in cases where this savings capacity has been channeled properly, the 
response has been positive. There is thus a promising production and 
financial development potential which would allow for the adaptation 
and consolidation of schemes that could use a mix of public resources and 
remittances to finance development projects, the design of pilot projects 
using government seed capital, and the development of suitable tax 
incentives and attractive financial instruments that would provide 
emigrants with a means of investing in their home countries. Possible 
ventures include investments in real estate or in businesses and the 
development of idiosyncratic products that would find a market among 
emigrants in their host countries. Finally, as a means of promoting other 
sources of financing, remittances could be used as collateral for loans 
from social and development banks. 
(iii) Organizational capacity 
Since the number of migrants is so large, their effective 
organization could afford many advantages. As one possibility, they 
could develop an information network and distribution channels for 
products from their home countries. In addition, once they are organized, 
their shared background will motivate them to undertake community 
infrastructure projects; these sorts of initiatives will require appropriate 
institutional designs to enhance their development capabilities, especially 
in the areas of education and training. 
2. Official external financing 
The 1990s saw a number of worrisome developments concerning 
the future availability of official financing for the region. In the first place, 
when compared with other components of external debt flows, net 
bilateral financing has decreased and multilateral flows have grown only 
slowly, as shown in figure 3.1. Second, official development assistance 
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(ODA), which is particularly important for the region’s less developed 
countries, has also tended to decline (see table 3.4). Third, although the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative has generated high 
expectations on the part of some of the region’s poorest countries, this 
initiative has been hindered by operational difficulties which have 
affected not only HIPC-eligible countries, but other countries of the region 
as well, along with the regional and subregional agencies that have 
resources committed in those countries. On a brighter note, one of the 
more positive developments on the ODA front has been the introduction 
of specific initiatives for financing the sustainable development agenda, 
although their scope remains limited. 
Figure 3.1 
















NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE RECEIVED 
BY LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
(Millions of dollars) 
    ODA/GDP 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1997 % 
Group A 3,026 3,570 3,546 2,853 2,793 3.2 
Group B 694 833 729 748 787 0.4 
Group C 1,097 1,095 999 674 615 0.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 4,817 5,498 5,274 4,275 4,195 0.3 
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108 ECLAC 
(a) Uncertainties relating to ODA and bilateral resources 
Despite the recent appearance of some more encouraging signs, the 
future of ODA is widely seen as very uncertain, since official aid budgets 
generally reflect domestic conditions in the donor countries more than the 
needs of recipient countries. The first element of uncertainty, which has 
been a factor since the early 1990s, stems from changes in official 
assistance levels caused by budget cuts in donor countries. Second, public 
opinion in these countries has become increasingly skeptical of the 
effectiveness of development assistance. In addition, the ending of the 
cold war changed certain strategic and commercial interests that had 
previously served to promote official assistance, at the same time that 
private capital inflows to developing countries have undermined its 
perceived urgency. 
According to World Bank data, Latin America and the Caribbean 
received 7.3% of total ODA in 1999. It is interesting to note that over the 
last decade (1990-1999) the recipient sectors for such funds have changed 
significantly. Manufactures, agriculture, traditional energy and 
communications have become less attractive sectors for public funding, 
while basic social services and environmental protection have been 
attracting more attention. 
ODA levels need to be restored so that the target of 0.7% of the 
industrialized countries’ GDP, as agreed upon within the framework of the 
United Nations, can be met. Such resources should be channelled primarily 
to the less developed countries and small island States, where vulnerability 
to natural disasters, erosion of trade preferences and economic fluctuations 
have dramatically worsened in recent decades. In all these countries, 
programmes should be evaluated chiefly in terms of their social impact. 
ODA should also be used to support the provision of global public goods or 
goods having strong international externalities, including peace, the global 
environmental agenda (climate change and conservation of biodiversity) 
and the war on drugs worldwide. For their part, recipient countries need to 
improve the efficiency and transparency with which they use these 
resources since, apart from anything else, this is a necessary condition for 
domestic harmony and integration into a globalized world. 
It should be noted that non-concessional bilateral resources are also 
an important source of financing for the region, and especially for the less 
developed countries. The points discussed above are equally valid for this 
type of funding. As seen in the preceding chapter, bilateral funding has also 
been used for emergency financing programmes. Although it may continue 
to play a useful role in cases of scarce multilateral financing, it is a 
suboptimal source for this purpose, and its function as a stabilization 
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mechanism needs to be brought under the broader agenda for the reform of 
the international financial architecture. 
(b) The role of multilateral, regional and subregional development 
 banks 
Development banks whether they operate at a multilateral level 
(World Bank), on a regional scale (Inter-American Development Bank, IDB) 
or in a subregional context (Andean Development Corporation, ADC; 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration, CABEI; Caribbean 
Development Bank, CDB; and the Financial Fund for the Development of the 
River Plate Basin, FONPLATA) play a major role in supplementing 
domestic investment financing and private external funding. The key role 
played by regional and subregional lending agencies during the 1990s is 
clearly illustrated by their share of the credit channelled to the region. Table 
3.5 shows that these resources are particularly important for the least 
developed countries, where the World Bank’s International Development 
Association (IDA) also plays a major part. Multilateral financing from all 
these sources accounted for 84.7% of long-term external credit received by 
these countries in 1995-1998. Regional and subregional bank credit is also 
very important for countries with per capita incomes of between US$ 2,000 
and US$ 4,000 (group B in table 3.2), where these sources accounted for 15% 
of long-term credit during that period and slightly over half in the first part of 
the decade. The corresponding amounts are smaller for the higher-income 
countries. 
Even for the latter, one of the great virtues of multilateral banks has 
been their capacity to provide countercyclical financing to cushion the effects 
of external shocks and prevent crises from deepening. This has been clearly 
evident in the growth of such funding during the external financing droughts 
that occurred in the wake of the Asian crisis (see figure 3.1) or during the debt 
crisis. This source has supplemented rather than substituting for the balance-
of-payments financing provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and some bilateral sources, especially since these banks are the only source of 
long-term financing that is available at times of crisis, unlike exceptional 
financing. This type of funding also makes it possible to smooth out 
necessary fiscal adjustments by averting the need, in particular, to cut critical 
social programmes and making it possible to introduce social safety nets for 
the most vulnerable sectors. No less importantly, the support provided by 
multilateral banks has acted as an important catalyst in shoring up or 
restoring confidence in countries at times of crisis and hence reinstating 
private flows. This characteristic has turned them into a highly valued asset 
in the eyes of stakeholder governments from developing countries, as 










NET LONG-TERM DEBT FLOWS, BY SOURCE 
(Millions of dollars) 




Group A             
Net long-term debt flows 1,118 498 297 958 639 988 1,289 1,968 930 1,740 100.0 100.0 
Public sources 1,060 675 753 781 836 1,017 917 1,377 812 1,212 117.0 77.1 
Multilateral 355 341 565 517 740 1,118 894 1,475 900 1,271 71.7 81.8 
World Bank 43 25 9 9 122 340 183 194 246 566 5.9 22.1 
IDB and other development banks 312 316 557 507 618 778 712 1,282 654 705 65.8 59.7 
Bilateral 705 334 188 265 96 -101 23 -98 -89 -59 45.2 -4.7 
Private sources 58 -177 -456 176 -197 -29 372 591 118 528 -17.0 22.9 
Group B             
Net long-term debt flows -184 -335 -573 1,237 2,120 1,967 3,151 5,412 2,102 5,517 100.0 100.0 
Public sources 145 107 -445 130 -539 -337 -596 299 197 1,315 -26.5 4.8 
Multilateral 15 -349 -122 345 -493 171 141 654 832 1,673 -26.6 19.1 
World Bank -329 -367 -701 19 -586 -164 -204 121 162 507 -86.7 2.3 
IDB and other development banks 344 18 579 326 93 334 345 533 670 1,166 60.0 16.8 
Bilateral 130 455 -323 -215 -46 -507 -737 -354 -636 -359 0.1 -14.3 
Private sources -329 -441 -128 1,107 2,659 2,304 3,746 5,113 1,905 4,203 126.5 95.2 
Group C             
Net long-term debt flows 8,294 7,318 8,746 19,514 15,365 31,580 34,397 28,257 62,671 12,090 100.0 100.0 
Public sources 5,489 2,089 843 1,747 -1,598 8,604 -8,591 -6,221 8,091 -286 14.5 0.9 
Multilateral 3,844 1,586 492 1,581 -671 374 1,509 2,120 9,589 4,010 11.5 10.4 
World Bank 3,225 747 -178 452 -778 -266 384 430 2,000 1,077 5.9 2.1 
IDB and other development banks 619 838 670 1,130 107 640 1,125 1,690 7,589 2,933 5.7 8.3 
Bilateral 1,645 504 352 165 -927 8,230 -10,101 -8,341 -1,498 -4,296 2.9 -9.5 
Private sources 2,805 5,229 7,902 17,768 16,963 22,976 42,988 34,478 54,580 12,375 85.5 99.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean             
Net long-term debt flows 9,228 7,482 8,470 21,709 18,125 34,535 38,837 35,637 65,703 19,347 100.0 100.0 
Public sources 6,694 2,871 1,152 2,658 -1,300 9,284 -8,270 -4,545 9,100 2,241 18.6 4.0 
Multilateral 4,214 1,578 935 2,443 -424 1,662 2,545 4,249 11,321 6,954 13.5 13.8 
World Bank 2,939 406 -871 480 -1,242 -89 363 744 2,409 2,150 2.6 2.9 
IDB and other development banks 1,274 1,173 1,806 1,963 818 1,752 2,182 3,505 8,913 4,804 10.8 10.9 
Bilateral 2,480 1,293 217 215 -877 7,622 -10,815 -8,794 -2,222 -4,713 5.1 -9.8 
Private sources 2,534 4,611 7,318 19,051 19,425 25,251 47,106 40,182 56,603 17,106 81.4 96.0 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, Washington, D.C., 2001. 
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Multilateral and bilateral ODA is also provided on clearly 
advantageous terms and conditions (see table 3.6), as loans from these 
sources have longer maturities and lower interest rates than private 
credit. Lending terms are especially favourable in the case of new 
commitments to the less developed countries. This, in combination with 
the greater relative significance of these resources for the poorer 
countries, reflects the special attention they have received from these 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF NEW 
COMMITMENTS 
(Simple averages) 
  Interest rates (percentages)  Maturities (years) 
  Official sector a Private sector b  Official sector a Private sector b 
       
Group A 1990 4.0 9.5  28.1   6.4 
 1994 4.2 7.3  26.2   9.1 
 1998 4.7 5.5  28.0   8.5 
 1999 4.0 6.0  29.7   7.7 
       
Group B 1990 6.8 8.3  14.5   5.4 
 1994 6.5 7.5  18.0   6.8 
 1998 6.3 8.1  13.8   7.0 
 1999 5.1 8.8  17.5 11.0 
       
Group C 1990 7.4 9.0  17.2 10.9 
 1994 6.4 8.5  17.7   6.7 
 1998 7.7 8.1    13.3 d   7.9 
 1999   6.7 c  8.5    19.6 e 11.0 
       
Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, Washington, D.C., 2001. 
a
 Bilateral loans and resources from multilateral agencies. 
b
 Bond debt and international bank loans. 
c
 Country average (except Venezuela). 
d
 Country average (except Chile). 
e
 Country average (except Mexico). 
 
Thanks to their preferential relationship with developing countries 
and their readiness to adapt to modern risk- and portfolio-rating systems, 
IDB and ADC have better ratings than the countries of the region 
themselves and can thus secure external financing at a lower cost than the 
countries could individually. This is especially important in the case of 
ADC, as all of its stakeholders are developing countries in the region. 
These institutions are therefore able to provide financial intermediation 
services that are highly beneficial for their member countries, which 
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would otherwise have to shoulder very high costs or would simply not 
have access to sufficient financing. This fact, together with the generally 
high quality of multilateral development bank portfolios, suggests that 
private agents tend to overestimate risk, especially during crises. 
Overestimation of risk is a market failure that in itself justifies the 
operations of multilateral development banks. 
The loan portfolios of regional and subregional banks have 
diversified profiles that vary from one to another. These institutions give 
priority to social development projects and have played a pioneering role 
in financing sustainable development programmes and channelling 
resources to production sectors that have traditionally been bypassed by 
such flows, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises. At the 
institutional level, they have been active in providing support for State 
modernization programmes. They also contribute to the development of 
physical infrastructure, certain production sectors and, in some cases, 
foreign trade operations, particularly those linked to integration 
processes. Technical assistance, provided directly or in connection with 
project financing, has been an additional characteristic of these 
institutions, alongside their role as a meeting place for member countries 
to exchange information and analyse successful (and, equally 
importantly, unsuccessful) development experiences. 
Development banks can act as catalysts for private resource flows 
in three different ways: furnishing guarantees for the timely payment of 
public debt or the timely fulfilment of commitments (in the form of 
guarantees or subsidies) assumed by the State in support of private 
projects; providing direct financing or cofinancing for innovative private 
projects (with the funds being supplied either directly by the bank or by a 
related financial corporation); and providing venture capital (through the 
relevant financial corporation) to innovative enterprises. These 
mechanisms are being developed in a variety of ways by the banks and 
their corporations, and they have been particularly effective in 
stimulating private-sector investments in infrastructure. Development 
banks have also pioneered means of guaranteeing the servicing of public 
bond debt when issues are floated at times of great uncertainty on the 
capital market. In all of these cases, private investors value not only the 
solidity of multilateral institutions, but also their special relationship with 
the governments concerned, which makes their support even more 
valuable. These operations should continue to be expanded on the basis of 
a strictly defined criterion of additionality, i.e., through the development 
of support mechanisms that are unavailable in the private sector at any 
given point in time. One new line of action could be to underwrite bonds 
issued by countries that have not previously used this financing modality.  
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Regional and subregional institutions can also contribute to the 
development of financial markets by issuing debt securities that will help 
create markets with longer maturities and investing in small-business 
lending and microfinance institutions. This would help create and deepen 
market segments that tend to be underdeveloped. Support for the 
operations of national development banks is another essential element in 
order to achieve results in these areas. 
To summarize, multilateral banks play a vital role in channelling 
resources to the region under more favourable terms than private-sector 
financing; they supplement private investment when private capital is not 
available on acceptable terms and conditions; they help improve 
financing terms by restoring confidence; they can act as catalysts for new 
private investment and for financial market development in the countries 
of the region; they provide a forum for the countries; they contribute to 
the regional integration process; and they are a mechanism for 
channelling technical assistance and information useful in preparing, 
financing and executing development programmes. For all these reasons 
although they certainly need to prioritize their actions, and their 
activities should aim at greater efficiency and transparency multilateral 
banks continue to play a crucial role, even for middle-income countries. 
Table 3.7 
COMPOSITION OF SELECTED REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL 
BANKS’ LOAN PORTFOLIOS 
(Percentages) 
World Bank IDB ADC CABEI CDB
1998-2000 1997-1999 portfolio cumulative cumulative
 as of 31/12/99 1961-1999 1970-1999
Social services, social and environmental 24.8 27.3 7.1 11.0
protection and investment
Education, science and technology 9.4 6.1
Urban development, housing and physical infrastructure 1.3 6.2 31.1
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 6.0 1.5 2.0 2.7 5.8
Industry, mining, quarrying, oil and gas 1.2 9.1 11.0 4.4 9.8
Electricity, energy and water 2.3 8.8 21.0 14.5 8.8
Transport and communications 8.7 9.6 24.0 10.1 25.3
Tourism and microenterprise 0.0 1.3 2.5 3.1
Multi-sector and other 5.3 2.6 14.0 27.6 13.3
Finance and distribution 12.5 0.3 28.0 22.8
Economic policy, public sector reform and public admin. 28.5 27.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: ECLAC, based on annual reports of the World Bank, IDB, ADC, CABEI and the Caribbean Development Bank.
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(c) The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
Since the mid-1980s the absolute and relative share of total lending 
to the poorest countries in the region that is provided by private creditors 
has systematically declined (see table 3.8). Bilateral financing has also 
decreased. Thus, unlike resource flows elsewhere, in the poorest countries 
the proportion of total debt owed to multilateral creditors has increased. 
In some of these countries, foreign borrowing levels are very high and 
represent a major development constraint. In view of this situation, an 
initiative to reduce the external debt of heavily indebted poor countries 
was introduced in 1996. Four countries from the region Bolivia, 
Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua fulfil the eligibility requirements for 
this programme. 
Table 3.8 
COMPONENTS OF EXTERNAL DEBT OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
CLASSIFIED AS POOR a 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 
(Millions of dollars)       
Long-term debt 11,953 23,948 32,782 37,494 36,071 36,885 














   Multilateral creditors 2,516 5,195 9,009 12,846 15,010 15,860 
   Bilateral creditors 3,128 7,518 13,920 14,620 10,482 10,100 
   Private creditors 4,463 10,174 9,293 9,079 8,764 8,755 
Unguaranteed debt 
 
1,846 1,061 560 949 1,815 2,170 
(Percentage composition)       
Long-term debt 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public and publicly guaranteed 
debt 
84.6 95.6 98.3 97.5 95.0 94.1 
   Multilateral creditors 21.0 21.7 27.5 34.3 41.6 43.0 
   Bilateral creditors 26.2 31.4 42.5 39.0 29.1 27.4 
   Private creditors 37.3 42.5 28.3 24.2 24.3 23.7 
Unguaranteed debt 15.4 4.4 1.7 2.5 5.0 5.9 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001, Washington, D.C., 2001. 
a
 Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
The original objective of the HIPC initiative was to do away with 
overborrowing and reduce the level of eligible external debt4 to 
                                                          
4 In order to be eligible for reduction under the HIPC Initiative, debts have to have been 
incurred before the cut-off date, which is defined as the point in time when countries 
first agreed to renegotiate their debt with the Paris Club. Under this criterion, the cut-off 
dates for determining the percentage of bilateral debt eligible for reduction are as 
Growth with stability 
 
115 
sustainable levels. Generally speaking, given appropriate economic 
policies, a sustainable level of external debt is understood to be a level at 
which external liabilities can be met without resorting to further 
renegotiation, write-offs or an accumulation of arrears and without 
sacrificing economic growth. More recently, these objectives have been 
modified to give greater emphasis to freeing up resources so that, rather 
than being used to service external liabilities, they can be channelled into 
poverty reduction programmes. 
Some critics of the HIPC Initiative contend that eligible countries 
have to travel down a long and complex road in order to benefit from it. 
This argument is outlined in box 3.1. The decision as to whether a country 
will be admitted into the programme is not taken until three years after it 
has adopted a reform programme, and during this period the main 
recourse available to the country is debt reschedulings. Moreover, the 
date on which debt relief will finally be provided (the “floating 
completion point”) tends to be a distant, indeterminate point on the 
horizon which is subject to fulfilment of a reform programme, the 
achievement of macroeconomic stability targets and the creation of 
conditions for sustainable growth. Although steps have already been 
taken to streamline the initiative, its terms and conditionality continue to 
be restrictive. 
A second criticism is that, given the established cut-off dates, only a 
small proportion of bilateral debt will be eligible for reduction once all 
these conditions have been met. As may be seen in table 3.9, the 
percentage of official debt eligible for reduction in the countries of the 
region that can avail themselves of this initiative ranges between 21% and 
31% for Bolivia, Honduras and Guyana, although it is greater in the case 
of Nicaragua. Hence, given the larger role played by multilateral 
financing in the first three countries, debt relief there is likely to depend 
chiefly on the efforts made by multilateral agencies. These agencies are 
therefore likely to be faced with a significant challenge in securing 
enough resources to finance this programme, and this is particularly true 
in the case of regional and subregional institutions (Tromben, 2000). The 
sustainability of the debt coefficients defined in the initiative has also 
been the object of a great deal of controversy, especially in the case of the 
African countries (Botchwey, 2000). 
                                                                                                                                    




THE ENHANCED HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES INITIATIVE 
This initiative is divided into two phases of adjustment and economic 
reform: a decision point at the end of the first phase; and a “floating” 
completion point, which comes at the end of the second phase and is the 
point in time when debt reduction is applied. 
First phase 
The country must establish a three-year track record of sound 
performance and, in conjunction with civil society, prepare a poverty 
reduction strategy paper (PRSP). The Paris Club offers the possibility of 
rescheduling debt service falling due during the three-year consolidation 
period under the Naples terms (67% reduction in maturities). Other bilateral 
and commercial creditors offer terms that are, at the least, comparable. 
Decision point 
There are two possibilities at the end of this first phase: 
• If the traditional conditions of debt reduction have been sufficient to 
achieve external debt sustainability ==> exit from the initiative. 
• If it is impossible to achieve debt sustainability without assistance 
from multilateral institutions and governments involved in the HIPC 
initiative ==> eligibility. 
In this case, all creditors (multilateral, bilateral and commercial) 
undertake to provide debt reduction at the floating completion point. The 
amount of the assistance depends on the reduction needed to bring the debt 
to sustainable levels at the decision point. 
Second phase 
The World Bank and IMF, working with the government in question 
and with broad participation by civil society and the donor community, identify 
structural reforms and social development actions (including macroeconomic 
measures) that represent a significant step towards sustainable development 
and poverty reduction. The World Bank and IMF offer provisional assistance 
within this framework. Other multilateral and bilateral creditors and donors offer 
temporary debt relief measures as they deem appropriate. 
Floating completion point 
Implementation of the reforms previously agreed upon is supervised 
on a transparent basis. Once those reforms have been carried out, the 
completion point is considered to have been reached. The Paris Club will 
then offer to reduce the eligible debt on more concessional terms (up to, or, 
where necessary, even more than 90% of net present value) in order to 
provide the country with a way out of its unsustainable debt position. Other 
bilateral and commercial creditors are to offer at least comparable treatment 
in terms of the volume of debt. Where necessary, multilateral institutions will 
take additional steps to reduce the debt to a sustainable level, seeking broad 
and fair burden-sharing by all creditors involved. 
Source: World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Modifications to the initiative for debt 
reduction in heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)” (DC/99-25), Washington, D.C., Joint Ministerial 
Committee of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on the 
Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries, September 1999. 















Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, Washington, D.C., May 2000. 
The availability of resources to finance the initiative has been a 
third obstacle to its implementation. Some multilateral financing 
institutions, particularly those with large proportions of their portfolios in 
eligible countries, face serious difficulties in financing the commitments 
they have to assume under the HIPC Initiative. This is an especially 
critical problem for CABEI, which incurred heavy costs in refinancing 
Nicaraguan debt just a few years ago. In the case of IDB, developing-
country stakeholders have had to bear the cost represented by the 
diversion of technical cooperation resources to finance the initiative; and 
in the World Bank, the demand for funds for this initiative, along with 
others faced by this institution, has driven up borrowing costs. Some 
countries of the region have incurred (Mexico, in particular) or will have 
to incur (the Central American countries) additional commitments in 
connection with write-offs of bilateral debt with beneficiary countries. No 
overall assessment has been made of the distribution of the costs of the 
programme including those associated with the decrease in the amount 
of funds available for technical assistance and wider interest-rate 
spreads in order to prevent the burden from falling disproportionately 
on other developing countries. 
By April 2001, four countries of the region (Bolivia, Guyana, 
Honduras and Nicaragua) had reached the decision point, and US$ 8.49 
billion in debt service relief is to be provided to them. This corresponds to 
a US$ 3.012 billion reduction in present value (see tables 3.10 and 3.11). As 
compared to the payments made in 1998-1999 (i.e., before the Enhanced 
HIPC Initiative was created), this level of debt relief would translate into 
an effective savings in debt service equivalent to an estimated 2% of GDP 
Millions Percentages Millions Percentages Millions Percentages Millions Percentages
of dollars of dollars of dollars of dollars
Official debt 3,724 100.0 1,078 100.0 3,219 100.0 5,239 100.0
A. Bilateral 1,444 38.8 401 37.2 1,366 42.4 3,877 74.0
  - Before cut-off date 791 21.2 335 31.1 854 26.5 3,372 64.4
  - After cut-off date 635 17.1 66 6.1 513 15.9 505 9.6
B. Multilateral 2,280 61.2 677 62.8 1,853 57.6 1,362 26.0
      IMF 210 5.6 127 11.8 101 3.1 41 0.8
      World Bank 534 14.3 130 12.1 509 15.8 233 4.4
      IDB 1,225 32.9 222 20.6 765 23.8 567 10.8
Other 311 8.4 199 18.5 478 14.8 521 9.9
Memorandum
   - Cut-off date Dec. 1985 Dec. 1988 June 1990 Nov. 1988
Bolivia HondurasGuyana Nicaragua
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for Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua in 2001-2003 and a significantly 
greater amount for Guyana.5 
Table 3.10 
DEBT RELIEF COMMITMENTS MADE TO POOR COUNTRIES OF THE REGION UNDER 
THE HIPC INITIATIVE AS OF MARCH 2001 
(Net present value in millions of dollars) 















































  873 
  363 
  339 
1,123 
  429 
  222 
  217 
2,144 
Total 5,710 549 270 1,104 775 2,698 3,012 
Source: World Bank, Financial Impact of the HIPC Initiative. First 22 Country Cases, Washington, D.C., 
10 April 2001. 
a
 Includes US$ 508 million from CABEI and US$ 53 million from ADC. 
Table 3.11 
ESTIMATED DEBT RELIEF UNDER THE HIPC INITIATIVE 
 Bolivia Guyana Honduras Nicaragua 
Committed nominal 
reduction in debt 
service, 


















Debt service savings, 
on a due basis, as a 
percentage of GDP a 
 
 
   2.0 
 
 
  9.2 
 
 
   2.0 
 
 
  8.0 
 
Debt service savings, 
on a paid basis, as a 
percentage of GDP a 
 
 






   1.6 
 
 
  1.6 
 
Debt service savings, 
on a paid basis, in 













Source: World Bank, Financial Impact of the HIPC Initiative. First 22 Country Cases, Washington, D.C., 
10 April 2001. 
a
 Average annual savings; comparison of payments for 1998-1999 and 2001-2003. 
                                                          
5 In 1999 Guyana received a reduction in debt service under the original HIPC Initiative. 
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These debt relief commitments represent a major contribution on 
the part of regional multilateral banks (IDB, CABEI and ADC) that could, 
in some cases, reduce their capital. This possibility has prompted 
proposals that all the countries of the region should help strengthen these 
institutions by pooling their resources to provide the necessary funds. 
Table 3.12 shows the cost of the HIPC Initiative by countries and by 
groups of creditors. In addition to the contribution being made by 
regional multilateral institutions, these figures demonstrate that a 
significant portion of Nicaraguan debt reduction costs are being absorbed 
by other Central American countries, particularly Costa Rica, Guatemala 
and even Honduras, which is itself a beneficiary of the initiative. 
Table 3.12 
ESTIMATED HIPC DEBT RELIEF COSTS, BY COUNTRY AND CREDITOR 
(Net present value in millions of dollars as of end-1999) 
 
Bolivia Guyana Honduras Nicaragua Total 
Total 1,282 566 524 3,154 5,526 
Multilateral creditors 862 353 321 1,060 2,596 
World Bank 189 66 92 179 526 
IMF 83 70 29 77 259 
IDB 469 114 126 365 1,074 













A. Paris Club members 391 158 159 823 1,531 
Australia    1 1 
Austria 9   1 10 
Belgium 22    22 
Brazil    29 29 
Canada 1 1 1  3 
Denmark  1 1  2 
Finland    5 5 
France 18 1 5 33 57 
Germany 95 7 7 213 322 
Israel    1 1 
Italy 20  14 41 75 
Japan 143 1 88 96 328 
Netherlands 8 3 2 17 30 
Russia  1  235 236 
Spain 43  28 124 195 
Sweden 1    1 
Switzerland   1 1 2 
Trinidad and Tobago  88   88 
United Kingdom 9 39  1 49 
United States 22 16 12 25 75 
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Table 3.12 (conclusion) 
     












Algeria    18 18 
Argentina  1   1 
Brazil 10 2   12 
Bulgary    60 60 
China 7 5  3 15 
Colombia   3  3 
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 




Costa Rica   4 369 373 
Czech Republic    4 4 
Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia 




Guatemala   5 351 356 
Honduras    96 96 
Hungary    5 5 
India  1  1 2 
Irán    25 25 
Kuwait  6 6  12 
Libya  5  56 61 
Mexico   9 41 50 
Polland    6 6 
Peru    7 7 








United Arab Emirates  1   1 
Venezuela  6 4 47 57 
Slovenian Republic    19 19 
C. Commercial creditors 7 28 3 39 77 
Source: IMF/World Bank, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), Progress Report (DC2001-0012), 
Washington D.C., 2001. 
a
 Includes CABEI and ADC. 
 
Given this situation, it is clear that further adjustments need to be 
made in the HIPC Initiative in order to ensure that it will operate 
smoothly, achieve its aims and be properly funded. One of the highest 
priorities in the use of the HIPC Trust Fund should be defraying the costs 
borne by the corresponding subregional banks. 
(d) Financing the sustainable development agenda 
One of the most positive developments on the official financing 
front during the last decade has been the implementation of specific 
initiatives for financing the global sustainable development agenda. These 
initiatives have primarily been launched by multilateral banks 
themselves.  Both the World Bank and IDB have allocated significant 
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sums for environmental management. In 1999, the World Bank’s 
environmental portfolio in Latin America and the Caribbean amounted to 
about US$ 3 billion, or one fifth of the total resources allocated to this 
sector worldwide. The main targets of these projects in the region were 
pollution and urban environmental management (50%), natural resource 
and rural environmental management (34%), and institution-building 
(9%). Approximately 9% (US$ 894 million) of total IDB lending in 1999 
went to environmental or natural resource conservation projects. In this 
case, the main targets were urban management (especially anti-pollution 
and drinking water projects), natural resource conservation, and the 
prevention and mitigation of natural disasters. Initiatives in this field are 
also being pursued by subregional banks. 
A number of innovative multilateral financing mechanisms have 
been devised to finance the implementation of the global environmental 
agenda by developing countries. Two of these, the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) and the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol, are 
fully operational, although their resources are limited in comparison to 
the scope of existing international commitments. GEF was set up in 1991 
to enable developing countries to meet the incremental costs of tackling 
global-scale environmental problems (loss of biodiversity, climate change, 
depletion of the ozone layer and environmental problems relating to 
international waters and desertification). The financial contribution made 
by GEF up to 1998 amounted to over US$ 2 billion, and about one fifth of 
this was used to finance projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
executing agencies for this facility are the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), with most of the funding coming from developed 
countries. The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol provides 
financial assistance to developing countries in order to help them find 
alternatives to ozone-depleting substances used in a number of industrial 
processes. Since 1990 the Fund has disbursed over US$ 1 billion. 
Negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol are introducing new 
approaches to investment and financing for sustainable development. 
Since 1997 the international community has been negotiating the “clean 
development mechanism” (CDM) defined in article 12 of the Protocol, 
which is designed to complement the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. This mechanism gives developed 
countries the chance to meet their greenhouse gas reduction commitments 
(mainly carbon dioxide) at less expense than the investment that would 
be required to do so nationally and, at the same time, gives developing 
countries an opportunity to reduce carbon emissions at a lower cost. 
Under this provision, certified reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in 
developing countries resulting from energy efficiency projects or the 
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conservation and management of forests (which operate as carbon sinks) 
could be “sold” to developed countries to enable them to meet their 
emission reduction commitments at a lower cost.6 These negotiations have 
not yet been concluded, however, and many issues surrounding the CDM 
remain to be resolved, including transaction costs, market prices and 
adaptation strategies. Pilot schemes are being tried out in Costa Rica, 
which has been a pioneer in this field, and elsewhere in the region with a 
view to paving the way for the full application of the Kyoto Protocol. 
One of the most innovative aspects of this mechanism is that it 
could be the start of a genuine system for pricing global environmental 
services and turning them into tradables. It also shows that developing 
countries have promising opportunities for diversifying their comparative 
advantages as they pursue the international environmental agenda. The 
appraisal of global environmental services opens up an opportunity for 
resource and technology transfers to countries with major comparative 
advantages in terms of forests, biodiversity and the potential for 
achieving greater energy efficiency through a reduction in the use of fossil 
fuels. 
3.  Access to private international finance 
Countries’ varying degrees of access to private resources in the 
international financial system are a function of many different factors 
whose individual weights are difficult to establish but which, taken 
together, help determine how attractive the region is in the eyes of foreign 
investors and how much confidence it inspires in them. The following 
discussion will focus on two alternative means of gaining access to 
private flows: the creation of an attractive financial environment, and the 
promotion of FDI. 
(a) Development of an attractive financial environment for 
 private investors 
The region’s ability to attract long-term external financing on a 
competitive and stable basis will largely be determined by the countries’ 
success in strengthening their national financial systems (banking and 
                                                          
6 The total annual emission reduction required of developed countries is calculated at 
approximately 1.3 billion tons of carbon. Recent estimates put the price of reducing one 
ton of carbon -in the absence of international emissions trading at between US$ 584 
per ton in Japan and US$ 116 in transition economies. With the participation of 
developing countries through the CDM, however, the price would come down to US$ 24 
per ton (Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux, 1999). 
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capital markets) so that they can offer risk-return profiles which financiers 
will regard as being more attractive and safer than those of other regions. 
The emphasis on profitability and country risk as factors 
influencing the inflow of private external resources has spurred the 
implementation of policies aimed at strengthening external solvency and 
stability and  creating mechanisms for absorbing exchange-rate risk. 
Recently, greater attention is being devoted to devising means of rating 
private debt issuers more accurately, formulating regulations and legal 
provisions to protect minority investors from abusive practices on the 
part of controlling stakeholders, and promoting transparent reporting by 
corporate managers. 
One of the main reasons why there is such an urgent need to bring 
the region’s financial regulations up to international standards is the 
increasing presence of foreign private institutional investors (pension 
funds, investment funds and insurance companies). In addition to these 
investors’ natural desire to gain a better understanding of the risks 
existing in new markets, regulatory authorities in the more developed 
countries have been making a greater effort to safeguard investors’ 
solvency by making sure that they properly assess the implicit risks 
associated with all the assets contained in their portfolios. This has drawn 
attention to institutional shortcomings in the countries of the region that 
are limiting their access to this market. Overcoming these failings will be 
a key element in the region’s bid to position itself in international 
financial markets. 
The difficulty of reconciling the accounting and regulatory 
practices of countries in the region with those of private investors’ home 
countries is a problem which, at the very least, calls for a special effort on 
the part of providers of external funds to improve their reporting 
practices. Furthermore, this explicitly closes off access to some of the least 
expensive sources of external funds for potential borrowers in the region. 
Although some countries have made progress in this area, the region 
continues to exhibit major lags, especially in terms of regulations 
governing the capital market and those designed to promote transparency 
and sound corporate governance. 
The modernization of regulatory practices and the introduction of 
effective prudential supervision both of which should be oriented 
towards progressively raising standards until they match those prevailing 
in more developed financial centres- are one of the main tasks that the 
region must complete in order to position itself appropriately in 
international financial markets. The consensus surrounding the Basle 
Committee’s recommendations regarding banking regulation and 
supervision has paved the way for legislative advances in this area. A 
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number of major shortcomings remain, however, as will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapter. 
(b) FDI: characteristics and guidelines for enhancing its 
 contribution to development 
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, foreign investment was primarily 
channelled into manufacturing activities geared to supplying the region’s 
heavily protected national markets. More recently, international market 
trends and the new patterns of competition resulting from financial and 
trade liberalization have drawn the interest of new entrants and forced 
transnational corporations operating in the region to rethink their 
strategies.7 This has altered investors’ orientations and the part played by 
FDI in external financing. 
Table 3.13 summarizes the investment strategies, broken down by 
production sector, used by transnational corporations operating in the 
region. As will be seen, the reorientation of FDI was triggered by 
transnational corporations’ own pursuit of greater efficiency in their 
integrated international production systems. Illustrative examples are 
provided by investment and exports in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin. In 
most cases these are United States firms that are exploiting specific 
advantages low wages, geographic proximity and preferential access to 
that market to become more competitive in their own country so that 
they can contend with competition from Asian firms (ECLAC, 2000b, 
chapter II and 1998c, chapter IV).8 Other foreign investors have sought 
access to national and subregional markets for manufactured goods. This 
strategy has led them to invest heavily in the automotive, food, chemical 
and machinery industries with a view to supplying large local and 
subregional markets (ECLAC, 1998c, chapters II and IV). In addition, the 
deregulation process in Latin American economies and especially the 
privatization of public-sector assets has opened up investment 
opportunities in sectors that previously had been off-limits to private-sector 
activity generally and to foreign firms in particular. This has resulted in an 
influx of firms that previously did not maintain a major presence in Latin 
America, particularly in services and extractive industries. 
                                                          
7 Some of the transnationals operating in Latin America withdrew (in some cases 
continuing to supply local markets with exports from their countries of origin or from 
subsidiaries); others have tried to defend or increase their market share by rationalizing 
their operations (chiefly on the basis of strategies for defending themselves against 
imports) or by restructuring and making new investments (ECLAC, 2000b). 
8 There are a number of provisions that give United States firms special access to their 
own market, notably Rule HTS 9802, which allows firms based in the United States to 
export components originating in that country for assembly abroad and then re-import 
them while paying tariffs only on the value added abroad (ECLAC, 2000b, chapter IV). 
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Services   Finance: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela  
Telecommunications: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Peru 
Electric power: Argentina, Brazil, 
Central America, Colombia 
Gas distribution: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
Tourism: Central America, 
Caribbean Basin, Mexico 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division 
of Production, Productivity and Management. 
Decisive factors in the entry of foreign investors in the services 
sector have included the size of the local market, the regulations in place 
and technological changes. Their impact can be seen through the 
contributions they have made to systemic competitiveness in the economy 
as a whole, the access of the population to new products and services, 
and the dissemination of international best practices. This is of the utmost 
importance in Latin America and the Caribbean, as investment in 
these sectors grew significantly in the 1990s especially in 
telecommunications, electricity, financial services and retail trade and 
has come to represent an increasing proportion of total FDI, as shown in 
figure 3.2.9 The arrival of transnational corporations in the region’s 
extractive industries brought a new model for the organization of 
                                                          
9 European firms have been particularly active here, especially Spanish companies that 
have focused on member countries of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and 
Chile. As a result, Spain has become the second largest investor in the region and the 
largest of European origin (Calderón and Casilda, 2000; ECLAC, 2000b, chapter III). 
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production, the application of new technologies and regulatory changes 
in countries possessing natural resources. In general, the benefits brought 
by these investments have been increased exports of natural resources 
and construction of the necessary infrastructure. 
While FDI has certainly supplemented domestic saving in 
providing investment financing, some aspects of foreign firms’ impact on 
recipient economies warrant more careful scrutiny, as they offer 
important national policy lessons. In some cases, economic authorities 
have looked to FDI for a more stable source of financing to cover external 
deficits and a means of modernizing the production apparatus and thus 
improving productivity and international competitiveness, but these 
objectives that have not been fully achieved. 
Figure 3.2 
LATIN AMERICA: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF FDI,  1981-1999 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data processed by the Unit on Investment and Corporate 
Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity and Management. 
A large proportion of these capital inflows have been generated by 
the transfer of existing assets, rather than the creation of new production 
units. Their contribution to gross fixed capital formation has therefore 
been limited, since the purchase of existing assets has been the modality 
most frequently used by foreign investors in the region. In the early 1990s 
(and in some countries, especially Brazil, in the last few years as well), 
these purchases were occasioned by the privatization of State-owned 
enterprises; more recently the focus has shifted to the acquisition of 
private firms. The purchase of existing assets accounted for around 40% 
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earlier years.10 In addition, a large proportion of greenfield investment in 
the region has focused on the modernization and expansion of recently 
acquired service enterprises (ECLAC, 2000b and 1998c). 
Nonetheless, privatization programmes did provide additional 
revenues that helped finance structural reforms and ease external 
constraints. Even though, at least initially, it has not increased production 
capacity, this type of investment has made it possible to improve the 
quality of services (mainly telecommunications, transport, and power 
generation and distribution), and this has had a positive effect on the 
systemic competitiveness of recipient countries. 
Since these high levels of FDI largely stemmed from changes in 
ownership among the leading enterprises in the largest economies of the 
region, they were bound to be a temporary rather than permanent feature 
of these economies. Inward FDI has probably peaked, and it is quite 
possible that FDI inflows will decline in relative terms over the next few 
years.  The downturn in FDI in 2000 and 2001 is, in effect, a reversal of the 
upward trend seen until then and, for the reasons noted above, may be a 
long-lasting one. In any case, as noted in chapter 1, multinational 
corporations’ growing involvement in the region’s development ensures 
that FDI levels will remain significantly higher than they were before the 
1990s. 
The contribution made by FDI to development has been modest 
from the standpoint of national integration, however. On the one hand, 
export development focusing on natural resources or on natural-resource-
based industrial commodities continues to reproduce enclave economies, 
mainly in oil and mining. On the other hand, in the case of the export 
model based on the assembly of manufactured goods (found chiefly in 
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin), the rules of access to the United States 
market virtually prohibit the use of physical inputs produced locally, 
thereby limiting the formation of positive production linkages.11 
Nevertheless, despite the scant local content of many of these activities, 
the incorporation of cutting-edge technology, together with the creation 
of a few incipient technological clusters and an impressive increase in 
exports, make these experiences positive ones in terms of their 
contribution to the international competitiveness of host economies. 
                                                          
10 The boom in mergers and acquisitions reflected the many operations carried out in the 
largest Southern Cone countries, including privatizations in Brazil in 1997 and 1998 
(Telecomunicações Brasileiras (TELEBRAS) and electric power distribution companies) 
and the sale of local private-sector enterprises in Argentina and Chile in 1999 
(Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) and ENERSIS S.A.). 
11 Mexico’s entry into NAFTA has given it greater advantages over the Caribbean Basin 
countries (Mortimore, 1999). 
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The large investments made by many foreign companies in 
restructuring their long-standing operations in the Mercosur countries 
and the arrival of new entrants in response to the changed competitive 
landscape have significantly increased these industries’ export potential. 
Even though most of these firms cater to domestic markets, the need to 
compete with imports has forced them to become more competitive in 
international terms. 
Despite the positive systemic effects that FDI has had on external 
competitiveness, steps need to be taken to prevent an excessive bias 
towards non-tradables, since this could generate future balance-of-
payments pressures. The adoption of proactive policies aimed at 
promoting a greater convergence between national objectives and those of 
foreign investors has a key role to play here. 
In order to overcome the external vulnerability of the region’s 
economies, priority should be placed on using FDI to help create a 
competitive production structure. In countries with a relatively abundant 
natural resource endowment and a supply of the required types of labour, 
FDI could contribute to the development of the kinds of industrialization 
processes and manufactured-goods export models seen in more 
developed countries. While it is true that investments made to gain access 
to raw materials and those aimed at boosting efficiency both tend to 
strengthen the recipient country’s export performance, manufactures are 
the most dynamic category of exports, have the highest technological 
content and offer the greatest potential for positive externalities for the 
rest of the country’s economy. In cases where tourism-related resources 
and skills predominate, association with foreign investors provides access 
to international quality standards and management practices. 
Although trade liberalization and deregulation are necessary to 
attract FDI and stimulate exports, the Latin American experience shows 
that they are not enough in themselves to promote technological 
dynamism, foster the formation of positive linkages with the rest of the 
economy or help ensure environmental protection. It is therefore 
important to design active policies for the development of production and 
to adopt a proactive stance towards FDI in promoting a closer match 
between national development goals and the objectives of transnational 
corporations. 
The growing convergence of foreign investment regulations in 
most Latin American and Caribbean countries has tended to erode the 
spurious advantages that can arise from the existence of different legal 
frameworks. Instead, the countries of the region are using other means of 
differentiation in an effort to stand up to strong international competition 
for investment. These include measures designed to enhance and promote 
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their countries’ “image” and to create a generally pro-investment 
environment by furthering the development and increasing the 
sophistication of factors of production (human capital, finance, etc.), 
infrastructure, and the institutional framework for technological research 
and development. The articulation of FDI and long-term development 
policy thus emerges as the chief strategy for sustaining investment flows 
and strengthening their contribution to the development of the countries 
of the region.12 If a clearly defined policy of this type is absent, FDI is 
likely to be less beneficial and less effective in contributing to the host 
country’s development. 
                                                          
12 Leading examples are provided by Ireland, Scotland and Singapore, and, increasingly, 
Costa Rica, where national institutions have been proactive in channelling investments 
towards the higher value-added and higher-technology categories of manufacturing and 
towards priority activities, goals or regions. 
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Chapter 4 
Mobilizing domestic resources to provide 
financing for development 
As ECLAC has noted in previous documents (ECLAC, 2000b and 
1996), if the countries of the region are to reduce their income gap with 
the developed countries and bring poverty levels down at a desirable rate, 
per capita income will need to grow by 4%-5% a year. Depending on the 
particular demographic characteristics of each country, this would mean 
that GDP growth would have to be between 5.5% and 6.5% and 
investment rates would have to around 26%-28%, i.e., between four and 
six percentage points of GDP higher than the averages for the 1990s. To 
avoid the volatility-related risk that a higher level of external financing 
might entail (see chapters 1 and 2), a corresponding increase in domestic 
saving would be essential. In addition, from a microeconomic and 
financial standpoint, a proper allocation of household, corporate and 
government saving is important to ensure adequate investment financing, 
since otherwise savings efforts may be frustrated. Consequently, policies 
are also needed that will result in the development of solid financial 
systems capable both of supplying funds on suitable terms and conditions 
for profitable investments by business enterprises of all sorts and of 
ensuring security, liquidity and profitability for savers. 
This chapter is organized around these two facets of national 
financing. The first two sections deal with the complexities involved in 
designing savings policies and explore a number of policy options for 
raising corporate, household and government saving. The third section 
looks at the policy principles required to strengthen the role of the 
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banking system, the capital market and development banks in financing 
productive investment. 
1. The complexity of saving 
Recent international crises have provided valuable lessons about 
how to deal with the new challenges involved in financing development 
in a context of globalization. They have also served to confirm the 
enduring validity of a number of tenets, among them that economies with 
high levels of external saving are vulnerable to international cycles and 
that the maintenance of prudent and sustainable limits on current account 
deficits ought to be an ongoing objective for national economic 
authorities. The corollary of this is that the bulk of investment financing 
should come from domestic saving. 
Despite the relationship between national saving and future 
economic prosperity, it is difficult to implement policies that will succeed 
in raising savings rates. The main political difficulty is that, in most cases, 
higher saving entails a reduction in present welfare. Reducing budget 
deficits, achieving financial balance in pension systems and promoting 
  or even compelling prompt payment of debts, to name just a few 
examples, can carry a high political cost in the short run while producing 
major economic benefits in the medium term. Voluntary saving is another 
highly complex phenomenon, as decisions to save depend on a vast 
number of variables, many of which cannot be controlled by the economic 
authorities. Effective strategies for its promotion are therefore very 
difficult to design. 
Saving behaviour is one of the factors to which economists and 
economic authorities pay the greatest attention. Nonetheless, there is still 
a great deal of debate as to what its determinants are and what policy 
recommendations should be made in order to foster a greater willingness 
to save. Although the following discussion will by no means provide an 
exhaustive analysis of this question, it will identify some of the difficulties 
involved and set out a number of elements that could serve as a basis for 
the design of effective policies to promote saving. 
First of all, saving decisions are, by definition, intertemporal and 
are influenced not only by present opportunities, incentives, policies and 
institutions, but also by perceptions about the future. A climate of greater 
predictability within a sound, stable macroeconomic environment is 
a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for any strategy to increase 
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saving.1 Likewise, in an economy whose financial system is weak, or 
where property rights are ambiguous or economic agents are at the mercy 
of discretionary decisions by third parties, be these public or private, 
voluntary saving and its use to finance productive investment will be 
discouraged. When it comes to creating a climate of confidence in order to 
encourage saving, it is particularly important to have an institutional 
structure that motivates borrowers, lenders, intermediaries and regulators 
to establish transparent financial contracts and to comply with them. This 
same structure must also provide for appropriate prudential regulation to 
protect the owners of financial assets from systemic risk. Clear and 
transparent ground rules are an integral part of a pro-saving 
environment, while corruption, tax evasion, money laundering and 
poorly functioning judicial systems, among other institutional failings, 
undermine the predictive capacity that is essential to saving and 
investment decisions, to say nothing of the obvious unacceptability of 
these institutional flaws on ethical grounds. 
A second type of complexity arises from the absence of a clear 
relationship, either theoretically or empirically, between the return on 
savings —normally represented by the after-tax interest rate— and 
personal and household savings rates. As profitability rises, it is difficult 
to predict whether people will save more because saving is better 
rewarded (substitution effect), or whether they will save less in order to 
attain a given future level of expenditure (income effect). This theoretical 
complexity has not been resolved by the empirical evidence, which is 
ambiguous and evinces a statistical relationship that in most cases differs 
from zero by no more than a negligible margin. Despite the theoretical 
and empirical ambiguity of the link between saving and profitability, 
however, many countries have developed incentives particularly tax 
incentives to raise the return on saving in the hope that saving will 
increase accordingly. 
This ambiguity is largely due to the fact that existing incentives 
focus more on asset ownership than on saving as such. Personal and 
household saving, like that of any other agent, is the difference between 
current income and current spending, and its corollary is an increase in 
wealth through the acquisition of assets or a reduction of liabilities. 
Incentives for ownership of particular assets are therefore, by definition, 
incomplete. Theoretically, incentives should focus on the flow of saving, 
                                                 
1 The subject of macroeconomic balances is analysed only briefly in this section. This 
should not, however, be construed as implying that the adoption of sound and 
consistent macroeconomic policies is of only incidental importance to saving. It is 
impossible to overemphasize the importance of sound macroeconomic management as a 
necessary condition for stimulating saving and investment. 
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defined as current income minus current expenditure. This consideration 
gives rise to a persuasive criticism of fiscal systems that tax income rather 
than expenditure. The argument here is that personal income taxes 
discriminate against saving because they tax the income that is saved and 
then, later on, tax the profits on those savings. Thus, there is an element of 
double taxation on savings that could theoretically be eliminated by 
replacing income taxes with (progressive) taxes on consumption. Under 
such a system, consumer loans would be taxed but the service on those 
borrowings would be exempt. Systems of this kind are, however, so 
difficult to design and administer that they are essentially infeasible, as 
they would require natural persons to maintain comprehensive financial 
accounts so that they could determine their own tax base. 
In the absence of taxes that fully reward personal and household 
saving, tax systems generally have total or partial exemptions for income 
derived from the ownership of certain assets, such as the interest earned 
on deposits in the financial system.2 This stimulus is, however, subject to 
the following leakages, which diminish its potential: (i) it benefits not only 
saving, but existing assets as well, and there is no guarantee that the 
proceeds from the latter will not be used to finance additional 
consumption; (ii) some saving would have taken place even without the 
incentive; (iii) there is an incentive to alter the composition of portfolios so 
as to raise the proportion of tax-exempt assets, without producing any 
increase in net saving; and (iv) if the incentive is a subsidy rather than an 
exemption, the profitability of the subsidized assets may exceed the cost 
of borrowing funds, thereby encouraging taxpayers to “borrow to save”. 
In this case there is no additional saving. These arguments highlight the 
income effect generated by incentives aimed at boosting the profitability 
of personal and household saving. In addition, incentives for asset 
ownership have a fiscal cost in the form of lower tax receipts, which 
reduces public-sector saving.3 In order for national saving to rise, personal 
saving has to rise by more than public-sector saving falls. In other words, 
households need to increase their saving by an amount greater than the 
benefit received (they need to reduce their consumption). 
A third difficulty is that there is no guarantee that the savings of 
certain agents will be used by them or other national agents to finance 
new productive investment or to provide additional working capital. For 
                                                 
2 These incentives are also generally justified on the grounds that they foster a habit of 
saving or give pro-saving policy signals. In these cases, there is an implicit assumption 
of irrationality on the part of economic agents which does not always have a basis in 
fact. 
3 This argument assumes that current spending by the public sector remains unchanged. 
If expenditure is reduced in order to keep public saving constant, then national saving 
will rise for this reason, not because of the incentive. 
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example, all things being equal, higher savings invested in external assets 
will increase national saving, but they are also likely to result in lower net 
external saving, without there necessarily being any increase in domestic 
productive investment. Similarly, by definition, any new borrowing 
makes use of the savings of other agents. This use of others’ savings may 
go to finance borrowing for consumption, temporary losses, interest debt 
reschedulings and write-downs, purchases of existing fixed assets or 
financial assets, or fiscal deficits. Productive investment competes for 
financing with these and other uses for savings. Consequently, financial 
saving does not always coincide with national saving. 
Most private uses of savings for purposes other than investment 
financing are legitimate, however, and there is no reason to discriminate 
against them. For example, prudent access to consumer credit leads to 
greater well-being, although the fact remains that excessive borrowing 
will invariably be counterproductive. What is more, the purchase of 
durable consumer goods does in fact have an investment component 
(albeit a non-productive one), and the financing provided for such 
purposes has a savings component, since goods of this kind, once 
purchased, yield a benefit in terms of consumption and an improved 
quality of life over a long period. The accounting conventions used in 
national accounts, for example, treat housing investment as part of gross 
fixed capital formation, even though housing for one’s own use is a 
durable consumer good rather than a capital good.4 There are also types 
of expenditure that clearly have a component of productive investment in 
human capital even though national accounts treat them as consumption, 
such as expenditure on education. From the point of view of policy 
design, there is no reason to discriminate against alternative uses of 
savings, except, of course, as far as is necessary to ensure that borrowing 
is prudent, sustainable and transparently managed. 
The key point, though, is that productive investment has to 
compete for financing with alternative uses of savings. In accounting 
terms, only savings that finance investment constitute national savings. In 
the final analysis, then, it is national saving, plus external saving, that 
finances investment, as defined in accordance with national accounts 
conventions.5 Thus, a favourable climate for productive investment is also 
a necessary although not sufficient condition for higher national 
                                                 
4 Under the same accounting convention, GDP figures in national accounts include a 
contribution from the housing stock equivalent to the income that it is hypothetically 
capable of generating. 
5 For national accounts purposes, investment is defined as the sum of gross fixed capital 
formation plus changes in inventories, and investment financing is defined as the sum of 
national saving plus external saving (deficit on the balance-of-payments current 
account). 
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saving. Most of the ingredients of a pro-savings environment 
predictability, a sound financial system, appropriate macroeconomic 
policies, etc. are also conducive to productive investment. When it 
comes to designing incentive policies, on the other hand, there is less 
ambiguity regarding methods for enhancing productive investment than 
there is in the case of policy measures for boosting saving. 
2. Policies for boosting public and private saving 
Despite the complexities outlined in the preceding section, there is 
considerable scope for using specific types of policies, over and above 
those already noted, to stimulate national saving. The general thrust of all 
such policies is to encourage, urge and even oblige economic agents to 
save. For the most part, in the following discussion corporate, household 
and public-sector saving decisions are dealt with separately. From the 
point of view of their future growth potential, the public sector and 
business enterprises are the agents that have the capacity to make the 
greatest contribution. This is because individuals and households take 
saving decisions primarily as a function of intertemporal consumption 
decisions. Those decisions, in their turn, are based on increases in income 
which are basically determined by macroeconomic conditions (growth) 
and income distribution. Firms, by contrast, have an ongoing interest in 
the accumulation process, and governments whose fiscal authorities work 
on the basis of a medium-term policy horizon have an ongoing interest in 
maintaining stability and in ensuring that they do not crowd out the 
private sector. These issues will be explored in greater depth in the 
following analysis. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that the successful use of one of the 
above mechanisms to boost saving will necessarily contribute to the 
financing of productive investment. As mentioned earlier, saving by some 
agents may be used to finance other types of spending. Any increase in 
national saving needs to be accompanied by a simultaneous and matching 
effort to stimulate productive investment, to channel savings into this 
type of investment and into long-term financial instruments, and to 
develop appropriate financial intermediation mechanisms. 
(a) Reinvestment of corporate profits 
One of the main lessons to be learned from the “Asian miracle” is 
that corporate saving must be channelled into productive investment if a 
country is to succeed in furthering its development (Akyüz and Gore, 
1996). Another lesson to be learned from this experience, however, is that 
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specific policies need to be used to encourage firms to reinvest their 
profits. 
Gross corporate saving consists of firms’ reinvested profits and 
depreciation funds. Companies can also choose to finance their operations 
with other agents’ savings by borrowing, which they may do in many 
different ways, or by issuing equity. The conventional theory on optimum 
corporate behaviour is not yet capable of accounting for business 
investment and financing decisions simultaneously. On the one hand, 
investment theory assumes that the structure of financing when broken 
down into reinvested profits, borrowing and capital contributions is 
exogenous. Under this assumption any increase in investment will raise 
profit reinvestment and borrowing by generally predictable percentages. 
On the other hand, according to the theory of corporate financing, which 
looks at the financial structure as such, regardless of the amount of the 
investment, reinvested profits take the place of other sources of financing. 
According to this theory, the tax structure is crucial in determining the 
financial behaviour of business enterprises.6 If taxes on reinvested profits 
are low, then reinvestment will become the main source of financing, and 
there will thus be a major stimulus for saving. This tallies with investment 
theory, which states that reductions in taxes on reinvested profits are a 
more effective incentive for productive investment than equivalent 
reductions in taxes on distributed profits. Reinvestment will reduce the 
flow of dividends to shareholders, at least in the short run, but there is a 
counterbalancing effect because a larger volume of reinvested profits will 
raise the market value of the company. Hence, shareholders will realize 
capital gains that will compensate them for the reduction in dividend 
receipts. At the extreme, under a system of taxation that operates on a 
withdrawal basis, profits would be tax exempt until they were 
withdrawn. To sustain tax revenues from capital income which is the 
correct way to measure the impact of alternative tax structures 
reductions in taxes on reinvested profits would have to be offset by 
increased taxes on distributed profits. Otherwise, there is a risk that tax 
revenues will decrease, thereby reducing the public sector’s contribution 
to national saving. 
Taxation on a withdrawal basis entails serious practical problems, 
however. First, it would need to be applied across the board. If such a 
scheme were applied only to certain activities while others were subject to 
the traditional sort of tax on corporate profits or to a presumptive income 
system, a substantial volume of revenue might be lost. This is because 
                                                 
6 The Modigliani-Miller theorem asserts that with perfect prediction, and in the absence of 
risk and bankruptcy, the tax structure will be the sole consideration for a company in 
determining its financing structure. 
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when different tax schemes overlap, tax planners will concentrate profits 
in firms to which a withdrawal-basis tax scheme applies and withdrawals 
in firms to which other tax systems apply, using transfer prices to shift 
profits and liquidity around. Second, the withdrawal-basis system 
requires closer oversight, more complicated accounting procedures and 
an entire range of complementary tax regulations to prevent the use of 
simulations that will allow firms to take advantage of legal loopholes. 
The decision to move towards a withdrawal-basis tax seems less 
advisable in countries that have a high degree of tax erosion (due to 
exemptions, special tax regimes, poor administration, etc.). In such cases, 
legally mandated tax incentives exist more in theory than in practice, 
since non-payment of taxes erodes both revenues and, to an even greater 
extent, the desired effect of incentives. In such cases, there are all the costs 
associated with the use of more complex tax schemes but the benefits are 
more uncertain. In such situations, it seems more advisable to concentrate 
efforts on reducing tax erosion by using simpler systems, and it will 
always be easier to tax income at the source. In countries with more 
effective tax systems, on the other hand, there is less of a gap between the 
intent of the law and its practical outcome, and the costs and benefits of 
alternative systems can be weighed more accurately. 
Some of the simpler ways of improving tax systems inadvertently 
increase the propensity of firms to borrow rather than to reinvest profits. 
The recommendations concerning these methods aim at increasing 
corporate saving as a source of investment finance and reducing the 
propensity to borrow. The clearest example of this is the practice, which is 
quite common in many countries, of making nominal interest payments 
deductible as a business expense. In the absence of monetary correction 
for the effects of inflation, however, real after-tax interest contains an 
implicit tax incentive which generates an artificial bias towards a greater 
use of borrowing as a source of corporate financing. The greater the 
inflationary component in the nominal interest rate, the greater the 
hidden incentive to borrow. The obvious solution is to introduce 
adjustments to correct for the accounting effects of inflation. 
Another element worth considering is the way accelerated 
depreciation is treated in countries that have consolidated their profits tax 
with the top marginal personal income tax rate. As is well known, 
skilfully designed accelerated depreciation schemes are a powerful tool 
for stimulating productive investment. Their main effect is the benefit 
derived from delaying the payment of profits taxes because of the 
difference between financial profits (with normal depreciation) and 
accounting profits (with accelerated depreciation). Countries that have 
consolidated their profits taxes with personal taxes make profit 
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withdrawals tax exempt based on the argument that such withdrawals 
have already been taxed within the company. The combined effect of 
accelerated depreciation and tax consolidation is that the benefit is 
extended to personal taxes, as untaxed profits can be withdrawn while 
maintaining the exemption for personal taxes. One possible solution to 
this problem is for financial profits deriving from accelerated depreciation 
to be recorded as taxable accounting profits upon withdrawal. This 
approach preserves the incentive for using retained profits as a source of 
finance, since taxes on those profits are deferred until their withdrawal, 
and, at the same time, prevents leakage into personal income of a tax 
benefit whose primary intent is to increase investment financing. 
The list of cases is a long and specialized one. What is clear, 
however, is the importance of evaluating and reviewing tax and 
accounting rules to detect hidden biases that may inadvertently 
discourage the reinvestment of corporate profits. 
(b) Household saving 
Intertemporal consumption decisions are associated with 
intertemporal saving decisions, where expectations of future income play 
a determining role. People may decide to save now and consume later, or 
to borrow and consume now and to save later (when they pay off their 
consumer debts). This characteristic of personal saving provides a useful 
opening for institutional efforts to promote saving habits. Incentives and 
regulations designed to encourage, or force, individuals and households 
to save for specific purposes are less subject to leakage and thus have a 
greater potential for raising saving rates. 
The most obvious case is that of social security saving, which is 
used to finance old-age pensions, survivors’ benefits and disability 
pensions. Pension systems have rules making the payment of 
contributions mandatory (forced saving), and the rights conferred under 
pension systems have the force of law. Underfunded pension systems 
have two negative effects on saving. On the one hand, their deficits 
compete for financing with other uses, which means that they drain off 
resources that would otherwise be available for financing investment 
(national saving). On the other hand, saving in pension schemes is a 
partial substitute for voluntary saving by contributors, since if there were 
no formal pension system many individuals would save voluntarily. The 
extent to which substitution takes place will depend more on the expected 
benefits (which are linked primarily to pension system expenditure) than 
on the level of contributions (linked mainly to pension system revenues). 
Furthermore, the expected benefits are also influenced by people’s life 
expectancies. As this increases over time, without there being a matching 
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increase in contributions, pension systems invariably exhibit a tendency 
towards underfunding. So long as contributors do not feel that this 
underfunding will threaten their pension rights, however, they will have 
no incentive to increase their voluntary saving. The obvious conclusion is 
that pension systems need to be constantly assessed so that any deficits, 
whether current or actuarial, can be corrected without damaging the 
redistributive elements that any pension system should ideally contain. 
The conversion of pension systems into privately managed 
individual capitalization systems, such as those introduced in a number 
of countries in the region, represents a special case. Theoretically, from 
the point of view of their contribution to saving, there are no major 
differences between individual capitalization, or funded, systems and 
pay-as-you-go systems, with more important factors being the level of 
contributions, the system’s coverage, retirement age, management costs, 
State pension insurance and, in the case of pay-as-you-go systems, 
replacement rates. Another important factor is how sensitive the system’s 
benefits are to pressure from organized groups, whose cumulative effects 
are greater in older systems. The chief point is that, regardless of the 
pension system’s institutional structure, the smaller its deficit or the larger 
its surplus is in terms of both flows and present value, the greater its 
contribution to saving will be. 
Although alternative systems ought to be evaluated primarily on 
the basis of their effectiveness as pension schemes, it must be recognized 
that individual capitalization systems have the additional advantage of 
helping to improve the operation of local capital markets, both because 
efforts have to be made to develop and expand these markets if such 
systems are to operate and because the existence of this kind of link 
between the capital market and the pension system necessitates greater 
transparency and governance. If national saving is to be increased, 
however, the development of local capital markets requires a concomitant 
effort to find ways to ensure that institutional investors, and particularly 
pension systems, will use their long-term resources to finance productive 
investment. This, in turn, means that instruments and rules for assessing 
risk and profitability conditions need to be devised. This subject will be 
discussed in greater detail further on. 
Another highly significant aspect of pension reform is the fiscal 
management of the system during the transition period. By their very 
nature, these reforms have a long transition period, since for several 
decades the State will be obliged to cover the revenue loses of the old pay-
as-you-go system while the new capitalization system builds up sufficient 
income, over a span of many years, without being obliged to pay out 
equivalent benefits. The pension savings built up by capitalization 
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systems may, in fact, be more than offset by the dissavings or deficits 
generated by the pay-as-you-go systems, since they are losing their 
revenues while continuing to pay out benefits. Financing these deficits by 
issuing government bonds that are paid for with the surplus from the 
new system does not generate net saving in the short term and can steer 
the system as a whole in a dangerous direction. Consequently, if these 
reforms are to be sustainable over time, fiscal efforts have to be made to 
offset the larger public-sector social security deficit arising as a 
consequence of the reform. Of course, the greater this effort, the stronger 
the effect on overall saving.7 
This line of reasoning is predicated on the existence of forced 
saving, which may be higher or lower than the voluntary saving that 
would have taken place if there had been no pension system. In the first 
case, there will be a net contribution to saving, since people are being 
forced to save more, unless they are able to borrow against their pension 
savings. Although it will never be possible to eliminate all leakage from 
the system, it is advisable to introduce legal provisions to prevent people 
from either drawing on these savings for non-pension purposes or using 
them as collateral for personal loans. In the second case, pension saving is 
substituted for voluntary saving and does not represent a net contribution 
to overall saving. In either cases, it is advisable to permit additional 
voluntary contributions or to set up complementary systems for 
voluntary pension saving. Apart from the institution-building that a 
complementary system will require, it seems best to exempt voluntary 
contributions to such a system from personal taxes and then to tax 
whatever benefits are subsequently paid out. To avoid leakage, the rule 
that pension savings may be drawn upon only for pension-related 
purposes should also apply to tax-exempt voluntary pension savings, and 
their use as loan collateral should be restricted. 
In addition to pension saving, another way of boosting personal 
and household saving is to put the emphasis on savings set aside for 
specific and clearly identifiable purposes. For example, targeted subsidies 
can be provided for saving to purchase a home or to pay for a child’s 
education (particularly higher education, which has a higher direct cost 
and a greater opportunity cost for students of working age). These 
subsidies can be allocated using a scoring system which rewards prior 
saving and reflects household income and living conditions; they should 
                                                 
7 The question of how pension system reforms affect national saving and how this is 
related to the fiscal deficit generated by the changeover from a pay-as-you-go to an 
individual capitalization system has been analysed by ECLAC on the basis of Chile’s 
experiences in this area. See ECLAC (1999, chapter VII), Arrau (1996), Holzman (1997), 
Uthoff (1998) and Mesa-Lago (2000). 
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come into effect only when the targeted event occurs (the purchase of a 
home or admission into an institution of higher education, in the 
examples given). Although such incentives are also subject to leakage, 
their income-effect components are clearly weaker than those associated 
with general incentives to asset ownership.8 
Another case worth mentioning is that of personal saving as a 
hedge against unforeseen events. Such contingencies can best be dealt 
with through a good insurance and reinsurance system. Indeed, insurance 
policies represent an important form of saving. Life insurance is the most 
obvious example, and there are a variety of ways of encouraging people 
to purchase such policies, although all of them necessitate a reliable 
regulatory framework that meets international standards. Some of these 
savings mechanisms may be compulsory, as in the case of individual 
capitalization pension systems, where the pension is generated by the 
purchase of a life annuity that is paid out by the pension fund upon 
retirement. Other examples are disability insurance provided under the 
pension system and fully or partially self-financed unemployment 
insurance. Housing mortgages or other types of long-term personal loans 
generally require borrowers to take out mortgage life insurance and other 
forms of insurance to ensure servicing (fire insurance, unemployment 
insurance, etc.). Mandatory insurance against road accidents is another 
case in point. All of these are compulsory forms of insurance which, apart 
from their direct effect in providing protection against covered losses, 
help to raise personal and household saving. 
Policy measures can also be used to encourage people to take out 
voluntary insurance coverage (e.g., life insurance, insurance against 
catastrophic illnesses and occupational injuries, etc.). In all these cases, the 
insurance is providing coverage for involuntary losses of some sort, so 
there is less likelihood of leakage. Tax incentives for individuals and/or 
groups to take out such insurance are more likely to raise national saving 
than, for example, direct incentives for the ownership of particular assets. 
In short, the main point being made here is that, in the absence of 
reliable schemes for stimulating personal and household saving, one 
alternative is to use rules and incentives to boost special-purpose saving. 
                                                 
8 The market-based financing of low-cost housing through the use of demand subsidies 
has been analysed by ECLAC on the basis of an examination of initiatives in Chile, 
Colombia and Costa Rica. See Held (2000) and Szalachman (2000). 
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(c) Financing public investment 
ECLAC (1998a) has discussed the need for the consolidation of the 
fiscal adjustment made by the region in the last two decades. The 
Commission’s proposed fiscal covenant contains a set of policy 
recommendations for raising the level of public revenue, increasing the 
productivity and transparency of public spending, and enhancing its 
contribution to equity and to the construction of democratic institutions. 
The following discussion will focus on the close link between 
consolidation of the fiscal adjustment and the contribution that proper 
management of public finances can make to generating and increasing 
national saving. 
Many countries in the region have had traumatic experiences due 
to a lack of fiscal discipline which eventually led to painful economic 
adjustments. In some instances these events coincided with periods when 
credit was readily accessible, particularly during the second half of the 
1970s. The anguish caused by this economic instability had the effect of 
raising the political and economic value of stability. During the two 
decades that followed, substantial progress was made by most of the 
countries of the region in bringing order to their fiscal accounts and to the 
institutional structures needed to do so, thereby demonstrating that 
important lessons had been learned from recent events. The boom in 
voluntary financial inflows over the last three decades, coupled with an 
increasing degree of market sophistication and the emergence of 
numerous alternative ways of accessing the resources available on 
financial markets, has inevitably fostered the belief that progress towards 
solving the region’s most pressing problems can be accelerated by means 
of public spending. The obvious corollary to this, however, is 
vulnerability to cycles and unforeseen shocks. In other words, when 
advantage is taken of the fiscal degrees of freedom available during 
upturns, the inevitable consequence is a lack of fiscal degrees of freedom 
for coping with downturns. If policy makers refrain from using that 
greater leeway during expansionary phases, on the other hand, the 
downswings will be less traumatic and they will have more policy 
options for handling them. No major economic agent is going to help the 
State to refrain from short-term borrowing to meet urgent present needs. 
Nor can the State expect any support if it chooses not to spend transitory 
revenues. Meeting the challenges involved in implementing a fiscal policy 
based on a medium-term horizon demands a level of political 
determination, strength and decisiveness that only public authorities 
themselves can be asked to provide. It is evident that a proper analysis of 
fiscal-policy costs and benefits inevitably has an intertemporal 
144 ECLAC 
component, and it is equally obvious that there is a very close link 
between this issue and national and public-sector saving. 
A strategy for boosting national saving will have a much greater 
chance of success if macroeconomic policy makers’ main fiscal objective is 
to persevere in their adjustment efforts until a structural balance or, 
better still, a structural surplus has been achieved in the country’s fiscal 
accounts. To put it another way, such a strategy will be more likely to 
succeed if, after stripping out the effects of the business cycle and 
sporadic government revenues, the authorities aim to achieve a public 
savings rate (current revenue in excess of current outlays, including 
interest payments) sufficient to finance all public investment (real and 
financial) and still leave something to spare.9 It was pointed out earlier 
that productive investment competes for financing with a range of 
alternative uses of financial savings. And in point of fact, a public sector 
that is running a deficit is a major competitor for these limited resources, 
since, by drawing in outside savings, the deficit partially crowds out 
financing for private productive investment, puts pressure on the balance-
of-payments current account deficit (external saving) and, except insofar 
as it is used to finance new public investment, reduces national saving.10 
It is important to stress that the target being proposed here is a 
structurally balanced budget or a structural budget surplus. This should 
by no means be construed as suggesting that the countercyclical role 
which fiscal policy necessarily has to play should be relinquished. On the 
contrary, if public finances are put on a structurally more solid footing, 
they can then be used more actively in contending with recessions or 
unforeseen shocks, as well as helping to avert the need to cut public 
spending and permitting the implementation of special programmes for 
dealing with the crisis. 
To achieve a structural fiscal balance, it is necessary to arrive at an 
estimate of public revenues, corrected for a variety of factors. One 
correction is for the business cycle’s effect on public accounts, particularly 
revenue. An overheated economy temporarily generates additional tax 
revenues that would not otherwise be available, just as an economy in 
                                                 
9 As was noted earlier, accounting conventions treat items involving human capital 
formation or improvements in living standards (such as spending on education, 
training, health, etc.) as current expenditure. This bias has particularly important 
implications for public social expenditure. In that area, consideration could be given to 
drawing a distinction between income policies having a clearly a current expense) and 
social investment policies. 
10 A budget deficit must be funded by a matching level of third-party savings. This 
includes not only net borrowing over a given period of time, but also asset sales. The 
sale of equity in public enterprises, for example, also draws on the savings of other 
agents.  
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recession denies the State tax revenues that would otherwise be available. 
A fiscal policy that sets deficit/surplus goals without considering the 
effects of the business cycle will tend to raise spending during upturns 
and reduce it during downturns, thereby generating counterproductive 
procyclical pressures. A correct measurement of the structural balance on 
fiscal accounts requires an accurate estimate of potential GDP and of the 
levels of public revenue and expenditure consistent with this estimate. 
Another kind of correction can be made by preparing separate 
estimates that will differentiate between the long-term trend in the terms 
of trade and short-term fluctuations. Public accounts are sensitive to the 
terms of trade in most of the region, and transitory export-price spikes or 
shocks can also produce an illusion of strength or weakness in public 
accounts. Given this situation, the establishment of stabilization funds for 
the main goods that are exported and imported (with the accounts for 
such funds being kept separate from fiscal accounts) is an extremely 
useful mechanism for safeguarding fiscal stability. Indeed, a good way to 
stabilize fiscal policy in the first place is to set up general stabilization 
funds that will help smooth out not only fluctuations in earnings caused 
by changes in the terms of trade, but also the effects of temporary 
increases in income during the expansionary stage of the cycle and those 
resulting from the sale of assets. Proceeds from the sale of State assets or 
the award of concessions are, in particular, one-off revenues that can 
create the illusion of solidity in fiscal accounts in the short run. What 
these and other corrections have in common is that they separate out the 
transitory or short-lived components of public accounts from their 
structural components. This differentiation is necessary if fiscal policy is 
to have a medium- and long-term horizon.11 
Yet another important consideration in this respect is the treatment 
of the public sector’s contingent liabilities. State guarantees, be they 
explicit or implicit, should be properly determined in advance (Arenas de 
Mesa, 1999). Cases requiring special attention include unemployment 
insurance, explicit or implicit pension system insurance, insurance for 
infrastructure projects contracted out to the private sector, and fiscal and 
                                                 
11 It is of interest for the region to examine the recent experience of the countries in the 
euro zone in this respect. The need to coordinate the member States’ fiscal policies has 
required not only the establishment of fiscal compliance targets, but also the creation of 
more sophisticated public accounting methods to differentiate the structural and 
transitory components of public accounts. It should be noted that, within certain limits, a 
degree of flexibility is allowed in the implementation of fiscal policy with regard both to 
differences between actual deficits and structural ones and to short-term deviations from 
the agreed level of structural deficit for countercyclical purposes (never for procyclical 
ones). In the final analysis, the main consideration for policy coordination purposes is 
the medium-term position of fiscal accounts. 
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quasi-fiscal resources associated with financial crises. When such crises 
arise, it is understood that the State is responsible for guaranteeing the 
continuity of the payment chain. In particular, the State is expected to 
guarantee, either wholly or in part, the ownership rights of savers during 
systemic crises. As will be seen later on, adequate prudential regulation of 
the financial system is essential if this is to be achieved. In addition, 
during times of crisis the State must premise its actions on the principle 
that when financial losses occur, fiscal and quasi-fiscal resources must 
never come into play until the corresponding banks’ capital and reserves 
have first been entirely exhausted, without exceptions. The sequence in 
which the costs of a crisis are distributed will continue to be an issue of 
prime importance in the region. Self-interest is always a good incentive 
for proper management of the banking system by its stakeholders. 
The previous paragraph introduces a more generic and highly 
important subject for the region which ECLAC has addressed on many 
occasions: the transparency of public accounts (ECLAC, 1998a, chapters I 
and II). Contingent liabilities, implicit insurance against financial crises 
and a range of other items do not show up in public accounts. Tax 
benefits are one such item. By contrast with the practice followed in some 
developed countries, in the region the cost of these benefits is simply 
ignored, which makes proper cost-benefit analysis virtually impossible. 
Another is excessive regulations, which generally are used because public 
resources are too scarce for direct action to be taken by means of 
incentives. Yet another is arrears in fiscal payments, which are not 
recorded as part of the public debt or of the budget deficit. Clearly, efforts 
to consolidate the fiscal adjustment will have to entail more stringent 
rules to ensure transparency in public expenditure. 
Consolidating the fiscal adjustment until a prudent structural 
balance or surplus has been achieved is a feasible goal only if there is a 
willingness to pay the short-term costs of the transition. This calls for an 
ongoing commitment to improving the productivity of public expenditure 
and the performance of public institutions, to reducing tax erosion in the 
region and to increasing the transparency of public accounts. Above all, 
however, it calls for budgetary priority-setting with regard to the 
composition of public revenues and expenditure. In the final analysis, the 
use of outside savings (deficit) to finance recurrent government 
expenditures implies that the objective of contributing to national saving 
and to the financing of private investment is of only secondary 
importance to the State. 
Reference was made earlier to the fallacy implicit in using short-
term resources from privatizations to finance government spending. 
Privatization processes are complex and have to be designed and 
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evaluated from a variety of standpoints. It is particularly important to 
ensure an adequate supply of public goods and merit goods and to 
protect society from abuses by privately run natural monopolies, which 
means that a suitable regulatory system must be in place before 
privatization. The quality of the administration and management of 
public enterprises and infrastructure are also an important consideration. 
If, however, increasing national saving is a policy priority, there will also 
be other decision-making criteria that should be considered by the 
authorities. In particular, the privatization process has an important 
contribution to make to fiscal adjustment on a different level. 
The fact is that investment by public-sector agencies and firms is 
usually a source of pressure on the overall public deficit. Deferring such 
investment can also carry a high cost in the medium and long terms. 
Quite often, it is not only socially profitable (as public-sector investment is 
expected to be) but is highly profitable in market terms as well, and this, it 
could be argued, means there is scope for public-sector borrowing 
without harming the State’s net wealth position. There can be no doubt 
that a fiscal deficit of this nature is less harmful economically. 
Nonetheless, the argument that the deficit competes for savings with 
other uses, including the financing of private investment, is still relevant. 
The merits of other arguments notwithstanding, a major contribution to 
saving can be made by the privatization of public infrastructure projects 
and enterprises that need to increase their productive investment 
substantially. 
Where these public investments are profitable in market terms and 
the State cannot finance them out of its own resources in other words, 
without running a deficit privatization can free up public resources for 
other expenditures. The cross-effects that come into play here are of 
interest from the standpoint of national saving. When public-interest 
investments are financed with private savings, the State does not have to 
divert its own resources into these investments. It will then have 
resources it can use to finance institution-building or social policies 
without incurring a deficit. A successful tender should yield public 
revenues that internalize the market value of the assets sold for the benefit 
of the State. If these resources, which are by nature transitory, are used to 
prepay public debt or to capitalize the development banking system, for 
example, then they will be recycled into the financial system and will 
thereby contribute to the financing of productive investment and to 
national saving. As pointed out earlier, however, these are not the only 
considerations that should carry weight in privatization programmes. 
Hence, given the competition for financing and the cyclical nature 
of external resource flows, efforts to achieve a prudent fiscal policy 
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should be redoubled. At a time of increasing international financial 
liberalization, it is becoming more and more difficult for central bank 
authorities to adopt an active stance in managing their exchange-rate and 
monetary policies. Consequently, fiscal policy is being called upon to play 
an increasingly important role in macroeconomic management. 
3. Policies to develop financial intermediation for 
purposes of productive investment 
In order to boost the region’s growth rates and reduce its 
vulnerability to external fluctuations, efforts to increase national saving 
should be coupled with measures for channelling these funds into 
investment. Most of the region’s financial systems suffer from serious 
shortcomings that diminish the effectiveness of such measures, however. 
As noted in chapter 1, bank financing is less developed in Latin America 
and the Caribbean than it is in other regions, the system’s intermediation 
spreads are wider, and its long-term segment is quite shallow. 
Furthermore, capital markets are small, and some of them have become 
even smaller during the 1990s. 
Events in the region indicate that the public policy approach 
required in order to surmount these obstacles will have to go beyond the 
bounds of policies focusing entirely on the liberalization of financial 
markets. In the wake of costly bank crises in countries of the region and 
elsewhere, and in view of the fact that key segments of the financial 
market (especially long-term credit, SMEs and the capital market) have 
shown very little spontaneous growth, a consensus has emerged 
regarding the vital role that the State will be called upon to play as a 
regulatory and supervisory agent and as a catalyst for institution-building 
in the various components of the financial system. 
(a) Financial regulation and supervision  
The crises that have been associated with financial liberalization 
processes have led to greater caution in the design and implementation of 
regulatory and supervisory systems and to a more accurate perception of 
the costs of systemic crises. At least 14 countries made fundamental 
changes in their regulatory and supervisory systems during the 1990s, 
and there is a widely held commitment to compliance with the Basle 
recommendations. On the other hand, there is a strong tendency to 
deregulate interest rates, lower entry barriers and reduce regulatory 
dirigisme in lending. To balance this out, greater powers have been given 
to supervisors, and financial oversight has been strengthened. Generally 
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speaking, the supervisory problems that remain have more to do with 
problems of implementation than with legislation. To improve this 
situation, supervisory bodies will have to be supplied with more public 
and human resources and given greater autonomy from political 
authorities. In terms of the allocation of public funds, it is worth pointing 
out that good financial supervision, insofar as it prevents systemic crises, 
is a highly profitable investment. 
Within the sphere of regulation, there are five areas that need to be 
strengthened.12 First, there is a sizeable vacuum in the regulations 
covering financial conglomerates. This problem has a number of aspects 
which will be analysed further on. Second, a high degree of concentration 
in the banking system is very costly. Banks that are too large may be 
prone to problems of moral hazard, in the sense that they are “too big to 
fail” and their managers may become lax if it is believed that these 
institutions enjoy some degree of implicit State insurance. Third, the 
presence of more foreign financial institutions increases the international 
correlation of systemic risks, since if a parent company fails, its 
subsidiaries and international agencies will be weakened and vice versa. 
Consequently, it is wise to discourage market entry by institutions whose 
parent companies’ home countries do not have a reliable supervisory 
system or have not consolidated their regulation of conglomerates. 
Fourth, the management of first-tier State banks should be reworked, and 
steps should be taken to ensure that market standards are used when 
rating their portfolios. It seems advisable to adopt regulatory and 
supervisory standards equivalent to those used in the private commercial 
banking system. This would entail strengthening the legal powers of bank 
supervisors and shielding the supervisory system from political pressure. 
Fifth, regulation and supervision of the credit, currency and maturity 
risks of commercial banks need to be strengthened. Since these risks stem 
from both micro- and macroeconomic conditions, there is a need, as was 
pointed out in chapter 2, to deploy prudential regulatory and supervisory 
instruments in a way that will avoid generating the procyclical 
macroeconomic effects that arise in this field when traditional approaches 
are used. 
When considering these five areas, there are a number of points 
that need to be made. The main task is the regulation of financial 
conglomerates. Generally speaking, the regulation of financial 
conglomerates is defined as a set of rules covering the operations of a 
business group that is active in a variety of financial industries, such as 
banking, securities, insurance and pensions, and that may have branched 
                                                 
12 These lines of reasoning are based on Held (1994), ECLAC (1998b, chapter XII), and 
Livacic and Sáez (2000). 
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out into manufacturing and commerce as well. This dimension of 
regulation has already been incorporated into some legal codes, as in El 
Salvador and Mexico, and to some extent in those of Ecuador and 
Venezuela. Almost without exception, however, these rules have yet to be 
implemented. 
This more comprehensive view of the regulation of conglomerates 
is not the only one that should serve as a basis for action in the region, 
however. There are also more obvious and clearly delimited shortcomings 
in the regulation of these conglomerates, such as the absence of integral, 
consolidated regulation and supervision of what could be called “banking 
sub-conglomerates”, whose activities are confined to financial 
intermediation (attraction and placement of financial resources). In 
practice, there are a variety of unsupervised bank-related agencies and 
mechanisms operating under legal provisions designed specifically to 
elude supervision. 
The most widespread mechanism of this type is unregulated 
offshore centres. Using such centres, a bank or its shareholders can create 
a separate financial entity in a different country that has few regulatory 
requirements, and then use that entity to account for some of the banking 
activities carried out in the country of origin. Bank secrecy provisions 
place such entities beyond the reach of the local supervisory body. In 
some countries this practice has taken on very substantial dimensions 
when measured as a percentage of duly recognized local banking activity. 
Thus, for example, during the banking crises in Venezuela (1994) and 
Ecuador (1998), it was discovered that a substantial proportion of banking 
activity was being accounted for by offshore subsidiaries.13 A similar 
situation occurred in Paraguay’s banking crisis of 1995. Another formula 
used to evade regulation and supervision is the creation of unregulated or 
very lightly regulated entities that are artificially “separated” from the 
bank by means of various subterfuges. Trust funds are the type of entity 
most commonly used for this purpose in a number of countries. A lack of 
regulation has led to crises in El Salvador, Guatemala and Paraguay, 
among others. 
With regard to the participation of foreign financial institutions in 
national markets, recent evidence shows that discriminatory practices in 
the issuance of bank charters or licences are costly. What is recommended 
here is that objective (non-discretionary) rules be introduced for new 
banking operations wishing to enter the market. Such rules should be 
based on the principles of solvency, fitness (ethical conduct, over and 
                                                 
13 To resolve these crises, the authorities of these countries extended State insurance 
coverage to these operations. 
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above strict definitions of legality) and financial experience, which have 
nothing to do with whether the parent company is local or foreign. The 
only additional requirement that should be used in respect of the entry of 
foreign businesses is the existence of reliable bank regulation and 
supervision in the parent company’s home country and, ideally, the 
negotiation of international cooperation agreements between the two 
countries’ supervisory authorities. 
Banking supervisors should also have the necessary powers to 
regulate the banking system’s degree of concentration. When banks are 
“too big to fail”, systemic risk increases and the potential effectiveness of 
monetary and exchange-rate policies in dealing with difficult economic 
circumstances is weakened, quite apart from the risk of monopoly 
practices. Since the nationality of banks makes no difference to the risk of 
concentration, the relevant provisions should not discriminate between 
domestic and foreign banks. 
Regulatory systems in the region also suffer from failings in the 
regulation of market (currency and interest-rate), country and liquidity 
risks. The most influential type of risk in the immediate term is currency 
risk, since a large percentage of financial assets are denominated in 
dollars (Argentina, Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador before dollarization), 
but the situation will depend on the direction taken by exchange-rate 
regimes in the region. Again, as banking markets increase in 
sophistication and the volume of longer-term operations expands, greater 
progress will have to be made in regulating the risks (interest-rate and 
maturity risks) inherent in these areas. 
The Latin American and Caribbean region has a particular need for 
adequate safeguards against liquidity risk, since if this type of risk is not 
dealt with satisfactorily it can quickly turn into solvency risk. Some 
countries have introduced innovative measures to address this issue (e.g., 
Chile’s regulation of maturity risk and Argentina’s imposition of liquidity 
requirements when a deposit is nearing maturity). 
In all of the world’s financial systems, however, the biggest 
financial risk is still credit risk. In the region, where products are less 
sophisticated than in the developed countries, the relative weight of credit 
risk is greater still. A growing number of countries have introduced 
regulations under which credit risk is to be evaluated using methods that 
project the borrowers’ ability to pay, but, in practice, default (i.e., the 
discovery of payment difficulties a posteriori) is still the most widely used 
procedure. In such cases supervision loses a large part of its effectiveness 
as a preventive tool and instead becomes an exercise in the measurement 
of financial problems after the event. 
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A similar problem that has been a factor in almost all Latin 
American banking crises has to do with the practice of extending loans to 
bank stakeholders. Since the 1980s, every country in the region has 
introduced regulations and legal provisions to deal with related-party 
lending. With few exceptions, however, their actual implementation has 
been quite limited, as there are serious difficulties in obtaining the 
information needed to detect such operations, and supervisors have 
lacked the necessary resources to keep up with the subterfuges employed 
for this purpose. What is more, existing legislation does not include the 
presumptive evidence laws that would provide supervisors with the 
powers they would need to apply the regulations effectively. 
While it is true that a great deal of unfinished business remains on 
the banking regulation and supervision agenda, the prospects for 
progress seem to have improved. The recent international crisis and the 
ongoing debate about a new international financial architecture have once 
again highlighted the need for adequate banking regulation and 
supervision (see chapter 2). It is interesting to note that the perception that 
a correlation exists among the systemic risks of different countries has 
prompted the international financial community to work to promote 
suitable systems of prudential regulation in line with internationally 
accepted recommendations.14 What is more, private banking institutions 
have welcomed and promoted these regulatory and supervisory schemes 
because they understand that they, too, benefit from stability in the 
financial system. The best known of the Basle recommendations is the one 
relating to capital adequacy. According to this recommendation, a 
financial institution’s total risk-weighted financial assets have a 
prudential limit which is determined by its capital and reserves. It is thus 
recognized that overlending entails an element of risk that threatens the 
stability of the financial system. Banking supervision also needs to be 
more active in overseeing and protecting against credit, currency and 
maturity risk and in demanding the timely establishment of provisions 
for those risks. 
The common aim of all these measures is to provide proper 
safeguards against systemic risk and help ensure that the payment chain 
works smoothly. To this end, ensuring proper compliance with financial 
contracts brings a range of benefits for saving and investment financing. 
Just as a credit operation involves the direct or indirect use of others’ 
savings by the borrower, subsequent repayments on this debt up to and 
including the point in time when it is extinguished will, in most cases, 
require an effort by the borrower to save. If the debt is not repaid, the 
                                                 
14 The application of international standards to banking regulations and supervision is also 
facilitating the internationalization of the banking system. 
Growth with stability 153 
 
borrower has not only ceased to contribute to national saving, but has also 
carried out an implicit expropriation of third-party savings. If the 
financial system is to function properly, an appropriate balance needs to 
be struck in terms of lenders’ rights, and abusive practices, whether on 
the part of borrowers or lenders, need to be prevented. 
First-tier State banking is a case that warrants special mention. In 
general, governments are more likely to recover only a portion of their 
direct financial investments, since collection is politically costly. It is 
therefore important for first-tier State banks to comply with the same 
regulatory, supervisory and ratings standards as private commercial 
banks or, if this is not possible, for a second-tier State banking mechanism 
to be used instead. 
(b) Capital market development 
Despite the region’s achievement of greater price stability, tighter 
fiscal discipline and better financial regulation, its capital markets have 
not taken on a greater role in lending funds to support local economic 
activity. During the 1990s, only four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico) posted steady growth in trading volumes on their capital 
markets, and even in these cases, the growth rates were well below those 
of the United States and Europe.15  Even more alarmingly, most of the 
countries’ capital markets have been shrinking, and the number of firms 
listed on their exchanges continues to decline (Dowers, Gómez-Acebo, 
and Masci, 2000). Thus, one of the tasks that will have to be accomplished 
in order to strengthen investment financing is the development of a deep, 
broad and efficient capital market. 
As capital markets deepen, new forms of financial intermediation 
are appearing that are not, in a strict sense, what is normally thought of as 
bank intermediation. The issuance of shares and debt instruments, the 
securitization of assets, leasing and factoring operations, the use of 
financial derivatives in hedging operations, and the growing participation 
of institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, and 
mutual, investment and venture capital funds) are just some of the many 
new mechanisms that have come into use. Much of this new activity, 
whose hallmark has been the creation of new agents and markets, has 
necessitated the emergence of a secondary market for “second-hand” 
transactions involving tradable assets, and this represents a new and 
potentially large source of liquidity for all kinds of agents. If these new 
                                                 
15 In 2000, Latin American stock markets’ capitalization averaged 25% of GDP, whereas the 
figure was 200% in the United States and 60% in Europe. Similar figures are recorded for 
firms listed on the exchange (see figure 1.11). 
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developments, and especially the creation of new agents and markets, 
take place in an orderly and stable fashion, the positive effects for national 
saving and development financing will become evident. 
The development of new forms of financial intermediation may or 
may not be linked to banking activity. For example, leasing and 
securitization operations are essentially alternative types of credit, and 
banks are becoming increasingly involved in supplying these products. 
Other activities, particularly those linked to institutional saving, such as 
pension fund management, stock brokering and insurance, do not 
necessarily have to be connected with banking as such. Universal banks, 
which are more common on the European continent, enable virtually all 
financial activities to be brought within the sphere of banking operations, 
with the aim here being to obtain the benefits of synergies in financial 
activity. The niche operations typically found in the United States, by 
contrast, seek specialization and aim to find more dynamic and flexible 
ways of responding to financial innovation. There is no way to determine 
the superiority of one system over the other, and indeed there are more 
and more points of convergence between the two. In either case, it is 
important to have proper supervision of the tangible and intangible assets 
shared between banks and their allied financial activities. As mentioned 
earlier, in order for these safeguards to work, there has to be a 
consolidated form of supervision of financial conglomerates, or at least of 
the subset of activities engaged in by banking consortia. 
If the dynamic innovation process being seen in the capital market 
is to be managed successfully, the focus should be on improving 
transparency, disclosure and governance in the handling of third-party 
resources. The common objective of all such efforts is the provision of 
adequate safeguards for ownership rights and confidence among 
minority stakeholders. For example, the main activity of institutional 
investors (insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds, etc.) is 
the management of third-party funds. For this activity to prosper, an act 
of faith is required on the part of the agents who hand over portions of 
their assets to be administered by others. Any perceived possibility that 
this trust might be abused by fund managers will discourage investors 
from participating and, incidentally, reduce the potential for channelling 
savings through these mechanisms. A suitable regulatory framework 
should perform a preventive function, rather than simply imposing 
sanctions once losses have been sustained. Consequently, regulations 
must provide for severe and effective penalties for the use of inside 
information and failures to resolve conflicts of interest properly. In 
addition, regulators should maintain strict accounting requirements. 
Other requirements should include regular, independent and reliable 
audits; the establishment of oversight committees; independent risk 
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assessments; separate accounting for fund managers’ own assets and 
third-party assets; and sufficient capital reserves to ensure that fund 
managers are solvent enough to safeguard the interests of fund 
contributors in the event of unforeseen contingencies or management 
error. 
The transparency which is so essential for the sound development 
of capital markets is just as important in the case of corporate assets. The 
development of an equity ownership structure may be hindered if the 
regulatory system is unable to defend the ownership rights of minority 
shareholders vis-à-vis the controlling shareholder. The regulations 
applied in this area should not, however, restrict the management 
capabilities of controlling shareholders, except insofar as is necessary to 
ensure that minority stakeholders have equal rights over the profits of the 
company. Corporate governance laws, which are constantly being 
updated in developed economies, should be designed with a view to 
enabling minority shareholders to carry out appropriate oversight and 
auditing of transactions with parties linked to the controlling shareholder. 
The sharp differences in market value between blocks of shares that 
provide a controlling interest and minority shareholdings are, by and 
large, a reflection of market failures and of a lack of corporate governance. 
This is particularly true at times when controlling interests are changing 
hands and strategic partners are being sought. What is recommended in 
this case is that corporate governance and takeover laws be reviewed and 
updated, as the region displays obvious and widespread shortcomings in 
this regard. The effect of sound regulations in this area is to reduce 
perceived risk and thus lower the cost of financing investment through 
the issuance of equities. A close and proper correlation between the 
economic benefits flowing to controlling and minority shareholders can 
also lead to increased participation by institutional investors in the 
ownership of firms in which they do not seek a management role, thus 
establishing a more direct link between productive activities and the 
supply of financial resources. 
The primacy of the ownership rights of investors over those of 
institutional fund managers and the equality of ownership rights 
(although not of management rights) between minority stakeholders and 
controlling shareholders are two aspects that must be given priority in a 
regulatory framework designed to promote the development of deeper 
national capital markets in the region. The same requirements apply to 
the creation of appropriate mechanisms for consolidated project 
financing, which are increasingly being used to finance productive 
investment megaprojects. 
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Two further requirements that are important for the proper 
development of capital markets are the provision of protection against 
inflation in financial contracts and incentives for risk absorption based on 
the use of financial derivatives. In the first case, the obvious solution is to 
encourage indexation of long-term financial instruments and contracts. The 
main objection to indexation is that it perpetuates the effects of temporary 
inflationary shocks, but the benefits of a longer horizon for contracts and 
decision-making, particularly in the financial sphere, greatly outweigh the 
costs associated with indexation. The experience of the 1990s shows that, 
even in highly indexed economies, consistent macroeconomic policy is 
capable of reducing inflation to satisfactory levels. Inflation uncertainty, by 
contrast, can raise the cost of long-term credit to the point where it becomes 
prohibitive. 
Furthermore, the orderly development of a financial derivatives 
market makes it possible to deal with other risks inherent in financial 
operations, to the benefit of both investors and borrowers. Clearly, 
however, it is important (particularly for the purpose of determining capital 
requirements) for the accounts of derivatives brokers and risk arbitrageurs 
to reflect the assets and liabilities implicit in their operations clearly and 
transparently. Large-scale transactions by undercapitalized intermediaries 
give rise to undesirable risk correlations that encourage herd behaviour 
among financial investors. This is an area in which recent international 
experience and know-how offer useful innovations in the form of more 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory mechanisms that can give capital 
markets greater stability. In the final analysis, long-term stability and 
sound, transparent management of price, maturity, interest-rate and 
currency risks, among others, are necessary ingredients for the successful 
development of capital markets in the region. 
(c) Development banking 
Views on the role of development banking have changed substantially 
in the last 50 years (see box 4.1). In recent decades, these banks have been the 
object of a great deal of criticism on the following counts: (i) interventionist 
and unproductive management of scarce financial resources which lacks any 
clear or transparent rationale based on economic and social considerations; 
(ii) a tendency to finance development institutions by drawing primarily on 
fiscal and multilateral sources that carry a high opportunity cost (higher still 
in the case of budget deficits); (iii) poor risk management, which in the long 
run leads to crises that impose high financial costs on the State; (iv) 
management of long-term resources based on short-term political and social 
criteria; and (v) inadequate collection policies that have often resulted in 
unacceptably low loan recovery rates. 
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Box 4.1 
CHANGING VIEWS OF THE ROLE 
OF DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
For many years after the Second World War, the role of 
development banks in supporting growth and development was undisputed. 
The reconstruction of Europe and Japan, which, from a political standpoint, 
was deemed too important to be postponed, required long-term financing for 
capital formation. Most economists agreed that private long-term lending 
institutions and markets were inefficient in the industrialized countries 
hardest hit by the war and virtually non-existent in less developed countries. 
Proposals for the creation and expansion of development banks were based 
both on the Keynesian paradigm and on other more orthodox approaches. 
For example, it was argued that financial underdevelopment led to a scarcity 
of saving instruments, with the result that potential savings either remained 
idle, in the form of hoarded funds, or were simply spent on consumption. 
Lack of financial development therefore translated into low levels of loanable 
funds and less investment. 
In the 1970s, this picture changed significantly. In the political 
sphere, Europe and Japan had recovered completely, and the problems of 
less developed countries were seen as being important only in the context of 
the cold war. At the theoretical level, as a result of the development of 
financial theory based on the hypothesis of market efficiency, the State’s role 
in financing investment was increasingly called into question. According to 
this view, low savings rates and low levels of financing for investment were 
associated with “financial repression”; that is, with policies that included 
limits on interest rates, selective credit and other types of government 
intervention in financial markets. 
This theory held that low (and even negative) real interest rates 
discouraged saving. The consequences were: (i) a scarcity of private 
financing for investment, which forced governments to use selective credit 
policies, with development banks serving as the primary instrument for their 
implementation; (ii) the influencing of public credit by political factors, which 
made the allocation of the scarce credit available inefficient and resulted in 
low long-term growth; and (iii) the inability of governments to finance their 
deficits, which led to inflationary financing. 
In the 1980s, this view predominated among multilateral agencies, 
which showed an increasing tendency to include financial liberalization as 
one of the conditions required of countries during the debt crisis. In the 
1990s, most of the countries of the region adopted this strategy, which, in 
addition to the deregulation and liberalization of their financial systems, and 
in some cases of their capital accounts, also called for specific measures to 
scale back the role of public financial institutions, including development 
banks (ALIDE, 1999). 
(continued) 
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Box 4.1 (conclusion) 
Nevertheless, these reforms have not only failed to achieve 
significant progress in building up savings rates, but have also increased the 
region’s dependency on external financing. What is more, openness to 
international financial markets has not yet resulted in the further 
development of national capital markets. In addition, a number of sectors, 
such as small and medium-sized enterprises, construction of public housing 
and technology-related firms, still lack access to the scant supply of private 
financing. In view of this situation, some authors and institutions have 
reconsidered previously-held positions and have turned their attention to the 
role which public development institutions could play in breaking the vicious 
circle of low investment, low growth and low savings rates. For example, in a 
well-known report, the World Bank (1993) acknowledged that development 
banks and other public lending agencies had played a key role in the 
achievement of high investment-led growth rates in some Asian countries. 
More recently, a report prepared by the United Nations (1999) supported this 
view and highlighted the role of development banks in promoting growth. 
Nevertheless, the benefits of good development banking are also 
substantial. First, for private financial institutions, the transaction costs of 
evaluating and financing smaller companies are high, and this results in a 
tendency towards the concentration of lending. Second, while the 
resources of development banks might be channelled into higher-risk 
businesses and agents, the risk diversification afforded by their large 
number of borrowers tends to reduce portfolio risk. Third, development 
banking is often the first step in the financial history of small and new 
clients, who can then “graduate” to the private market. Fourth, because of 
the instability of international financial flows, larger firms with better risk 
ratings tend to borrow on the international market when capital is in 
ample supply and then return to the national market when credit 
becomes tighter. This tendency to move in and out of national financial 
markets has made the supply of financing for companies that lack access 
to international markets highly unstable. Development banking provides 
them with a steadier source of financing, thereby partially insulating them 
from cyclical fluctuations. Lastly, owing to the higher level of risk and a 
lack of long-term deposits, national financial markets may offer a 
suboptimal volume of long-term credit, which exposes investors that 
cannot draw on longer-term external credits to maturity risk and exposes 
those that can to currency risk. 
The criticisms made of development banks and the arguments 
made in their favour are equally valid, and all of them are supported by 
historical evidence. Is it possible to design development banks in such a 
way as to maximize their advantages and remove the drawbacks that 
have given rise to valid criticisms of their past performance? In the view 
of ECLAC, such a combination is feasible, appropriate and necessary, 
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since most of the criticisms made of development banks could be obviated 
by a good institutional design. The essential point is that a financial 
system that manages risks in accordance with market criteria and that is 
subject to appropriately stringent regulation and supervision has a bias 
against the more “expensive” and higher-risk agents. The introduction of 
instruments such as leasing operations, securitization and the creation of 
venture capital funds can partially offset this bias, but it is clearly not 
enough. There are no natural incentives in the market for the provision of 
banking services to informal activities, small farm owners or, more 
generally, small and medium-sized enterprises, and this has major social 
and economic costs. Incentives for the development of long-term credit 
segments and segments oriented towards financing innovative activities 
may also be inadequate. An appropriate development strategy needs to 
focus not only on equity in the distribution of the benefits of growth, but 
also on equity in opportunities for making a productive contribution to 
the development process. Access to financing is an inherent part of this 
second component of equitable development. In addition, access to long-
term credit is necessary in order to achieve high levels of investment. At 
the same time, however, the system has to protect itself against excessive 
risk, which has a high economic cost, and against abuses by borrowers 
whose behaviour is distorted by the perception that they enjoy some 
degree of “political insurance” if they fail to meet their financial 
obligations. 
To reconcile these objectives, a first line of policy should focus on 
the need for constant oversight of development banks’ portfolio risk. The 
market has an important role to play in this connection. This could be 
done, for example, if a development bank were set up as an independent 
off-budget institution (as a State enterprise, for example), were not 
covered by government third-party deposit insurance, and were subject to 
regular rating of its portfolio risk by outside agencies. These three 
components have the common feature that they make portfolio risk 
transparent without biasing its assessment by incorporating the sovereign 
risk of State financing. In addition, they would make it necessary for 
proper accounting standards to be followed when competing for private 
funds. 
A second line of action should focus on the improvement of 
collection policies. In order for this to happen, as pointed out earlier, first-
tier development banks should be organized like commercial banks and 
should be subject to exactly the same regulation and supervision as 
private banks are. This would improve the transparency of their 
commercial operations, force them to apply stricter collection policies and 
permit the financial effects of short-term political pressures to be rapidly 
detected. 
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Perhaps the best collection policy for a development bank would 
entail its organization as a second-tier bank. The targeting difficulties 
experienced by such banks would, however, make it necessary to improve 
their channelling mechanisms and the design of the subsidies used to 
pursue their social objectives. Appropriate targeting may require a 
combination of interest-rate subsidies, partial subsidies on credit 
insurance premiums or the operation of partial guarantee funds, subsidies 
for credit ratings by first-tier intermediaries and training in project 
management and design for potential borrowers. Of course, these 
subsidies and transfers would have to be based on a proper social and 
economic assessment. It is of equal importance, however, that they be 
well designed, that they operate transparently, that the associated fiscal 
cost be explicit and, ideally, that their financing come directly from duly 
budgeted public funds. An interesting example of this approach is 
provided by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, the German 
reconstruction credit bank, which is independently managed but can 
provide subsidies of this type up to the funding limit set each year in the 
federal budget. The main advantages of funding subsidies out of the fiscal 
budget, apart from greater transparency, is that development banks can 
then generate operating profits that will build up their long-term 
resources and can turn to the market to obtain additional funds. If there 
were no State guarantees for privately obtained funds, development 
banks would be obliged to manage their portfolio risk better and improve 
their collection policies. 
Lastly, development banks should concentrate their short-term 
activities on financing investment and working capital for firms that 
would not normally have access to private financing. In the medium term, 
they should be run in a way designed to avoid building up a permanent, 
stable customer base. In fact, one of their management objectives should 
be to initiate the financial history of customers who can then turn to 
private finance once they have “graduated”. As part of this effort, the 
financing of debt reschedulings and the capitalization of interest should 
be exceptions to the rule that are approved on a case by case basis, insofar 
as possible without public guarantees or subsidies. The development of 
leveraged long-term credit mechanisms in the development banking 
system should form part of wider efforts to develop long-term segments 
in national capital markets. 
The combination of credit schemes and State subsidies in areas of 
high social profitability, which has been analysed here in relation to the 
activities of development banks, may be applicable to other sectors as 
well. In fact, one of the areas in which this model has been used the most 
in the region is low-cost housing (see chapter 1). There are good reasons 
for the State to be involved in this area, since the private financial system, 
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working on its own, has no incentive to offer the kinds of sums, 
maturities or interest rates that would accurately reflect the social return 
on the provision of low-cost housing. The State, by contrast, can and 
should assess this social return and, on the basis of that appraisal, allocate 
fiscal resources accordingly. Its participation in this field may be based on 
various combinations of direct subsidization of low-cost housing, interest 
rates and/or previous saving with indirect subsidies provided through 
partial credit insurance, in cases where second-tier financing is being 
provided, or mortgage life, fire or unemployment insurance. The scale of 
these subsidies may differ depending on the economic circumstances of 
the households concerned. The main thing is to have reasonably certain 
knowledge of how much public funding is being used for these subsidies 
so that supplementary credit can be offered on acceptable conditions for 
intermediation through the market. 
This model can also be applied to sustainable development 
financing and support for retooling initiatives in crisis-hit regions or 
sectors. Financial support for high-technology activities can also be 
provided using this model or, alternatively, can take the form of venture 
capital put up by development banks or financial corporations involved 
in the relevant projects, preferably as minority stakeholders. Means of 
providing support for innovative export-oriented activities have already 
been examined in the preceding chapter. Finding ways of encouraging 
private venture capital institutions to become increasingly involved in 
providing supplementary funding must, of course, be a priority in all 
these areas. 
In all these fields of activity, State subsidies should be based on the 
principles of transparency and competition for scarce resources, and 
hidden, untargeted and unassessed subsidies must be kept to a minimum. 
The clear, legally institutionalized distinction between public subsidies 
and financial intermediation is a basic principle for the proper 
management of public funds. By contrast, the subsidies implicit in a poor 
collection policy or in non-transparent financial risks are simply a 
reflection of design flaws that lead to a socially costly leakage of public 
funds. State guarantees for loan reschedulings or interest capitalization 
are specific examples of poor insurance or collection policies. Rigorous 
compliance with financial contracts is the basis of any efficient financial 
system and, in the long run, more funding can be provided at a lower cost 
when the interests of lenders are protected. It needs to be pointed out just 
as forcefully, however, that because of the concentrative bias associated 
with this principle of good financial practice, the State has to be involved. 
To avoid repeating the errors made by development banking in the past, 
the key recommendation here is that the fiscal costs of linked subsidies 
and portfolio risk be made as transparent as possible in cases where the 
162 ECLAC 
State decides, for legitimate social reasons, to take a guiding role in financial 
activity. 
(d) Institution-building as a financial development policy 
Financial systems are prone to market failures and, in other cases, tend 
to lack certain markets, segments or components. Institutional design and 
development policies therefore have a key role to play in channelling saving 
into productive investment. Experiences in countries of the region and in more 
advanced nations have demonstrated that the spontaneous development of 
private financial systems is not necessarily well structured or complete. In fact, 
there are gaps in important market segments that can be closed up only by 
deliberate government action, and such action is therefore necessary in order to 
strengthen investment financing. 
One example of this is the boost given to the development of the 
housing credit segment by the introduction, on the government’s initiative, of 
mortgage-backed securitized financial assets. Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae16 
were originally a single housing mortgage institution that was created in the 
United States in 1934 as part of that country’s economic recovery plan. In 1970, 
Ginnie Mae introduced the world’s first securitized asset to provide housing 
finance, thereby creating an entirely new market. Around the same time, the 
government withdrew from Fannie Mae, giving a strong boost to private 
participation in a market that had previously been developed on the public 
sector’s initiative. As another example, Chile’s quite well developed mortgage 
credit system is the result of its creation of an explicitly indexed unit of account 
that protects financial savings from inflation and makes it feasible to offer 
longer maturities.17 Thanks to the country’s 1981 pension system reform 
programme and the banking system’s return to solvency following the banking 
reforms instituted in the wake of the 1982-1986 financial crisis, the development 
of institutional saving agents has resulted in the creation of a large market for 
long-term financing based on securitized mortgage instruments. In both cases, 
public policy was a key factor in the creation of the institutional structure 
needed to deal with crucial aspects of financing for activities requiring long 
horizons. 
The first step is to achieve sufficient macroeconomic stability to permit 
the terms of financial saving to be lengthened and to create instruments that 
will serve this purpose. The second, especially in less developed systems, is to 
                                                 
16 The official names of these institutions are the Government National Mortgage 
Association and the Federal National Mortgage Association, but they are generally 
known by the nicknames used here. 
17 Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay have also frequently used indexed financial assets to 
provide housing finance, but they have also employed other mechanisms. 
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create institutional saving agents capable of attracting long-term savings 
(pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds, etc.). It should be 
borne in mind that such agents generally behave like financial investors i.e., 
they do not become directly involved in the operations of the real investment 
project because experience has shown that this is not an area in which they 
have comparative advantages. This situation poses three new challenges: to 
control the level of risk, to absorb risk and to cover risk. In some cases, each of 
these functions is performed separately by a specialized institution. 
Risk assessment and control is usually performed by a first-tier 
institution which applies standardized procedures for rating direct investors 
and is able to reduce its portfolio risk through diversification. This portfolio is 
backed by borrowers’ capacity to pay and, in the case of housing, is secured by 
mortgages. This first-tier institution consolidates the different individual loans 
and offers them on the market as a single meet their payments) remains with 
the first-tier institution, since it possesses comparative advantages in the 
assessment of this risk, whereas the financial risk (the chance that future 
interest rates will differ from current rates and that the value of the portfolio 
assets will fluctuate) is transferred to the financial investor. In both cases, 
regulatory provisions exist which include risk-absorbing capital and 
provisioning requirements to safeguard the intermediary-investor’s solvency. 
Mechanisms for risk coverage are another essential institutional design 
component that will facilitate the development of a long-term credit market. 
Examples include guarantee funds and credit insurance, which are geared 
mainly towards covering commercial risk. Financial risk can also be covered in 
a deep secondary market through the use of specialized hedging instruments. 
In other cases, the creation of an appropriate regulatory framework may 
not suffice to provide access to credit for small businesses or for investment in 
innovative projects. A lack of guarantees or collateral usually limits SMEs’ 
access to credit, while in the case of innovative activities, an excessive 
reluctance to assume risk tends to hinder real investment. Public-sector support 
may take various forms, but its objective is invariably to limit exposure. The 
establishment of public/private guarantee funds and the subsidization of 
credit insurance premiums are tools that may be used to cover and absorb 
smaller firms’ credit risk. Institutions such as venture capital associations 
formed by both public and private investors can be useful sources of 
investment financing. As discussed earlier, public action by such institutions as 
development agencies or banks may be necessary in cases where private agents 
have difficulty in gauging and covering the risks involved. The key 
institutional design components, however, are modalities of intervention and 
regulation that will pave the way for the development of all segments of a 
financial market by playing a complementary role and serving as a catalyst in 
cases where a financial system’s own evolution does not lead to the 
development of long-term segments. 
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Annex 
Information sources for measuring 
capital flows to the region 
The two main sources of information on international capital flows 
received by the region that have been used in this document are the data 
compiled by ECLAC based on the fifth edition of the International 
Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Manual and World Bank data on 
aggregate net flows. The sources for the tables and figures contained in 
the document are indicated in table A.1. 
The main differences between the above two information sources 
are the following: 
(a) Short-term capital: included in the ECLAC series but not in the 
World Bank’s statistics. 
(b) Compensatory financing (other than IMF credits): included in 
the World Bank series but not in the ECLAC data. 
(c) Official transfers: included in the World Bank series but not in 
the ECLAC data. 
(d) Errors and omissions: included in the ECLAC series, where 
they are assumed to represent capital flight; not included in the World 
Bank data. 
(e) Number of countries: the ECLAC statistics refer to 19 countries 
and those of the World Bank to 29. 
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(f) Foreign direct investment: net inflows (outflows) are included 
in the ECLAC data; the World Bank series include inflows only. 
Table A.1 
A. INFORMATION SOURCES FOR SELECTED TABLES 







1.1 Structure of import financing •  
1.2 Structure of current account deficit •  
1.3 Contribution of external long-term financing, by groups 
 of countries 
 • 
1.4 Stock of debt with private lenders, 1999  • 
1.5 Latin America and the Caribbean: sources of external 
 financing 
 • 
3.4 Net official development assistance received by Latin 
 America and the Caribbean 
 • 
3.5 Net long-term debt flows, by source  • 
3.6 Latin America and the Caribbean: average terms and 
 conditions of new commitments 
 • 
3.8 Components of external debt of Latin American 
 countries classified as poor 
 • 
3.9 Net present value of official debt prior to the HIPC 












1.1 Latin America and the Caribbean: current account and long-
 term flows 
 • 
1.2 Latin America and the Caribbean: net capital inflows and 
 resource transfers 
•  
1.3 Latin America and the Caribbean: international bond issues • • 
1.4 Latin America and the Caribbean: used of IMF credit  • 
1.6 Latin America and the Caribbean: key macroeconomic 
 indicators 
•  
1.8 Latin America and the Caribbean: key external indicators •  
3.1 Latin America: long-term debt flows, by source  • 
 
Based on the information contained in table A.2 (World Bank 
statistics on net inflows to the region, together with ECLAC data on 
autonomous capital inflows and other components of the balance of 
payments), figure A.1 gives net flows for 1990-1999 as calculated using 
data from both sources. Except in 1992, calculations based on World Bank 
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data show a higher level of flows and steadier growth than do 
calculations performed using the methodology employed by ECLAC. If 
the unadjusted series are compared, the difference between the two 
ranges from a minimum of US$ 4.6 billion in 1993 to a maximum of US$ 
74.5 billion in 1998. Once they have been adjusted for purposes of 
comparability, the differential narrows to a minimum of US$ 4.6 billion in 
1994 and a maximum of US$ 34.2 billion in 1999. 
The information contained in table A.2 makes the data 
more comparable thanks to the following adjustments in the ECLAC 
series: (i) the exclusion of short-term capital for the last three years; (ii) the 
inclusion of compensatory financing (other than IMF credits); (iii) the 
exclusion of errors and omissions; and (iv) the exclusion of capital 
outflows in the form of outward foreign direct investment. In the case of 
figures A.2 and A.3, the difference between the two information sources 
for the first half of the decade is attributable to the fact that the ECLAC 
data do not include compensatory financing; in the second half, the 
differentials are primarily due to the fact that the ECLAC series include 
other net short-term flows. Discrepancies caused by the different number 
of countries covered by the two and the times at which the data are 
updated persist, of course. 
The World Bank statistics refer only to transactions involving long-
term liabilities, i.e., total disbursements less amortization, and do not 
include outward direct investment (the acquisition of assets abroad by 
developing-country residents). This accounts for the sizeable difference 
between the net long-term flows given in the World Bank series and the 
figures for net external financing that have been calculated on the basis of 
the balance of payments using the ECLAC methodology. Other causes of 
discrepancies include short-term flows, delays in updating the 
information, differences in reporting procedures, the use of cash-basis or 
accrual-basis accounting, accounting difficulties associated with derived 
figures and a shortage of data on off-shore financial centres.1 
                                                          
1 The World Bank also notes other limitations.  Firstly, its statistics on private flows to the 
countries are annual figures and therefore do not reflect sudden changes in market 
financing. Secondly, the quality of the estimates for the most recent years varies 
considerably from category to category.  The available information on net and gross 
official flows is quite reliable, as are the data on disbursements in bond markets and 
those of commercial banks.  Debt amortization payments are computed on the basis of 
the terms and conditions of the relevant contracts, even though actual payments may 
differ.  It is particularly difficult to estimate flows of equity investment since, although 
information on stock purchases in international markets is available, direct purchases on 
developing countries’ equity markets are estimated on the basis of trading reports 










NET CAPITAL FLOWS, BY INFORMATION SOURCE 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 b 
World Bank 
(Long term) 
           
Aggregate: net flow of resources 21,787 30,998 35,164 65,651 61,744 75,347 99,400 113,779 141,985 116,375 102,379 
ECLAC-IMF 
(Short and long term) 
           
(1) Autonomous capital (I+II) -7,497 22,393 48,588 61,051 41,773 29,051 66,457 84,600 65,597 41,843 68,100 
 Balance on financial account (I) -7,621 21,377 48,646 64,867 47,647 34,989 71,369 89,779 74,516 46,858 67,021 
 (2) Errors and omissions 124 1,016 -59 -3,816 -5,874 -5,938 -4,911 -5,178 -8,919 -5,015 1,079 
 (3) Outward foreign investment -1,067 -1,359 -1,913 -2,757 -3,729 -4,226 -3,169 -7,898 -8,976 -8,444 -8,610 
 (4) Short-term capital a        -21,154 -31,597 -20,253 -7,497 
(5) Compensatory financing 























            
Adjusted series (1)-(2)-(3)-(4)+(5) 16,471 36,588 59,673 73,511 57,118 56,337 75,068 118,837 121,059 82,186 80,406 
a
 Official statistics for seven countries. 
b
 Preliminary estimates. 
Note:  ECLAC uses information compiled on the basis of the fifth edition of the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, which has the following characteristics: 
 
– It includes short- and long-term autonomous capital. 
– Foreign direct investment includes inflows; outward foreign investment is deducted. 
– It does not include exceptional financing or IMF credits, which form part of the global balance. 
– It does not include official or private transfers; these transactions are entered as current and capital transfers on the current account. 
– It includes errors and omissions, most of which are some form of capital flight. 
– Portfolio investment swaps are deducted from equity investment. 
 
The ECLAC regional aggregate includes 19 countries; the ECLAC figures are more up to date. 
 
The definition of net resource flows used by the World Bank includes the following elements: 
 
– Long-term capital is included; short-term capital is not. 
– Foreign direct investment includes inflows only; outward foreign investment is not deducted. 
– Exceptional financing is included. 
– Grants and donations are included. 
– Errors and omissions are not included. 
– Portfolio investment swaps are not deducted from equity investment. 
– The regional aggregate includes 29 countries. 
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On this basis and as is indicated in table A.1, ECLAC figures 
compiled in accordance with the fifth edition of the IMF Balance of 
Payments Manual have been used to assess the volatility of short-term 
flows as part of an analysis of this factor and how it relates to economic 
policy management. World Bank series have been used to examine the 
structure and behaviour of net long-term flows over time and to classify 
most of the countries into three groups based on their per capita GDP. 
Figure A.1 
NET CAPITAL FLOWS, BY INFORMATION SOURCE 
(Unadjusted series) 
a
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Figure A.2 
CORRECTION OF SERIES, BY SOURCEa 
a
 Figures compiled by ECLAC on the basis of IMF data adjusted for outward investment, short-term 
capital, errors and omissions and compensatory financing. 
b
 Preliminary figures. 
Figure A.3 
DIFFERENCES IN NET RESOURCE FLOWS, BY SOURCE AND ADJUSTMENT 
a










































Adjusted for ourtward investment, short-term capital, and errors and omissions, which are included in ECLAC and IMF
figures but not in those of the World Bank
Adjusted for outward investment, short-term capital, errors and omissions, and compensatory financing, which are included
in World Bank figures but not in those of ECLAC or IMF
